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Joy in looking and comprehending is nature‘s most beautiful gift. 
(Albert Einstein) 
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Abstract (Italian) 
 
Alla luce del crescente interesse verso le complesse dinamiche che uniscono 
inestricabilmente i concetti di legge e linguaggio, questo lavoro mira ad osservare tali 
dinamiche in un particolare evento comunicativo, ovvero un processo con giuria 
popolare. Più specificatamente, viene analizzato il caso California vs Westerfield, 
svoltosi in California nel 2002. Lo studio si basa in particolare sull‘osservazione dei 
processi comunicativi che avvengono tra professionisti del mondo legale (in particolare 
giudice ed avvocati) e i giurati, che per definizione non possiedono una specifica 
conoscenza in ambito giuridico.  
La relazione tra esperti e non-esperti in un processo è inoltre determinata dalla 
peculiarità che da un lato i professionisti detengono una posizione vantaggiosa in 
termini di potere comunicativo e di conoscenze specifiche, ma al contempo il potere 
decisionale è ascritto esclusivamente ai giurati. Lo scopo primario è quello di giungere 
ad una migliore comprensione della complessa natura delle tecniche e delle strategie 
discorsive che emergono nella relazione tra professionisti e non in questo specifico 
evento. Dal punto di vista delle dinamiche comunicative i giurati sembrano assumere un 
ruolo di passivi spettatori dell‘evento che viene loro presentato e la relazione tra diversi 
partecipanti è caratterizzata da un‘asimmetrica distribuzione dei turni e delle possibilità 
di intervento. Tale relazione è determinata da specifiche pratiche e restrizioni 
procedurali di un evento che è per definizione altamente istituzionalizzato. Al contempo 
però l‘analisi prende in considerazione le molteplici sfumature che definiscono queste 
dinamiche e le varie possibilità che i giurati possiedono per intervenire in modo più 
attivo nel processo, in particolare alla luce dei recenti sviluppi procedurali.  
Il lavoro osserva l‘ibridità del linguaggio usato in tribunale, adottando diverse 
prospettive. Innanzitutto si studia la complessa relazione che esiste tra la modalità 
scritta e quella orale durante diverse fasi del processo. L‘ibridità è anche analizzata dal 
punto di vista della commistione di diversi stili e registri. 
Inoltre, lo studio osserva se e in che modo le caratteristiche che vengono generalmente 
attribuite al linguaggio legale, quali la presenza di lessico altamente specializzato, di 
strutture sintattiche complesse e di un registro molto formale, emergono in questo 
specifico tipo di processo. 
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Particolare attenzione è dedicata all‘osservazione delle modalità attraverso le quali 
specifici concetti giuridici vengono illustrati ai giurati in base ai diversi scopi 
comunicativi. Diversi tipi di tensioni vengono osservati all‘interno di questo contesto, 
quali la giustapposizione di tecnicismi e colloquialismi, o il conflitto tra il desiderio di 
sensazionalismo e la necessità di muoversi all‘interno di un quadro standardizzato e 
caratterizzato da specifici vincoli procedurali.  
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Abstract (English) 
 
Given the increasing interest in the complex dynamics that inextricably combine the 
concepts of law and language, this work aims to examine these dynamics focusing on a 
particular communicative event, namely a trial by jury. More specifically, the case 
under scrutiny is California vs Westerfield, which was tried in California in 2002. The 
study is based on the observation of the communicative processes taking place between 
professionals (specifically, judges and lawyers) and jurors, who by definition do not 
possess any specific legal knowledge. 
The relationship between experts and non-experts in a trial is also determined by the 
peculiarity that professionals assumes an advantageous position in terms of 
communicative power and specialized knowledge, while the decisional power is 
ascribed exclusively to the jury. The primary goal of this work is to reach a better 
understanding of the complex nature of the techniques and discursive strategies that 
emerge in the communicative relationship between professionals and laymen in this 
particular event. From a communicative perspective, the jurors seem to assume the role 
of passive spectators, and the relationship between different participants is characterized 
by an asymmetric distribution of turns and limited active intervention. These dynamics 
are determined by the specific practices and procedural restrictions of an event that is by 
definition highly institutionalized. At the same time, however, the analysis takes into 
account the many nuances that define these dynamics and the various possibilities that 
the jurors have to intervene more actively in the process, particularly in the light of 
recent procedural developments.  
The work aims to observe the hybridity of the language used in court, adopting different 
perspectives. First, it investigates the complex relationship that emerges between 
written and oral communication in different phases of the trial. Hybridity is also 
observed from the point of view of the combination of different styles and registers. The 
study also examines to what extent the characteristics that are generally attributed to 
legal language, such as the presence of highly specialized vocabulary, complex 
syntactic structures and a very formal register emerge in this specific context.   
Particular attention is devoted to the observation of the specific strategies adopted to 
illustrate legal ideas and concepts to the jurors in light of the speaker‘s various 
communicative purposes. Several kinds of tensions are observed within this context, 
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such as the juxtaposition of colloquialisms and jargon, and the conflict between the 
desire for sensationalism and the need to move within a standardized framework that is 
characterized by specific procedural constraints.  
13 
 
Table of contents  
Declaration........................................................................................................................ 5 
Acknowledgments ............................................................................................................ 7 
Abstract (Italian) ............................................................................................................... 9 
Abstract (English) ........................................................................................................... 11 
Table of contents ............................................................................................................ 13 
Detailed table of contents ............................................................................................... 15 
Introduction .................................................................................................................... 19 
1. Investigating legal language ....................................................................................... 25 
2. Research framework ................................................................................................... 61 
3. Communication processes in jury trials...................................................................... 91 
4. Analysis: the David Westerfield trial ....................................................................... 121 
5. Conclusions .............................................................................................................. 209 
References .................................................................................................................... 223 
Appendix 1 ................................................................................................................... 257 
Appendix 2 ................................................................................................................... 263 
 
14 
 
15 
 
Detailed table of contents  
Declaration........................................................................................................................ 5 
Acknowledgments ............................................................................................................ 7 
Abstract (Italian) ............................................................................................................... 9 
Abstract (English) ........................................................................................................... 11 
Table of contents ............................................................................................................ 13 
Detailed table of contents ............................................................................................... 15 
Introduction .................................................................................................................... 19 
1. Investigating legal language ....................................................................................... 25 
1.1 The inextricable interrelation between law and language .................................... 25 
1.1.1 Legal vs ordinary language............................................................................ 26 
1.1.2 Issues of institutionalization, authorization and appropriation ...................... 28 
1.2 Defining legal language ........................................................................................ 29 
1.2.1 Beyond the language of lawyers .................................................................... 30 
1.2.2 The notion of legal language......................................................................... 31 
1.3 Towards a taxonomy of legal language? .............................................................. 33 
1.3.1 Suggested categorizations.............................................................................. 33 
1.3.2 The complexity of legal language categories ................................................ 35 
1.3.3 Interdiscursivity ............................................................................................. 41 
1.4 Functions and speech acts..................................................................................... 44 
1.4.1 The functional nature of legal texts ............................................................... 44 
1.4.2 Speech acts and legal language ..................................................................... 46 
1.5 Researching law and language ............................................................................. 49 
1.5.1 Defining the field ........................................................................................... 49 
1.5.2 Research perspectives .................................................................................... 51 
1.5.3 Exploring courtroom language ...................................................................... 53 
1.5.4 Describing the language of the law ............................................................... 55 
16 
 
2. Research framework ................................................................................................... 61 
2.1 Research interest and rationale ............................................................................. 61 
2.2 Material and data .................................................................................................. 62 
2.3 Theoretical background ........................................................................................ 65 
2.3.1 The notion of discourse ................................................................................. 65 
2.3.2 Discourse in/as/and context? ......................................................................... 68 
2.3.3 Social context and context models ................................................................ 70 
2.3.4 Analyzing discourse ...................................................................................... 73 
2.4 Methodological framework .................................................................................. 77 
2.4.1 Discourse analytical approach ....................................................................... 79 
2.4.2 Critical discourse analysis ............................................................................. 81 
2.4.2.1 Critiques of CDA ........................................................................................ 83 
2.4.2.2 CDA and courtroom discourses .................................................................. 85 
2.4.3 Computer-assisted analysis............................................................................ 87 
2.4.4 Methodological concluding remarks ............................................................. 89 
3. Communication processes in jury trials...................................................................... 91 
3.1 The legal system ................................................................................................... 91 
3.2 The jury system .................................................................................................... 93 
3.3 Jury trials: criticism .............................................................................................. 95 
3.3.1 Issues of fairness, impartiality and representativeness .................................. 96 
3.3.2 Issues of competency ..................................................................................... 99 
3.4 The procedure ..................................................................................................... 101 
3.5 The communicative complexity of a jury trial ................................................... 105 
3.5.1 Emerging Asymmetries ............................................................................... 106 
3.6 Narrative structures of a jury trial....................................................................... 109 
3.6.1 Story framing and construction ................................................................... 110 
17 
 
3.6.2 Narrativism .................................................................................................. 112 
3.6.3 Competing stories ........................................................................................ 115 
3.7 The hybridity of courtroom language ................................................................. 116 
4. Analysis: the David Westerfield trial ....................................................................... 121 
4.1 The case .............................................................................................................. 121 
4.2 The trial............................................................................................................... 123 
4.3 Jury selection: who will be the audience? .......................................................... 125 
4.4 Jury instruction:  what should the audience do? ................................................. 127 
4.4.1 Jury instruction as a multi-phase ................................................................. 130 
4.4.2 Humor in court............................................................................................. 131 
4.4.3 Issues in instructing the jurors ..................................................................... 136 
4.4.4 Judge-jurors interaction and knowledge asymmetries................................. 138 
4.5 Opening statements: the story begins ................................................................. 142 
4.5.1 Narrativism in opening statements .............................................................. 144 
4.5.2 Engaging storytelling ................................................................................... 150 
4.5.3 Using Wmatrix for comparing stories ......................................................... 158 
4.5.4 The quest for clarity and simplicity ............................................................. 162 
4.6 Examination: the plot thickens ........................................................................... 165 
4.6.1 The question-answer model of narration ..................................................... 167 
4.6.2 Expert knowledge at trial ............................................................................. 170 
4.7 Closing arguments: the end of the story ............................................................. 173 
4.7.1 Accommodating legal knowledge ............................................................... 174 
4.7.2 Metaphors in court ....................................................................................... 177 
4.7.3 Concrete images for abstract principles: the case of ‗reasonable doubt‘ .... 181 
4.7.4 Explaining science ....................................................................................... 193 
4.7.5 Law, emotion and morality .......................................................................... 197 
18 
 
4.8 Deliberations and verdict: which story did you prefer? ..................................... 205 
5. Conclusions .............................................................................................................. 209 
5.1 Insights into courtroom dynamics ...................................................................... 211 
5.2 The hybridity of expert-lay talk .......................................................................... 212 
5.2.1 The tension between formality and informality in instructing the jurors .... 214 
5.2.2 The multifaceted nature of attorneys‘ talk ................................................... 215 
5.3 Concluding remarks ............................................................................................ 220 
References .................................................................................................................... 223 
Appendix 1 ................................................................................................................... 257 
Appendix 2 ................................................................................................................... 263 
 
 
 
19 
 
Introduction  
 
The ever increasing prominence of studies of language and the law in research agendas 
is often borne out of the acknowledgement of the fundamental role the law plays in 
everyone‘s life.  
The privileged field of analysis of this dissertation will be a jury trial within the U.S. 
context. In particular, the present study focuses on the communication processes which 
take place between legal experts and laymen in some specific phases of the trial, namely 
the jury instruction phase, the opening statements and the closing arguments.  
Trials, whether considered from a linguistic, communicative or social perspective, are 
highly complex, as well as critically important, events. This project focuses on spoken 
discourse within the context of jury trials, and aims to obtain a fuller understanding of 
how the language of jury trials operates, and how specialized legal knowledge is 
communicated across professional barriers. More specifically, the objective is an 
analysis of the communicative dynamics taking place in a criminal jury trial, and one of 
the main areas of interest in the current work are the various strategies and techniques 
which are used to communicate specific legal concepts, principles and procedures 
across knowledge asymmetries. In particular, this study will focus on the 
communication of specialized legal knowledge between experts from within the legal 
profession and laymen.  
The choice to focus on the jury trial system does not reflect an aim to reach a critical 
decision about which mode of trial is preferable, but rather to gain better awareness of 
the importance of knowledge asymmetries in this context, and to develop a deeper 
understanding of how they are exploited. By definition, a jury trial brings together a 
broad cross-section of society and, from this perspective, I will try to explain what 
mediational and communicative strategies are employed between legal experts and 
jurors, and what reasons lie behind these choices.   
The attempt is to contribute to a better understanding of how knowledge is 
communicated in this context, with the awareness that no analysis will answer such a 
complex question in a universally satisfactory manner. Therefore, the aim is not to 
resolve this ongoing dilemma on the validity of generalizations drawn from one case; 
rather, this work aims to understand how and why certain processes take place in a 
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specific communicative event. More specifically, I intend to undertake the exploration 
of this event through a linguistic and discursive analysis. 
The first chapter of this work offers some reflections on the inextricable interrelation 
between law and language and provides an introductory review of research on legal 
language with a specific focus on courtroom settings. In particular, courtroom 
interaction has been investigated in relation to the crucial role played by different kinds 
of power relations in the construction of meanings within the trial (Danet 1980, Maley 
1994, Jackson 1995, Cotterill 2003). Considerable attention has been devoted to the 
examination phase, focusing on the interaction between attorneys and (expert and eye) 
witnesses (e.g. Atkinson / Drew 1979, Matoesian 1993). Even though no introduction 
can adumbrate the complex concept that courts may be seen as fora for the 
appropriation of discourse, Chapter One also attempts to address issues related to the 
institutionalization, authorization and appropriation of legal discourse.    
The next chapter moves on from a review of the literature to describe the research 
framework that will be employed in the present work. It presents the research interest 
and rationale as well the theoretical and methodological background with the aim of 
illustrating the theoretical tenets and the methodological approach, the tools of analysis 
and the perspectives adopted for discussing real-world issues in interactions and, more 
specifically, for investigating courtroom discourse.  
In particular, starting from the assumption that the study of discourse has become a 
major interest in research in a vast array of disciplines and can be approached from a 
variety of perspectives, it is deemed necessary to specify the theory of discourse 
adopted here, while nonetheless acknowledging the complexity and the fluidity of such 
a concept. The chapter offers a brief discussion of Discourse Analysis and shows in 
particular which aspects of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) this investigation draws 
on. In this respect, it may be argued that ―[t]he move away from the analysis of 
individual decontextualised texts to look at the socio-cultural factors that lie behind the 
production of particular types of texts is a defining feature of Critical Discourse 
Analysis‖ (Barlett 2010: 137). From this perspective, it is clear that the analysis of the 
texts cannot be meaningfully carried out in isolation from reflections on the contexts of 
production, as well as the legal and procedural constraints that, in a trial, may determine 
the use of certain language items. However, it should also be pointed out that CDA does 
not simply ‗move away‘ from the observation of ‗decontextualized texts‘, in that from a 
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CDA perspective the very nature of texts is indissoluble from their contexts, and the 
decontextualization of a text would be a mere artifice. The approach that I will embrace 
is not only suited to the description of language in a specific social context, but it is also 
based on the analysis of emerging discursive issues and of knowledge and power 
asymmetries, which in turn shape and are shaped by their social context(s).  
As Stygall notes, ―[l]inguists, by and large, look at what‘s there, not what‘s not. In 
doing so, we may be missing some of the main effects of the interaction of institutional 
power‖ (Stygall 1994: 28). The observation of the actual talk and the development of 
discourse will be the point of departure of this analysis; however, some reflections on 
what is excluded from the discourse will be attempted, especially in the light of the 
linguistic constrictions imposed by the institutional setting of a criminal jury trial. The 
aim is to combine the description and the analysis of language structures with a wider 
approach in which the context is of primary importance. 
From a methodological perspective, I discuss the possibility of combining an overall 
qualitative approach with a quantitative one. In particular, considerations deriving from 
discourse analytical perspectives are complemented by the use of two main tools, 
namely AntConc and Wmatrix, in an attempt to combine their respective strengths; for 
instance, the very intuitive accessibility of AntConc and some of its specific tools, such 
as the Concordance Plot, are integrated with the use of Wmatrix, which encompasses 
other valuable analytical tools, such as the semantic tagger. 
I will engage myself in a form of localized discourse analysis, as the aim is not to focus 
on general or generalizable patterns, but, primarily, on a specific discourse event. Some 
research trends highlight the general idea that ―far less reliance is placed on quantifiable 
and/or general patterns‖ (Swann 2002: 59), but this study requires a more specifically-
focused approach because of the inherently localized nature that discourse assumes in 
this work and because of the specificity of the discourse situation under investigation. 
Quantitative specifications, however, have also been made in this analysis. Indeed, 
although affirming that ―discourse analysis, as with many other varieties of qualitative 
research is more difficult than positivist number crunching‖ (Parker / Burman / 1993: 
156, cf. Banister et al 1994) highlights the complexity of qualitative research, it does 
not consider the valuable contribution quantitative approaches may offer.   
In other words, the complementary use of several research approaches is a key aspect of 
this study; on this basis, the use of a quantitative perspective is considered to 
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supplement rather than contradict what is, in the final analysis, a qualitative 
methodology. This choice is not merely borne out of an awareness that ―investigators 
are increasingly stepping beyond their original disciplinary boundaries‖ (Iedema / 
Wodak 1999: 6), but is deemed necessary in order to enable this investigation to bridge 
the paradigms of theory and practice, descriptive and prescriptive studies, micro and 
macro analysis. 
Chapter Three provides an overview of communicative dynamics in courtroom settings, 
and in particular in jury trials. Some of the principal features of the legal system and of 
the jury system are highlighted. In particular, crucial issues related to the jury system, 
such as fairness, impartiality, representativeness and competency, are introduced. The 
inherent communicative complexity of a jury trial is also described, by focusing on the 
role played by knowledge and power asymmetries. 
The focus of the analytical chapter is on one specific communicative event. Indeed, 
Chapter Four is concerned with the analysis of a specific trial, namely California vs 
Westerfield, 2002. From a practical point of view, the choice to focus on this trial lies in 
a personal familiarity with the specific legal system, the accessibility of language, and 
the possibility of accessing data in a time- and cost-effective manner. Moreover, the 
U.S. is particularly representative of the trial by jury system, as it is in the U.S. that the 
highest proportion of jury trials takes place, as will be shown.   
In light of the consideration that language utterances can be made sense of and 
interpreted in relation to the situation and the cultural context, Chapter Four offers a 
discussion of different phases of the Westerfield trial, by first introducing some 
thoughts on the situational context, and offering a discussion of some of the procedural 
and legal constraints. In an attempt to avoid slipping into the discussion of the 
epistemology of legal issues, which are already commonly addressed in academic legal 
study, the main focus of this work is on the discursive construction of a specific 
communicative event. However, Galdia reminds us that there would be no Legal 
Linguistics without Law (Galdia 2009); it is therefore inevitable that some reflections 
upon the specific legal contexts, procedures and principles will be briefly introduced, 
not least to better enable the investigation to take into account the legal reasons 
underlying certain communicative and linguistic choices. 
The courtroom represents an arena not only for dispute resolution but also for 
constructing and maintaining a certain professional identity (Bogoch 1999: 1) and in 
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fact, as we shall observe, competing identities are continually fighting to emerge and to 
be recognized. The concept of identity is not here left as an unproblematic matter and 
the analysis observes some of the processes through which the construction and 
maintenance of professional identities take place. The main phases of the trial to be 
analyzed are jury instructions, opening statements and closing arguments. The analysis 
of the instruction phase focuses in particular on the communicative relationship between 
the judge and the jurors. The focal point of the analysis of opening and closing 
statements is, instead, on the dynamics that characterize the communication processes 
between attorneys and jurors. This chapter also focuses on accommodation strategies 
adopted by legal experts in their interaction with laymen and on the emergence of 
different forms of hybridity in courtroom discourse.  
This investigation constantly warns against the temptation to assume an automatic 
generalizabilty of the observations which emerge from the analysis. Moreover,  the 
study takes into consideration the fact that that ―the semiotic resources at our disposal 
are so rich and subtle that our command of them at the conscious level is necessarily 
limited‖ (Richards 2006: 3); at the same time discourse, especially when relatively 
planned (see Tannen 1987a, 1987b, 2007), includes specific choices that stem from a 
strategic repertoire.   
The conclusive chapter recapitulates and reframes the main insights gained into the 
linguistic and communicative dynamics that characterize the specific event under 
scrutiny; it also affirms the need for further investigation in the field, especially in the 
light of the consideration that trials are generally considered the most manifest 
realization of the process of doing justice, or injustice (Merry 1990). 
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1. Investigating legal language  
 
But do not give it to a lawyer‘s clerk to write, for 
they use a legal hand that Satan himself will not 
understand. (Cervantes) 
 
 
1.1 The inextricable interrelation between law and language 
 
 
Law and language are not simply inter-disciplinarily related, but they form an 
indissoluble nexus by their nature. It may be argued that language is the essence, and to 
some extent the precondition, of any reflection upon the theory and practice of law. This 
is not meant to imply that the relation between the language and law is in any means 
hierarchical, but to highlight the fundamental role language plays in the very existence 
of law.   
The expression ‗Law and Language‘ is sometimes used to refer to studies focusing on 
the interrelation (and to some extent the interdependence) between the two spheres. 
Following Galdia (2009: 63-64), the expression ‗Language and Law‘ is preferred here, 
given the assumption that language may be seen as a constitutive element, or an 
essential requirement, of the law. In other words, it may be argued that there would be 
no law without language, as the role of language as a pre-condition for the existence of 
law could not be substituted by any other means (Galdia 2009: 64). As Fletcher crudely 
remarks, ―[t]he idea of law without language is about as plausible as the idea of baseball 
without balls and bats‖ (Fletcher 2003: 85). A discussion of the intrinsic nature of law 
would go beyond the scope of this work, but it is conceptually worth pointing out that 
attempts to analyze law as a phenomenon independent from language are very limited
1
. 
In fact, it is plausible to assume that any formalization of law is inalienable from the use 
of language.  
                                                 
1
 See Leibnitz‘s attempt to formalize law as a ―more geometrico‖ in Dissertatio de arte combinatoria 
(1666) and Nova methodus discendae docendaeque jurisprudentiae (1667), discussed in Galdia (2009: 
63-64). 
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More specifically, Goodrich remarks the fact that ―both legal theory and legal practice 
are, and have always been, heavily dependent upon the tools of rhetorical and linguistic 
analysis‖ (Goodrich 1984: 173). From a historical point of view, the modes of self-
representation of legal language may be said to be predominantly exegetical and 
philological (Goodrich 1984: 187) and therefore intuitively linked to, and indeed 
inalienable from, linguistic methods and theories. 
Developments in the study of legal language have also generated crucial reflections 
upon its fundamental social role, starting from the considerations related to the 
pervasiveness of law in each society. The investigation of the influence of law on our 
lives cannot be dismissed as a mere intellectual experiment. As Galdia remarks (2009: 
55), ―[i]n everyone‘s biography the presence of law is sensible at least in some extent‖. 
Obviously, the impact it might have on each individual is considerably different, but, in 
the light of the high level of regulation and institutionalization (see Section 1.1.2) of 
modern society, law is inevitably present (although it may be argued that it is not 
omnipresent) in everybody‘s life (Galdia 2009: 56).  
 
 
1.1.1 Legal vs ordinary language 
 
 
In his definition of legal langauge, Cornu suggests: ―Le language juridique est un usage 
particulier de la langue commune‖ (Cornu 1995: 16). It has also been argued that legal 
language is an elaboration, an extension of ordinary language, and that it is inexorably 
through ordinary language that a specialized language is acquired. The relation between 
the concepts of legal and ordinary language is not self-explanatory and must be 
problematized for the interpretation of the notion of legal language adopted here to be 
illustrated effectively (see Section 1.2).  
A distinction between what is often generically labeled as ‗ordinary‘ language and 
‗legal‘ language is intuitively undeniable. In particular, if we consider the widespread 
perception that the legal world is based upon an overwhelmingly unfamiliar, archaic, 
unintelligible, opaque, and even deceptive language, it is easy to conceptually discern it 
from ‗everyday‘ language. However, this distinction is highly problematic and fails to 
address the obvious issue that the ‗legal‘ world and the ‗ordinary‘ world are 
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unavoidably interdependent; once one engages in a more detailed analysis, the line 
between the two (intuitively identifiable) languages appears to be finely drawn.  
In this respect, there is wide consensus upon the idea that one distinctive feature of legal 
language lies in its power to transfer and confer legal relevance and validity to everyday 
language and modify it accordingly (Greimas 1976: 92). More specifically, what is 
particularly interesting from a discursive point of view is to see through what 
mechanisms this process does (or does not) take place (see Goodrich 1984: 183), and to 
illustrate how different phenomena may characterize the interplay between what is 
simplistically seen as ‗ordinary‘ and ‗legal‘ language in different (legal) contexts. What 
emerges is generally not a mere transformation or translation from the former into the 
latter: ordinary and legal language cannot be understood as two opposite poles that may 
occasionally influence each other, but as deeply interrelated spheres, which constantly 
intermingle and amalgamate.  
Another common oversimplification springs from the heuristic temptation of 
establishing the nature of legal or ordinary language according to the primary category 
of users, and therefore establishing that legal language corresponds precisely to the 
language used by legal professionals. This assumption is intuitively incontrovertible and 
seems to strike at the core of the nature of legal language itself. Nevertheless, the 
supposition of a direct causal correlation between language users and language types 
may disregard the complexity of legal language use, the variety of contexts of 
production and the diversity of (potential) users. 
Of course I am not arguing that legal language cannot be seen as the language used by 
lawyers, but that a clear-cut distinction between legal and ordinary language may be a 
partial and even misleading interpretation of a much more multifaceted phenomenon 
(especially, as will be shown, in particularly complex contexts, such as trials). The 
language of the courtroom is a clear example of the indivisibility of legal and ordinary 
language and of the interdependence of these two spheres. 
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1.1.2 Issues of institutionalization, authorization and appropriation 
 
 
It is generally agreed that legal language finds its lifeblood in its institutionalization; in 
particular, it has been noted that the process of institutionalization of language is based 
on a sort of ‗secret pact‘ between the text and the institution that it, somehow, represents 
(Lenoble / Ost 1980: 87). Moreover, because of its highly institutionalized nature, the 
language of the law intrinsically brings with it the fundamental issue of authorization. 
As Goodrich remarks, ―legal discourse is socially and institutionally authorized - 
affirmed, legitimated and sanctioned - by a wide variety of highly visible organizational 
and sociolinguistic insignia of hierarchy, status, power and wealth‖ (Goodrich 1984: 
188). 
The Foucauldian ‗régime of truth‘ on which a society is based may be seen as the 
precondition for this process of authorization, intended as the affirmation, legitimation 
and sanctioning of legal discourse. More specifically, Foucault affirms: 
 
―Each society has its régime of truth, its ‗general politics‘ of truth: that is, 
the types of discourse which it accepts and makes function as true; the 
mechanisms and instances which enable one to distinguish true and false 
statements, the means by which each is sanctioned, the techniques and 
procedures accorded value in the acquisition of truth; the status of those 
who are charged with saying what counts as true‖. (Foucault 1980a:  131) 
 
Beyond the interdependence of legality and institutions (Lenoble / Ost 1980: 83), the 
issue of authorization is here intended as the process through which ―the appropriation 
and institutionalization of meaning and discourse‖ (Goodrich 1984: 185) takes place in 
a specific context. From this perspective, the following oft-quoted Bakhtinian remark 
strikes at the very heart of this crucial issue of the appropriation of meaning:  
 
―Every discourse has its own selfish and biased proprietor; there are no 
words with meanings shared by all, no words ‗belonging to no-one‘ […] 
Who speaks and under what conditions they speak, this is what 
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determines the word‘s actual meaning. All direct meanings and direct 
expressions are false, and this is especially true of emotional feelings and 
expressions.‖ (Bakhtin 1981: 401) 
 
It seems as obvious as it does necessary that meanings, and in particular meanings 
emerging in legal practices, cannot be seen as a static and predefined product to be 
contemplated and must be understood and problematized within a specific discursive 
framework. Indeed, the interdependence between meanings and discursive contextual 
factors is a fundamental postulation, even in the analysis of the apparently fixed, 
unalterable and stagnant language of the law.   
As has been mentioned, the social institution of ‗the law‘ has often been defined as ―the 
locus of a powerful act of linguistic appropriation‖ (Mertz 1994: 441) that emerges from 
the transformation of ordinary language into specific legal categories imposed by the 
state. The complexity underlying the concept of linguistic appropriation finds its 
exemplar illustration in the domain of law. More specifically, the question of linguistic 
authorization concerns the generation of the social legitimacy of legal language, the 
definition of its paradigms and their acceptance within a society, as well as the 
affirmation of its discursive practices; in other words, it may be seen as ―the question of 
the social production and control of meaning in the form of an order of discourse which 
determines what can and should be said‖ (Goodrich 1984: 185).  
 
 
1.2 Defining legal language  
 
 
Legal language is present to a more or less significant degree in all our lives (see inter 
alia Stygall 1994); the awareness of its pervasiveness and the understanding of its 
crucial social role are some of the factors that have determined the constantly growing 
interest in this area of study.  
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1.2.1 Beyond the language of lawyers 
 
Legal language has often been treated as a monolithic entity, as ―a unity to be 
understood as the social image of the argot or language of élite or professionalised 
power‖ and has been defined as ―the language of authority, which takes the discursive 
form of monologue, distance (temporal and hierarchical), and specialization‖ (Goodrich 
1984: 187). In particular, considerable research has been devoted to the study of the 
language of the law, understood specifically as the language of legal documents (see 
Section 1.5). For instance, Mellinkoff describes the language of the law as ―the 
customary language used by lawyers in those common law jurisdictions where English 
is the official language‖, insisting in particular on its use by a specific professional 
category (Mellinkoff 1963: 3).  
The conception of legal language found in this research is more inclusive (see Section 
1.3.3): it extends beyond the idea of legal language as the preserve of a specific 
professional class and emphasizes the complexity of this multi-faceted concept, 
attempting to give a more comprehensive account of the ways in which it 
accommodates change and constantly shapes and reshapes itself. In view of this 
theoretical platform, it will be seen that the complex nature of legal language finds its 
apotheosized crystallization in the context of a jury trial (see Chapter 4).   
Sharing the view that concepts such as class, gender, status and professional expertise 
are not self-explanatory (see inter alia Cameron 1990), Stygall (1994: 5-6) also points 
out that ―studies in legal language have assumed that the social explanation for the 
existence of such a language is the simple correlation between the existence of legal 
profession and of distinguishable legal language‖. 
I argue for a more complex interpretation of the concept of legal language for two main 
reasons. Firstly, professional categories and their boundaries cannot be automatically 
defined; secondly, assuming a mechanical correlation between belonging to a specific 
professional group and the use of a certain typology of language is an 
oversimplification, especially in the context of a jury trial, given the variety of 
participants involved, the relational dynamics between them and the complex processes 
(such as accommodation and reciprocal influence) which take place. 
At a deeper level, a strict definition of legal language as the language of lawyers implies 
the pre-existence of specific professional identities and cultures that make use of a 
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specific language. Conversely, I also would like to highlight the crucial role played by 
discourse in shaping professional identities and cultures, which within this work are not 
considered to be completely pre-defined and static entities, but fluid, shifting and 
evolving concepts (Gunnarsson / Linell / Nordberg 1997). 
 
 
1.2.2 The notion of legal language    
 
The problematization of the interpretation of the expression legal language is 
fundamental to any subsequent analysis. A wide range of interpretations may be 
offered; it has been suggested, for instance, that legal language should be treated as a 
technolect (Mattila 2006), a language variety (Charrow et al 1982, Crystal 1995, 
Tiersma 1999a) a dialect, a register, a domain, or a sublanguage
2
.  
In particular, in the attempt to offer a definition of legal language, it has been pointed 
out that it may be seen as a technolect, (Mattila 2006: 3), as it is often identified with 
the language of legal specialists; it also clear, however, that legal messages inevitably 
concern ordinary people, too. Legal language tends to be so pervasive and to govern in 
some ways all domains of social life, that the idea of a technolect appears limiting. 
Adopting a broader perspective, Cornu (2005: 17) describes legal language as a 
professional language, mainly used by people somehow operating in the legal world, 
whether directly or indirectly. In Cornu‘s view legal language does not belong to one 
single professional category, namely lawyers, but it is rather used by a wide range of 
different professions. 
In the following passage, Crystal adopts the expression variety of language. He points 
out the complex nature of legal language and stresses the social importance it assumes 
as well as the responsibility that this type of language inevitable carries with it: 
 
―Legal language is always being pulled in different directions. Its 
statements have to be so phrased that we can see their general 
applicability, yet be specific enough to apply to individual circumstances. 
They have to be stable enough to stand the test of time, so that cases will 
                                                 
2
 For a deeper discussion see Kurzon (1997: 123-134) and Danet (1980: 470-474). 
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be treated consistently and fairly, yet flexible enough to adapt to new 
social situations. Above all, they have to be expressed in such a way that 
people can be certain about the intention of the law respecting their rights 
and duties. No other variety of language has to carry such a 
responsibility‖. (Crystal 1995: 374, emphasis added) 
 
The notion of legal English as a variety of language (see Charrow et al 1982, Tiersma 
1999a: 49), has often been used in order to highlight its differences from the 
stereotypical interpretation of ordinary language, without assuming that it may for this 
reason be seen as a different language.  
Legal language has also been defined as a dialect, but this designation does not appear 
appropriate if the idea of dialect is understood to refer primarily to notions of 
geographical location. From another perspective, Tiersma (1999a: 133) also mentions 
legal dialects and distinguishes, for instance, between the legal English spoken in 
British contexts and American contexts
3
. Some interesting examples related to (in 
particular lexical) differences between the two spheres are mentioned in Tiersma 
(1999a: 134): 
 
―Sometimes one word has different meanings in various jurisdictions. In 
American legal English, a judgment is the disposition or outcome of a 
case. In England judgment also refers to the statements of reasons for the 
disposition, something that American lawyers call an opinion. An 
appellate court affirms or reverses a lower court‘s judgment in the United 
States, while it allows the appeal or dismisses it in England. A brief is an 
argument to the court in the United States, while it is a written case 
summary for the guidance of a barrister in England. Corporate law in 
America is company law in England. Legal idioms may also differ from 
place to place. An American lawyer is admitted to the bar, while a British 
barrister is called to the bar and may eventually talk silk (become a 
Queen‘s Counsel)‖. (Tiersma 1999a: 134, original emphasis) 
                                                 
3
 More specifically, it should be pointed out that there is no ―British legal system‖, and therefore the legal 
languages used, for instance, in England and Wales display considerable differences in relation to the 
legal language used in Scotland. 
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The terms jargon or argot are also occasionally used to identify specific professional 
languages, but they often tend to be associated with an aura of complexity and 
incomprehensibility. Similarly, expressions such as legal lingo and legalese tend to be 
attributed a relatively negative connotation and are not frequently used.   
With particular (but not exclusive) reference to the language used in the courtroom, 
Danet (1980) talks about language in the legal process, and Levi and Walker (1990) 
often use the expression language in the judicial process. On a practical note, scholars 
have also remarked that there has been a tendency to avoid the term legal in order to 
circumvent potential confusion with lawful (Mellinkoff 1963). 
 
 
1.3 Towards a taxonomy of legal language? 
 
 
The concept of legal language is vast and protean, and its intricacy and its versatile 
character have often been highlighted. As has been shown, legal language, with its 
pervasiveness (and at the same time its uniqueness), has drawn considerable scholarly 
interest. Different approaches have been adopted in order to offer a categorization or 
taxonomy of legal language. Considering the multifaceted nature of legal language, and 
the number of areas it penetrates, such categorizations are inevitably highly 
heterogeneous.  
 
 
1.3.1 Suggested categorizations 
 
Legal language has often been primarily considered as a question of style (Dölle 1949). 
Following Joos‘s taxonomy (1961) of styles (namely, frozen, formal, consultative, 
casual, and intimate), Danet (1980) offers a categorization of different areas of legal 
language according to their level of formality. Focusing on Joos‘s first four categories,  
Danet associates frozen style with written documents, but she also indicates that some 
types of events mainly characterized by the use of the spoken mode, such as civil 
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marriage ceremonies, could be considered frozen. According to Danet, formal language 
is encountered in statutes, lawyers‘ briefs and appellate opinions, as well as in lawyers‘ 
examinations of witnesses in trials, lawyers‘ arguments in trials, and expert witnesses‘ 
testimonies. Instead, lawyer-client interaction constitutes an example of consultative 
style. Finally, casual style characterizes informal conversations, such as lawyer-to-
lawyer conversations (see Danet l980: 474-82). Danet does not consider Joos‘s notion 
of intimate style to be attributable to any aspect of the language of the law.  
To some extent this categorization may be seen to be fallacious, as different areas of 
legal language may in turn be characterized by very different styles. For example, the 
language of the courtroom, which constitutes our field of analysis, includes, as will be 
shown, an intricate series of sub-domains, communicative situations and styles, and a 
categorical distinction would therefore be misleading. In other words, the styles of 
different legal domains (especially in trial processes) do not arise sui generis, but from 
the intermingling of different factors (contexts, settings, participants involved and the 
relationships between them, procedural constraints, etc.). 
It has been stated that legal language can be theoretically divided into sub-genres 
―according to the various sub-groups of lawyers‖, distinguishing, for instance, between 
―the language of legal authors, legislators (laws and regulations), judges, and 
administrators, as well as advocates‖ (Mattila 2006: 2). However, this approach will not 
be adopted in this study. Indeed, this categorization does not seem to sit well with the 
concept of interdiscursivity (see inter alia Fairclough 1992a, Candlin / Maley 1997, 
Candlin 2006) adopted here. Moreover, even though a distinction made according to the 
(primary) users does not automatically neglect the collective nature of some instances of 
legal discourse (and the collective process of production which lies behind it), it does 
not emphasize the essentially intertextual and interdiscursive character of such 
discourses. Finally, the very activity of identifying different ―sub-groups of lawyers‖ 
may raise issues related to the interconnections between such subgroups and the 
presence of reciprocal influences between them; this categorization may also call for a 
reflection on the inevitable exclusion of all other professional categories who do not 
prototypically belong to the specific professional category of lawyers (and its ―sub-
groups‖), but who may still be significantly involved in the use of legal language. 
The classification suggested by Galdia (2009: 91) also draws to some extent on the 
concept of language users: 
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- Language of statutes (language of legislation) 
- Language of legal decisions including fact description 
- Language of the legal doctrine 
- Language used by lawyers in professional discussions and pleadings 
- Language used by laypersons in legal contexts (testimony, comments on legal 
decisions) 
- Language used by administrative clerks. 
 
What emerges, especially in regard to the last three categories, is the use of language 
users as a categorizing criterion. This criterion will not be employed in the taxonomy 
suggested in this work, in light of the fact that the definition of different groups of users 
is not self-descriptive, and, moreover, the interactions between them determine crucial 
influences and contaminations.   
Another theoretical division may be made ―into sub-genres on the basis of branches of 
law‖ (Mattila 2006: 5). This criterion also appears both problematic, because it is based 
on the principle of a mechanic correlation between branches and sub-genres, and 
limiting, in that it relies on pre-existing categories, and does not emphasize the 
(potential) interrelation between different branches. Consequently, despite the 
difficulties inherent in any attempt to describe the highly complex concept of legal 
language, the use of more open and dynamic categories (see Section 1.3.3) is suggested 
in this work. 
 
 
1.3.2 The complexity of legal language categories 
 
As has been shown, the world of legal English comprises a variety of types of texts 
which fulfill different functions and a clear-cut distinction is often not possible. Gibbons 
(2003: 15) remarks that legal language could essentially be divided into two main areas, 
namely the codified sphere of language (which is mainly written) and the language of 
the legal process:  
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―The language of the law can be broadly divided into two major areas – 
the codified and mostly written language of legislation and other legal 
documents such as contracts, which is largely monologic; and the more 
spoken, interactive and dynamic language of legal process, particularly the 
language of courtroom, police investigation, prisons and consultations 
among lawyers and between lawyers and their clients‖. (Gibbons 2003: 
15) 
 
The border between these two areas is, however, often unclear, because of the 
intertextual nature of the texts we are dealing with. The examples are innumerable; for 
instance, it is evident that codified texts are not only referred to continuously in the 
legal process, but they also play a fundamental role in the development of the process 
and its outcomes.  
In his interpretation, Kurzon (1989) identifies the language of the law and legal 
language as two distinctive spheres, where the former is used ―in documents that lay 
down the law‖, and the latter refers to the language ―used when people talk about the 
law‖ (Kurzon 1989: 283-84). More specifically, in his later work Kurzon (1997: 120) 
offers the following categorization:  
 
 
Figure 1: The language of the law and legal language (Kurzon 1997: 120) 
 
According to Kurzon, the language of the law represents a narrower use of language in 
specific legal domains, whereas the expression legal language refers to the remaining 
domains (where the language of the law is not prevalent). Within the area of legal 
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language Kurzon also identifies law talk, specifying that ―this subtype is in a spoken 
form only, i.e. spontaneous speech used, for example, when a lawyer questions a 
witness, or when the judge speaks to the jury, or when two lawyers get together and 
speak about legal matters‖ (Kurzon 1997: 120). However, limiting this concept of law 
talk to spoken texts seems to neglect the complexity arising from the constantly growing 
interconnection and interdependence between modes. For instance, on a more practical 
note, lawyers may ―get together and speak about legal matters‖ in a mode that is not 
necessarily purely spoken. Similarly, client-attorney consultation would presumably fall 
into the category of other types of spoken legal language, but it is evident that such a 
definition may be restraining, in that it would not consider potentially hybrid forms of 
consultation, such as online interaction.  
It is not my aim to neglect the existence of a potential categorization into written and 
spoken texts, but this distinction would not be fruitful for the approach adopted in this 
analysis. First of all, at a general level, it may be argued that the written-spoken 
dichotomy appears unsuitable, because new technologies allow a constant interplay and 
interchange between these two modes to the extent that they may even appear 
indiscernible (see Gunnarsson 1995: 112). Moreover, texts may often be seen as the 
result of a complex interrelation between spoken and written modes and this process is 
particularly evident while analyzing the language of the courtroom (see Section 3.7).  
In her bibliographic work on legal language Levi (1994) identifies three major 
categories: 
 
- spoken language in legal settings; 
- language as a subject of the law; 
- the written language of the law. 
She also describes forensic linguistics as a separate applied class.  
 
The first category identifies a variety of events, from lawyers‘ speeches to judges‘ 
directions in court, but it is also plausible to assume that these events are not necessarily 
carried out through the spoken mode. For instance, in a jury trial the jury instruction 
phase may be seen as typically oral, but it is generally based on written instructions, and 
juries may be given the written version of the document (see Section 4.4).  
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The second category is inevitably linked to the other ones, in that issues related to 
language as the subject of the law may be dealt with in legal settings and are 
presumably governed by what Levi defines as the written language of law. The second 
category is also so strictly interconnected with the concept of forensic linguistics 
(identified by Levi as a separate applied class), as well as that of language law (see 
Section 1.3.3), that may at times appear impossible to discern them.  
Trosborg‘s (1995) interpretation of the concept of legal language is particularly 
revealing in that it complexifies the issue by identifying different types of sublanguages 
and domains of use. In this work, the expression ‗legal language‘ will be used, in line 
with Trosborg‘s view, as an umbrella term covering different types of sub-languages, 
such as the language of the law, (meaning the language of legal documents), the 
language used in the courtroom, in textbooks, in lawyers‘ communication or by people 
(professionals and laymen) talking about the law.  
 
 
Figure 2: Legal language (Trosborg 1995: 2) 
 
 
Another interesting categorization is suggested by Maley (1994: 13), who emphasizes 
the plurality of legal discourses and points out four main categories:  
- Judicial discourse, designating the language of judicial decision, either spoken 
or written; 
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- Courtroom discourse; 
- The language of legal documents; 
- The discourse of legal consultation, which includes both lawyer-lawyer and 
lawyer-client interaction.  
 
The basic conception for this categorization is that ―[l]anguage is medium, process and 
product in the various arenas of the law where legal texts, spoken or written, are 
generated in the service of regulating social behaviour‖ (Maley 1994: 11). 
As has been mentioned, the impossibility of treating ‗legal language‘ as a monolithic 
entity is evident as the expression comprises a vast series of genres, discourse situations 
and communities
4. Maley‘s visual representation (1994: 16) of the different discourse 
situations that are related to the use of legal language shows the complexity of the 
concept:  
                                                 
4
 A wider discussion of the notions of ‗community‘ would go beyond the specific goals of this section. 
For further details see the concepts of ‗speech community‘ (Hymes 1972), ‗discourse community‘ and 
‗place discourse community‘ (Swales 1991, 1998), and ‗community of practice‘ (Lave / Wenger 1991, 
Wenger 1998). 
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DISCOURSE 
SITUATION 
DISCOURSE 
SITUATION 
DISCOURSE 
SITUATION 
DISCOURSE 
SITUATION 
Sources of law; 
originating points of  
legal process 
Pre-trial 
processes 
Trial 
Processes 
Recording and  
law-making 
 
legislature/ 
(legislature/ 
subject) 
 
regulations, by- 
laws 
(authority/subject) 
 
precedents                         
(judges/ 
defendants) 
 
wills, 
contracts, etc.  
(two parties) 
 
 
police/video 
interview 
(authority/ 
subject, witness) 
 
pleadings 
(lawyer/lawyer) 
 
consultation                     
(lawyer/lawyer) 
(lawyer/client) 
 
subpoena, jury 
summons, 
(authority/ 
(subject, 
witness) 
 
 
court examination, 
cross- 
examination, re-ex   
(counsel/witness) 
 
intervention, rules 
and procedures 
(judge/counsel) 
jury summation 
(judge/jury) 
proceedings  
 
decision 
(judge/defendant) 
 
 
case reports 
-
(judge/defendant, 
judge/other 
judges) 
 
 
LEGAL 
DISCOURSES 
LEGAL  
DISCOURSES 
LEGAL 
DISCOURSES 
LEGAL 
DISCOURSES 
Table 1: Types of legal discourse (adapted from Maley 1994: 16) 
 
Maley points out the circularity of the process, specifying, for instance, that once a case 
is reported, it may function as a precedent for followings cases and become a potential 
source of law. At the same time, however, it is also emphasized that the sequence is not 
inevitable (Maley 1994: 15-17), in that certain potential originating points of legal 
processes may never progress to the subsequent phases. This representation succeeds in 
showing the plurality of discourses related to the legal sphere and attempts to emphasize 
the (potential) interrelation between them.   
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1.3.3 Interdiscursivity  
 
A particularly enlightening representation of how legal discourse may be conceived is 
offered in Bhatia et al (2004). Drawing on the concept of genre (for the purpose of this 
study see Bhatia 1983, 1993, Swales 1990; for a discussion of courtroom discourse as 
genre see also Harris 1988), it is possible to ―distinguish the nature of legal genres from 
a number of other professional genres‖ (Bhatia et al 2004: 204). What is particularly 
illuminating about the conceptualization offered by Bhatia et al (2004) is the clear 
emergence of the concepts of intertextuality and interdiscursivity. Looking at the 
continuum between academic and professional legal contexts, it would be possible to 
identify genres which are typically used in legal contexts, such as legislation, 
judgments, legal textbooks, and legal cases. However, it may be argued that, for 
example, in academic contexts we may identify instances of academic genres, such as 
the problem-question genre and the critical essay genre, which are inevitably linked to 
legal practice. Similarly, other professional legal genres, such as legal memoranda and 
legal pleadings, derive in some way from some form of interrelation with the broadly 
based legal genres (for a deeper discussion see Bhatia et al 2004: 204-212; see also 
Candlin / Bhatia 1998).  
Intertextuality is understood here as ―the property of one text being used in another, 
either directly or by pragmatic implication‖ (following Bhatia et al 2004: 204; see also 
Bhatia 1983). This property plays a fundamental role in legal contexts because of the 
inherent intertextual nature of legal texts. Interdiscursivity can be seen as an inter-
exploitation of genre conventions, as ―conventions associated with one genre are 
cleverly exploited in another genre‖ (Bhatia et al 2004: 204). More specifically, Candlin 
and Maley argue that ―in so far as any characteristic text evokes a particular discoursal 
value, in that it is associated with some institutional and social meaning, such evolving 
discourses are at the same time interdiscursive‖ (Candlin / Maley 1997: 203), and they 
suggest the following definition of interdiscursivity: ―the use of elements from one 
discourse and social practice which carry institutional and social meanings from other 
discourses and other social practices‖ (Candlin / Maley 1997: 212). In a similar vein, 
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therefore, when talking about legal discourse, I do not intend to infer that one single 
discourse of that type exists, but rather that it consists of a set of related discourses.  
As has been mentioned, the interpretation of legal language adopted in this work is in 
line with Trosborg‘s (1995) definition (see Section 1.3.2; cf. Trosborg 1992, 1997) 
according to which the expression ‗legal language‘  encompasses a series of other 
sublanguages and should therefore be understood as a superordinate term. Figure 3 
attempts to visualize the concept of interdiscursivity in legal languages:  
 
 
Figure 3: Interdiscursivity in legal languages 
 
This representation is by no means exhaustive and does not aim to unravel all the 
potential sub-domains of legal language. Rather, it is functional in that it shows the 
interconnection between some of the most clearly identifiable domains and sub-domains 
of legal language. Consequently, the labels I have decided to assign are to been seen as 
primarily heuristic (and not exhaustive and strictly exclusive) categorizations.  
Legal language is seen as to comprise some main categories such as the language of the 
law, trial-related language, and legal meta-language. The purest distillation of the legal 
language may be seen as the language of the language of the law, in particular as the 
language of the legislation. It is not only desirable, but necessary, that these domains be 
further delved into and expanded. For instance, the area of the language of the law 
includes a wide range of sub-categories, such as the language of the legislation, statutes, 
regulations, bylaws, wills, contracts, etc.  
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The label trial language (for the purpose of this work, also referred to as courtroom 
language) is here intended to encompass pre-trial and trial situations, and different sub-
categories may also be identified within these broader categories (ranging from police 
interrogations to the pronunciation of verdicts). 
The term meta-language is here deliberately not intended in the Galdian sense (2009: 
231) of a ―universal descriptive language for the propositional context of legal texts‖, 
i.e. as a transitional language deriving from a technical translation process. In this study 
the expression meta-language refers to the language used to explain, interpret or discuss 
the law. This category includes the general notion of ―language of people talking about 
the law‖ (Trosborg 1995: 2), instances of lawyer-client interactions, lawyer-to-lawyer 
conversations, as well the language of textbooks. 
The functional character of Figure 3 attempts primarily to show the complexity 
underlying the interrelation and the interdependence among different domains within 
the field of legal language, focusing on some of the prototypical situations. Indeed, the 
main areas that have been here identified are deeply intertextually and interdiscursively 
related. For instance, as will be shown, trials and pre-trials extensively include instances 
of meta-language (e.g. as regards the explanation of legal concepts and processes); 
moreover, trial language somehow arises from the application of the language of the law 
and also constantly refers to it. In other words, the notion of trial language may be seen 
as unconceivable without taking the language of the law into account. 
A more comprehensive interpretation of Figure 3 could also include a variety of other 
contexts in which the use of legal language emerges. Such contexts may include, for 
example, the language of alternative dispute resolution, whose peculiarity merits 
separate investigation, or the translation and interpretation of legal language, among 
others. In addition, the picture may obviously be more deeply investigated and 
expanded. For instance, categorizing the role played by forensic linguistics (see 
McMenamin 2002, Gibbons 2003, Olsson 2004) may be particularly problematic. The 
discipline is related to a broad range of domains (Shuy 2007), such as the language of 
the law itself, the language used in the courtroom by a variety of potential participants, 
both in pre-trials and in trails, and the legal meta-language adopted in a variety of 
potential situations; rather than constituting a separate field in itself, it may therefore be 
seen as a cross-domain discipline.  
44 
 
Similarly, the role played by language law contributes to a more complex ramification 
of the visual representation suggested. Language law has been identified as an area of 
studies dealing with the legal effects and the legal rules related to the use of language 
(Mattila 2006: 17, Cornu 2005: 43-45); to some extent, therefore, language law may be 
seen as a category including the subcategory of language legislation, which, in turn, 
according to the taxonomy presented, would be identified under the label of language of 
the law. The notion of language law is particularly complex in that it includes a wide 
variety of other sub-areas and deals with a broad variety of topics, such as language 
rights or language crimes (Shuy 1993).  
 
 
1.4 Functions and speech acts  
 
 
1.4.1 The functional nature of legal texts 
 
Different types of legal texts may be categorized according to their functional nature. 
Focusing in particular on written legal documents, Tiersma (1999: 139) identifies three 
main types of text: 
 
1) Operative legal documents: they aim primarily to create or modify legal 
relations, and this category includes, for instance, statutes, contracts, wills, etc. 
From a linguistic point of view, they assume a performative function. Austin 
(1962: 6) illustrates the term ‗performative‘ as follows: ―The name is derived, of 
course, from ‗perform‘, the usual verb with the noun ‗action‘: it indicates the 
issuing of the utterance is the performing of an action‖. It is interesting to note 
that Austin takes into consideration the adjective ‗operative‘ as somehow related 
to ‗performative‘, but with the former actually being a ―technical term […] used 
strictly by lawyers‖ (Austin 1962: 6) (see Section 1.4.2). 
2) Expository documents: they assume an expository function and primarily aim 
to explain the law. They include, for instance, schoolbooks, professional 
manuals, letters to clients, etc.   
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3) Persuasive documents: these display a persuasive function. A typical example 
represented here are the briefs submitted to courts.  
  
As for all categorizations, these distinctions are not always clear-cut, but they may be 
useful in identifying the main features of different texts. In particular, Tiersma (1999a: 
141) points out that ―[g]enerally speaking, operative documents have by far the most 
legalese, as compared to persuasive and expository documents‖. In this respect, he also 
argues: ―it is highly ironic that documents with the most legalese (like contracts, wills, 
deeds, and statutes) are also most likely to be read by clients and directly affect their 
interests‖ (Tiersma 1999a: 141). 
Working along the same line, but adopting different functional criteria, Šarčević 
presents another valuable classification and, in particular, distinguishes between 
prescriptive and descriptive texts (Šarčević 2000: 9). The former are normative 
instruments, such as laws, rules, codes, contracts and treaties, whereas the latter include 
different text types, such as articles and textbooks, which are generally written by legal 
scholars. It is interesting to point out that their authority varies according to the legal 
system, as in Civil Law countries the opinion of legal scholars contributes significantly 
to the definition of legal concepts (Šarčević 2000: 9). Between these two categories, it is 
also possible to identify hybrid texts, which include both prescriptive and descriptive 
elements.  
More specifically, as regards prescriptive texts, Williams (2005: 64) identifies two 
distinctive functions: a communicative one (the message conveyed by prescriptive texts 
is generally addressed to a multiplicity of receivers) and a pragmatic one. From a 
pragmatic point of view, it is plausible to assume that a text should be easily 
comprehended by the people it addresses, who are not necessarily legal experts. On the 
other hand, it is difficult to imagine that these kinds of legal texts could be written in 
such a way as to be immediately understood by all laypeople. The debate remains open 
and supporters of the Plain English Movement often stress the paradox that lies behind 
the complexity of legal language and the fact that it mainly affects ordinary people (for 
a further reflection on the use of Plain English in legal texts see inter alia Flesch 1979, 
Martineau 1991, Steinberg 1991, Garner 2001, Wydick 2005).   
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1.4.2 Speech acts and legal language 
 
The law is ―the arena of speech acts par excellence‖, argues Fletcher (2003: 85). An in-
depth analysis of the concept of speech acts (see Austin 1962, Searle 1969, 1975) would 
go beyond the scope of this study, but their application can offer a deeper understanding 
of potential categorizations related to the concept of legal language (see inter alia Danet 
1980). 
Austin theorized the notion of performative (Austin 1962) and, as seen in Section 1.4.1, 
used it in connection with the term operative, the latter being used more specifically in 
legal contexts. In some initial work on speech acts (Austin 1962), utterances would fall 
into two different categories, namely performatives and constatives, but the distinction 
was not maintained in later works, as Austin argued that it was ultimately not 
defensible. It is interesting to note that Hart (1994[1961]) also relates the Austinian 
interpretation of performative utterances to the notion of operative utterances.  
An influential distinction was then made between the three oft-quoted different aspects 
that utterances may display: locutionary (the physical utterance of what is literally said), 
illocutionary (the work an utterance accomplishes in a specific context), and 
perlocutionary (the effect on the hearer) (Austin 1962). More precisely, Austin‘s 
preliminary taxonomy of illocutionary acts included the following five categories 
(Austin 1962):   
 
- Verdictives: acts which deliver a finding or a judgment (e.g. acquit).  
- Exercitives: acts that consist of giving a decision for or against a course of 
action (e.g. sentence).  
- Commissives: acts of committing the speaker to a course of action (e.g. 
declaring one‘s intention). 
- Behabitatives: expressions of attitudes toward the conduct, fortunes or attitudes 
of others (e.g. apologizing). 
- Expositives: acts of expounding of views, conducting of arguments, and 
clarifying (e.g. denying).  
 
Further typologies of speech acts have subsequently been developed (see in particular 
Ohmann 1972, Fraser 1974a, 1974b, Searle 1975) and I will not enter into a 
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retrospective analysis of the various interpretations offered. However, speech act theory 
is particularly relevant to the understanding of the functional nature of legal texts, in 
that it shows that speech acts do not simply describe legal propositions, but assume a 
fundamental constitutive function.  
In particular, Searle (1975) offers an influential taxonomy of illocutionary acts and 
identifies representatives, directives, commissives, expressives, and declarations, plus 
an additional subclass, representative declarations. These categories may also be applied 
specifically to the study of legal language (Danet 1980) in order to identify the primary 
illocutionary point of different types of legal texts. Blurred contours of categories are 
inevitable, but they may be described as follows (Searle 1975): 
 
- Representatives: the main purpose of these acts is to ―commit the speaker (in 
varying degrees) to something‘s being the case, to the truth of the expressed 
proposition‖ (Searle 1975: 354). The degrees of commitment vary from weak 
cases such as hypothesizing to strong cases such as solemnly swearing. 
Examples include testifying, swearing, asserting, claiming and stating. 
- Directives: they are seen as attempts ―by the speaker to get the hearer to do 
something‖ (Searle 1975: 355). In these cases likewise, the degree of attempt 
may vary from weak cases such as suggesting something be done, to strong 
cases such as commanding something be done. Other examples are requesting, 
praying, permitting and advising. Questions are also defined as directives 
because in Searle‘s view they constitute ―attempts to get the hearer to perform a 
speech act‖ (1975: 356). Galdia remarks that statutes, as well as legal texts on 
different hierarchical levels such as ordinances and decrees, are typically 
directives (Galdia 2009: 149). Moreover, in courtroom contexts, subpoenas, jury 
instructions, and appeals, amongst others, may all be seen as directives. 
- Commissives: they are defined as those acts whose illocutionary point ―is to 
commit the speaker (again in varying degrees) to some future course of action‖ 
(Searle 1975: 356). The degrees of commitment vary from undertaking to do a 
certain action to, for instance, solemnly swearing to do it. Typical legal 
examples of this category are represented by documents found in private law, 
such as contracts and agreements, and wills. Similarly, guarantees, pledges, and 
promises of different kinds would fall within the category.  
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- Expressives: these express a psychological state in the speaker regarding a state 
of affairs that the expressive refers to or presupposes. Expressives neither 
represent (as representatives do) nor coerce (as commissives do) reality; they 
take it for granted, and the truth of the proposition is presupposed (Searle 1975: 
357). Typical expressives are thanking, congratulating, welcoming, deploring, 
but the category comprises a wide range of acts, from forgiving to blaming, from 
absolving to condemning. However, texts may be related to different speech acts 
and, for instance, a constitutional preamble may include commissives as well as 
expressives (see Galdia 2009: 149). 
- Declarations: the illocutionary point of this class lies in the possibility of 
determining a change in reality if the act is performed successfully; one example 
of this concept is the idea that ―if I successfully perform the act of marrying you, 
then you are married‖ (Searle 1975: 358). In legal contexts, such acts include, 
for instance, objections, sentences, and appellate opinions (see Danet 1980: 
460). 
The distinction between these categories is however not clear-cut. For instance, Searle 
also identifies a subcategory defined as representative declarations, whose nature is 
explained as follows: 
 
―Some members of the class of declarations overlap with members of the 
class of representatives. This is because in certain institutional situations 
we not only ascertain the facts but we need an authority to lay down a 
decision as to what the facts are after the fact-finding procedure has been 
gone through. […] Institutions characteristically require illocutionary acts 
to be issued by authorities of various kinds which have the force of 
declarations. Some institutions require representative claims to be issued 
with the force of declarations in order that the argument over the truth of 
the claim can come to an end somewhere and the next institutional steps 
which wait on the settling of the factual issue can proceed‖ (Searle 1975: 
360-361) 
 
With specific reference to the legal sphere, indictments, confessions, pleas of guilty/not 
guilty, and verdicts could be defined as representative declarations (Danet 1980: 460). 
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More specifically, a representative declaration involves a truth claim (because of its 
representative character), but it also transcends it (in that it is a declaration). For 
example, if the jury declares the defendant guilty, for legal purposes he is guilty (even if 
he is actually innocent). In this situation an appeal can result in a different 
representative declaration which replaces the previous one, or it may simply confirm the 
previous (‗erroneous‘) representative declaration (Searle 1975: 360-361).  
 
 
1.5 Researching law and language 
 
 
Studies in the area of legal language have grown exponentially in recent years and the 
importance of analyzing and reaching a deeper understanding of legal language crudely 
resides in the fact that ―the law is such an important and influential institution‖, and ―it 
is packed with language problems‖ (Gibbons 2006: 285). 
 
 
1.5.1 Defining the field  
 
Venturing into an identification of the origin of this field of study may be seen as an 
unattainable and unproductive mission. Indeed, it has often been argued that if by the 
study of legal language we mean a reflection upon the connection between law and 
language, we are confronted with an edifying past dating back to time immemorial (cf. 
Galdia 2009). For the purpose of this study, I will therefore adopt the more modern 
approach to legal language studies as a discipline with a certain degree of autonomy. 
The term legal linguistics (Mattila 2006, Galdia 2009) is often used to broadly define 
the area and is in line with the notion of linguistique juridique, which goes back to Geny 
(1921). The aim of legal linguistics as a discipline is generally considered to be the 
examination of ―the development, characteristics, and usage of language‖ (Mattila 2006: 
11) in legal contexts, assuming that ―the language of the law is examined, in the frame 
of legal linguistics, in the light of observations made by linguistics‖ (Mattila 2006: 11). 
The approach to the study of legal discourse adopted here focuses primarily on 
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discourse dynamics in a specific legal context. Consequently, this work falls within a 
framework which may be defined as legal discourse analytical studies. 
The study of discourse, and particularly of legal discourse, has progressively shifted 
from its analysis as an abstract system to a more ―integrative‖ (Mertz 1994: 436) 
approach which presupposes the creative function that language has in the construction 
of social dynamics and epistemologies (see inter alia Gumperz 1982, Silverstein 1993)
5
. 
It may certainly be argued that language plays a crucial role in the creation of social and 
societal reality and identity, as well as in the development of different professional and 
vocational cultures (Gunnarsson 1995: 111). In this respect, legal language is no 
exception and may actually be seen as one of the most evident crystallizations of such 
dynamics, in that legal language is a constitutive element of a continuous process of 
shaping and reshaping of realities, identities and cultures. 
Going beyond the discussion of the (apparent) dichotomy between a reflectionist and an 
instrumentalist approach to discourse, this study presupposes that an attempt to 
investigate ―the linguistic channeling and structuring of social life‖ seems particularly 
relevant in the domain of the law, if we intend it as ―a key locus of institutionalized 
linguistic channeling of social power‖ (Mertz 1994: 436).  
The concepts of institutionalization (see Section 1.1.2) and, in particular, of linguistic 
institutionalization are of profound significance to an understanding of legal discourse. 
More specifically, it would be appropriate to talk about a dual process, which includes 
two intertwined and interdependent phenomena: on the one hand ―the legal institutional 
regimentation and sedimentation of language‖ and on the other hand ―the linguistic 
regimentation and sedimentation of legal institutions‖ (Mertz 1994:  447), which do not 
arise sui generis, but shape (and are shaped by) a specific social context. 
The reason underlying the application of some form of linguistic analysis to the legal 
field has often been related to ―the desire to challenge the hermetic security both of 
substantive jurisprudence and of its meta-language, legal theory‖ (Goodrich 1987: 132). 
In this respect, one of the driving forces of these studies often derives from the desire or 
need to unveil the complexities of legal language and make a breach into a world which 
is often considered to be inaccessible and incomprehensible. However, studies in the 
                                                 
5
 For a more in-depth conceptualization of the concept of discourse see Section 2.3. 
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sphere of legal discourse have gradually tended to assume a wider perspective; they 
generally do not originate from a purely challenging ambition towards jurisprudence or 
legal theory, but rather aim to explore a wider range of dynamics related to legal 
discourse.  
 
 
1.5.2 Research perspectives  
 
As mentioned above, legal language is pervasive in social life, and the concept of legal 
language is multifaceted in its very nature. Consequently, it is not surprising that 
research in this field includes panoplies of approaches and perspectives, and offering a 
complete introductory survey of the research trends related to the analysis of legal 
language is a task which is doomed to failure. Consequently, given the numerous and 
admirable sources available as a background (see in particular Danet 1980, 1985, 
Gibbons 1994, Levi 1994, Kurzon 1997, Tiersma 1999a, Galdia 2009), it is the aim of 
this synopsis to eschew reproduction and deliberately adopt a highly selective focus.  
As Stygall (1994: 6) remarks, legal language can be analyzed from a variety of 
perspectives (such as linguistic, sociological, and anthropological), and the author 
identifies three main patterns of research within the field: 
 
- Language-as-object: works which treat language as the object of the 
investigation. These studies focus mainly on the description of the phenomena 
of legal language or on the application of single elements of theoretical 
linguistics to occurrences of legal language‖ (Stygall 1994: 7). 
- Language-as-process: this research trend is based on the analysis of the 
dynamics related to the comprehension and understanding of legal language.  
- Language-as-instrument: this approach takes an instrumental perspective and 
analyses legal language as a tool to create and maintain dynamics of power.  
 
Working along the same lines, but adopting a slightly different approach, and focusing 
on the nature of the studies, different research trends may also be categorized as 
follows:  
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- Descriptive (discourse production): the earlier work on legal language, in 
particular, primarily focused on the description of the most recurrent elements of 
legal language, mainly in comparison with what was generally placed under the 
heading of ordinary language. Particular attention was often devoted to written 
language (see Mellinkoff‘s seminal work, 1963). 
- Experimental (discourse reception): these studies tend to focus on the reception 
of legal language. As will be shown, an ample number of studies of this type 
have focused on the use of legal language in the courtroom, and, in particular, on 
jury trials, with the aim of understanding the processes which govern jurors‘ 
reception of specific instances of legal language. These studies are often based 
on experimental approaches and frequently draw on psycholinguistics (e.g. 
studies on the perceptions of jury instructions, such as Charrow / Charrow 1979, 
Elwork et al 1982, Sontag 1990). 
- Critical (discourse interaction): the focus of these studies tends to be on the 
dynamics that govern the interaction between the different participants involved 
in legal context, integrating the concept of production and reception
6
. Within the 
same perspective, but with a more accentuated critical stance, are studies 
focusing on the complex relation between legal language and issues related to 
social dynamics of power and knowledge, often in line with Foucauldian 
reflections. The focus tends to be predominantly on macro-structures of 
discourse formations and on the reflection on how discourse is influenced and 
reciprocally influences social dynamics.  
- Prescriptive (discourse prescription): this area assumes a more specifically legal 
standpoint and primarily aims to explicate the reasons (mainly related to 
jurisprudence and legal theory) underlying language choices in legal contexts.   
 
This is only one of the several perspectives that may be taken in order to frame the main 
trends regarding the expanding sphere of legal language studies; it is by no means 
exhaustive, definitive or static. It simply attempts to offer a frame of reference in order 
to better understand the positioning of the present work.  
 
                                                 
6
 As regards the dynamics of interaction in a jury trial, see, for instance, O‘Barr 1982. 
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1.5.3 Exploring courtroom language 
 
The language of courtrooms has been extensively investigated (see inter alia O‘Barr 
1981, Danet 1985, Levi / Walker 1990, Cotterill 2003, Heffer 2005). An overview 
inevitably implies simplifying and excluding, and I will therefore focus exclusively on 
the most significant research areas in the field of courtroom communication for the 
purpose of this study. 
Firstly, it is worth highlighting that a broad series of studies have been concerned with 
identifying and prescribing communication strategies which are successful in court. 
This, for instance, is the case of training manuals focusing on the most appropriate 
advocacy techniques to be used (‗how-to‘ books), and they are generally based on legal 
scholars‘ experience. As will be shown, the application of these theoretical principles 
and recommendations can vary significantly in practical contexts. Indeed, even though 
courtroom language can be seen as a relatively standardized communicative event, 
every moment of that interaction implies a certain level of unpredictability.  
Another series of studies (often, but not always, with their roots in the field of 
psychology) has been conducted on mock trials, often focusing on the analysis of 
juror‘s behavior and jury decision making processes (see inter alia Hastie / Penrod / 
Pennington 1983). Mock trials can offer important insights for the understanding of a 
variety of courtroom dynamics; however, issues related to assessment of the ecological 
validity of jury simulations have often been raised (Davis et al 1977, Gerbasi et al 1977, 
Bray / Kerr 1979, 1982, Diamond 1979, 1997). Indeed, every trial is so intrinsically 
context-bound and situation-bound that simulations may not be revealing for the 
investigation of real instances of courtroom discourse; more specifically, the main 
issues are related to juror representativeness, the research setting, the trial medium 
(Bornstein 1999: 75).    
Another ample area of study, which is particularly relevant to the framework of this 
work, is based on the description, exploration and explanation of actual courtroom 
proceedings. Given the complexity of trial communication, an exhaustive and definite 
categorization is not achievable, especially when one considers that different studies 
have often incorporated different orientations. Some of the main areas that may be 
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identified within courtroom language studies are based, for instance, on a 
conversational, a critical, or a corpus-based approach. 
Among the conversationally oriented studies we may cite Atkinson and Drew‘s 
influential work (1979) and Drew‘s studies (1985, 1992), which show insights into turn-
taking and interactional dynamics in the courtroom, as well as Matoesian‘s research 
(1993, 1997, 1999a, 1999b, 2001). Other studies focus in particular on the processes on 
which the examination phase is based, and on the development of question patterns 
(Harris 1984, Woodbury 1984, Philips 1987, Maley / Fahey 1991). In this area 
particular attention has also been devoted to the analysis of styles of testimony (O‘Barr  
1982). 
Like in other areas of legal language, the scholarly interest in language in the courtroom 
has progressively integrated the observation of microlinguistic details with the analysis 
of wider social dynamics (Conley et al 1978, Bennet / Feldman 1981, Jackson 1988, 
Conley / O‘Barr 1990, Matoesian 1993). Indeed, studies of the language of legal 
process have often confirmed that a courtroom represents a crucial cultural locus where 
dynamics of social power come into play. Critically oriented studies include, for 
instance, Wodak 1985, Harris 1989, 1994, Philips 1998.  
The analysis of legal discourse is here not only seen as an opportunity to scrutinize 
fascinating language phenomena, but also as a chance to understand how legal discourse 
is intertwined with social dynamics, and to investigate how legal discourse production, 
interpretation, or co-construction has crucial consequences the participants must 
experience. It may certainly be argued that this assumption is applicable to all types of 
discourse, but it cannot be denied that the impact of legal discourse is particularly 
significant; indeed, it is through and within legal discourse that power may be wielded.  
As has been mentioned (see Section 1.3.3), another significant area of research is 
forensic linguistics (McMenamin 2002, Olsson 2004, Coulthard / Johnson 2007), in 
particular as regards the investigation of the performance of linguists as expert 
witnesses (Hollien 2001, Grant 2008). On a final note, it is also worth highlighting that 
corpus-based studies have also attracted considerable interest in recent years (see Heffer 
2005).  
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1.5.4 Describing the language of the law 
 
 
1.5.4.1 Dominant features 
 
The study of legal language has often focused on the description of the principal 
features of the language of the law, interpreted primarily as the language of legal 
documents (see Section 1.3.2). Some of the main characteristics of these texts were 
extensively described in the pioneering study by Mellinkoff (1963). Along the same 
lines, Williams (2005: 31-37) identifies the following main characteristics: 
- Archaic or rarely used words or expressions; 
- Foreign words and expressions, especially Latinisms; 
- Frequent repetition of particular words, expressions and syntactic structures; 
- Long, complex sentences, with intricate patterns of coordination and 
subordination; 
- Frequent use of passive construction; 
- Highly impersonal style of writing. 
 
At a lexical level, the language of the law has frequently been described according to its 
complexity, to the extent that Mellinkoff defines it as ―wordy, unclear, pompous, dull‖ 
(Mellinkoff 1963: 23).  
Legal language has often been associated with ―the image of a context-independent 
lexicon of legal meanings‖ (Goodrich 1984: 188), but the question of stability and 
attribution of meaning is highly problematic (see Section 1.1.2) even (or especially) in 
regard to the highly specialized nature of legal rhetoric, which is often intended as a 
―unitary, internally-shielded and valorized, system of communication‖ (Goodrich 1984: 
186). Edelman writes of the language of legislation: ―The obvious approach to defining 
the meaning of legal language is to apply the dictionary meanings of the words, and the 
layman naturally assumes that this is how the experts do define its meaning. […] But 
dictionary meanings are operationally close to irrelevant so far as the function of the 
statute or treaty in the political process is concerned‖ (Edelman 1972: 139). This 
approach to the concept of meaning should be further problematized (see the Bakhtinian 
view of the appropriation of meaning mentioned above), but it does serve to highlight 
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the potential discrepancy between what meanings laymen may tend to attribute to 
certain terms and the possible interpretation of these terms in specific legal contexts.  
Among the lexical features that Danet (l985) identifies as emblematic of the legal 
register are: technical terms and common terms with uncommon meanings; archaic 
expressions; formal items (see Danet 1985: 279-80). The features identified refer to the 
most frequently emerging traits of what is here defined as the language of the law. The 
most often quoted features are (see Mellinkoff 1963, Tiersma 1999a, Williams 2005): 
 
 - The presence of archaic or rarely used words or expressions. Lexical items of this 
type are, for instance, archaic deictic forms such as hereinafter, hereafter, herein, 
hereinafter, hereof, heretofore, thereabout, thereafter, thereat, thereby, thereon, thereto, 
theretofore, thereupon, therewith. 
 
- The use of foreign words and expressions, especially of Latin origins. Among the 
Latin terms we may find
7
: 
ex parte: on behalf of 
ratio legis: the reason or principle determining a law  
a priori: from assumed principles 
bona fide: good faith, genuine, honest 
in personam: personal, personally 
inter alia: among other things 
inter se: among themselves 
mens rea: state of mind  
mutatis mutandis: with necessary changes 
obiter dictum: part of the judgment not essential to case decision 
prima facie: at first glance 
 
Besides Latinate forms, legal language also displays instances of terms of French origin, 
such as: agreement, appeal, attorney, bailiff, bar, claim, complaint, counsel, court, 
covenant, damage, declaration, defendant, demurrer, evidence, indictment, judge, 
judgment, jury, justice, party, plaintiff, plea, plead, sentence, sue, suit, summon, verdict 
                                                 
7
 See Mellinkoff (1963: 15) for further exemplifications. 
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and voir dire. Legal expression displaying a specific adjective positions, such as 
Attorney General, court martial, fee simple absolute, letters testamentary, malice 
aforethought and Solicitor General, also derive from the French language.  
 
- The use of two (or more) terms having a synonymic or similar meaning. They are also 
defined as doublets (Mellinkoff 1963) or binomial expressions (Tiersma 1999a). 
Mellinkoff places the diffusion of this practice in the period of diglossia following 
1066. A word of French origins was often presented together with its English 
correspondent in order to guarantee comprehensibility. Examples of expressions of this 
type would be: of sound mind and memory; give devise and bequeath; will and 
testament; goods and chattels; final and conclusive; fit and proper; new and novel; save 
and except; peace and quiet (Gibbons 2003: 43), as well as annul and set aside, entirely 
and completely; null and void; without let or hindrance (Mellinkoff 1963: 25). These 
practices somehow seem to confirm Mellinkoff‘s oft-quoted remark that ―[l]awyers are 
wordy. It takes them a long time to get to the point‖ (Mellinkoff 1963: 24).   
 
Other identifiable features are: 
- The use of prolix verbal constructions, such as:    
offer testimony  → testify 
make inquiry → ask 
provide assistance  →  help 
place a limitation upon  → limit 
make an examination of  → examine 
provide protection to  → protect 
reach a resolution  → resolve 
make mention of  →  mention 
be in compliance with  → comply 
make allegations  → allege 
effect settlement  → settle 
 
- Archaic morphological elements, such as the morpheme –eth used for the third person 
singular in the indicative present form, deriving from the Old English. However, such 
forms are particularly rare nowadays. 
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The syntactic traits that permeate legal language have been extensively investigated, 
particularly in a contrastive perspective in relation to more ‗ordinary‘ uses of language. 
Some of the most recurrent features are high sentence length, pervasiveness of 
nominalizations and passive forms (Crystal / Davy 1969, Shuy / Larkin 1978, Charrow / 
Charrow 1979). The language of the law is considered to display a pervasive use of 
long, complex sentences, with intricate patterns of coordination and subordination. In 
particular, legal texts are often imbued with intricate syntactical patterns, and it has 
often been stated that these texts display a certain lack of punctuation, even though 
Crystal and Davy (1969: 200-201) observe that ―[i]t is not true that legal English was 
always entirely punctuationless, and in fact the occasional specimens which were 
intended for oral presentation – proclamations, for instance – were quite fully 
punctuated. The idea of totally unpunctuated legal English is a later development‖. 
Another aspect characterizing written legal English is a highly impersonal style of 
writing (e.g. Šarčević 2000: 177, Williams 2005) and, in particular, the intense use of 
passive forms (e.g. Jackson 1995: 119-120, Williams 2004: 228), which conveys an 
aura of formality, impartiality and authoritativeness. 
 
 
1.5.4.2 Describing the language of the law: concluding remarks 
 
A detailed description of the features of legal language would exceed the scope of this 
work. Nonetheless, an outline of some common characteristics may shed some light 
upon the reasons behind this language‘s widespread reputation for intricacy and 
unfamiliarity. Any analysis of legal language must also take into consideration that this 
type of language ―is a socially constructed institution in its own right‖ (Stygall 1994: 4) 
and as such develops within constraints and may to some extent be resilient to change 
(see inter alia Stygall 1994: 4). Moreover, the complexity of legal language has often 
been seen as a way to legitimize selective access to this variety of language, and to 
disempower people who are excluded. However, it should also be noted that, because of 
its pervasiveness and the consequent variety of contexts in which it is employed, legal 
language can assume surprisingly varying contours. Furthermore, although it is often 
considered static and immutable, legal language is, like society, inevitably in constant 
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evolution (see the Plain English Movement, cf. Flesch 1979, Charrow / Charrow 1979, 
Hathaway 1983a, 1983b, 1985, Charrow 1987). 
The above mentioned features cannot be applied in toto to legal language when 
employed as a superordinate expression, and they mainly (but not exclusively) 
characterize what has, for the purpose of this study, been designated as ‗the language of 
the law‘. Such features may only occasionally emerge in other areas of legal language, 
for instance in the language of trials.  
In other words, it has been argued that the characteristics that are generally attributed to 
legal language (such as syntactic, lexical and semantic complexity) refer primarily to 
written legal language (Tiersma 2008: 22), whereas spoken legal language is ―not as 
different from ordinary speech as one might think‖ (Tiersma 2008: 23). Despite the fact 
that legal language is clearly associated with archaic and highly formal registers, it is 
interesting to note that, in certain contexts, it also includes instances of informal jargon 
(Tiersma 2008: 16, Tiersma 1999a: 137-138), for instance in courtroom communication 
(as will be illustrated in Chapter 4). Although a clear-cut and static distinction between 
the different areas of legal language is not only unachievable but also undesirable, what 
emerges is that these features cannot be extended indifferently to all areas of legal 
language use. 
Put simply, law cannot be reduced to a stagnant collection of sophisms, especially when 
one is dealing with the multifaceted language of the courtroom. 
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2. Research framework 
 
If the world is complex and messy, then at least 
some of the time we‘re going to have to give up on 
simplicities. (John Law) 
 
 
 
2.1 Research interest and rationale 
 
 
This study arises out of the desire to investigate the complexity underlying the 
interaction of different discourses within a highly institutionalized event, namely a jury 
trial. It may be argued that a society functions because of the interaction between 
experts and non-experts in different fields (Gunnarsson / Linell / Nordberg 1997: 1); 
consequently, an analysis of the interaction between these two broad categories is 
particularly crucial to any investigation of communicative events, especially those 
which take place in institutionalized settings. 
More specifically, a trial by jury represents a typical locus of knowledge asymmetries in 
that the participants, by definition, display significant differences in (inter alia) class, 
status, gender, level of education, etc. The analysis focuses in particular on the 
communication process between legal experts and non-experts. Even though such 
categories are not self-explanatory (see Section 3.5.1), in the context of a jury trial the 
belonging to (or the exclusion from) a certain professional category is one of the 
fundamental criteria which determine which people may or may not assume a certain 
role in the event. In other words, the communicative roles assumed, for instance, by 
lawyers and by jurors are clearly distinct and are highly dependent on their professional 
membership and their personal background. 
In investigating trial discourse, we are dealing with an event that is immediately 
associated with the legal sphere, and it may appear obvious to assume the constant 
emergence of a highly specialized form of language. Indeed, on the one hand the 
significantly standardized nature of the event determines the presence of procedural 
constraints and conventionalized practices; on the other hand, however, the 
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communicative strategies and the linguistic tools employed in the interactional process 
display a noteworthy level of heterogeneity. 
The discursive complexity of a trial calls for a series of questions: How do specialized 
and non-specialized discourses intermingle in a jury trial? What types of knowledge 
asymmetries are there? How are these asymmetries communicatively exploited? What 
communicative strategies and techniques are used? What are the reasons behind them?   
The choice to focus on communicative processes in the courtroom derives from the 
consideration that trials have (potentially) fundamental consequences for the life of 
individuals, as well as for society as a whole; the importance of achieving a finer 
understanding of the dynamics that shape such a crucial event is therefore also self-
evident. 
More specifically, the aim of this investigation is to combine a descriptive and an 
explanatory approach. As remarked in Chapter 1, a considerable corpus of research has 
revealingly described the purely linguistic aspects of interactions in the courtroom, 
whereas another ample body of work has focused on the prescription of what 
communicative strategies and techniques should or should not be employed. This study 
falls within the trend of research that aims to go beyond the descriptive-prescriptive 
dichotomy and attempts to merge descriptive observations with an explanatory 
approach. 
   
 
2.2 Material and data  
 
 
The main object of analysis of this dissertation is a criminal trial by jury, namely the 
David Westerfield trial, which took place in San Diego, California, in 2002. This choice 
derives, firstly, from the desire to focus on a specific type of trial (a jury trial), because 
it represents a typical example of knowledge asymmetries in a communicative event 
(see Section 3.5). The U.S. was chosen as the privileged context because it is somehow 
representative of jury trials, as the use of this type of trial is still relatively high there, 
compared to other countries: indeed, it is stated that ―[t]oday, more than 90 percent of 
the jury trials on the planet take place in the United States‖ (Young 2007), even though 
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it should be clear that exact comparative statistics are not viable
8
. It should also be 
remembered, however, that scholars have highlighted the declining importance of the 
jury trial (Koski / Saks 2003), as the number of jury trials is constantly decreasing even 
in the American system (both in criminal and civil cases), mainly because of cost and 
time issues, in comparison with other means of dispute resolution (Young 2007, von 
Mehren 2007).  
In this analysis I focused on a Californian trial because of greater previous knowledge 
of the Californian system and legislation, and the Westerfield trial in particular was 
selected for several reasons. Firstly, it was a relatively recent case at the time the data 
collection started. A considerable number of studies of trial language have been 
conducted, for instance, on the O.J. Simpson trials (in particular the criminal trial, 1995) 
because of the extraordinary media and social attention it drew, and because of its 
peculiarities (see Bugliosi 1996, Hunt 1999, Cotterill 2002, Felman 2002), but my 
intention was to focus on a more recent case; moreover, the case was concluded, which 
afforded me the possibility of gaining an overview of the entire case, from its initial to 
the conclusive stages. On a more practical note, the material was easily accessible, as 
the trial was televised. 
Using material that has already being collected has clear methodological implications, 
but it proves particularly efficient in terms of time and costs; moreover, it allows us to 
select from among different cases those that are most suitable according to a series of 
parameters, such as the length, the place or time the trial took place, the quality and the 
comprehensiveness of the video material, etc. The selection of data inevitably entails a 
subjective judgment, which should be acknowledged, and the different choices should 
be justified and explained in order to offer transparency and clarity. 
When deciding to analyze the language of a jury trial, the ―universe of possible texts‖ 
(Titscher et al 2000: 33) is extremely varied and large. Given the unique particulars of 
every trial, a comparison of different trials would have caused a significant lack of 
homogeneity (on which note the inappropriateness of random sampling for qualitative-
driven approaches has often been highlighted; see Bauer / Aarts 2000: 19). The choice 
                                                 
8
 According to the American Bar Association ―[i]t‘s been estimated that the United States accounts for 
95% of all jury trials in the world‖. Available at: 
 http://www.abanet.org/publiced/lawday/talking/jurytalk.html. Accessed on January 2, 2009. 
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to work on one single case certainly reduces the scope for generalizable results, but at 
the same time it guarantees a relatively high level of homogeneity and uniformity. 
The material gathered primarily includes video-recordings of trial sessions that took 
place between June and September 2002. One of the most obvious yet crucial 
advantages recordings have over other ways of collecting data (e.g. through a single 
observation) is the constant availability of the material for (potentially infinite) re-
examination and in-depth analyses; as Heritage remarks: ―In enabling repeated and 
detailed examination of the events of interaction, the use of recordings extends the range 
and precision of the observations which can be made‖ (Heritage 1984: 238). 
Other fundamental sources are the official transcripts carried out by the court reporter, 
which were constantly compared with the video recordings collected. Accurate 
transcripts of all the phases of the trial were available, excluding some specific 
moments, such as deliberations, since what happens in the jury room is not made public. 
The analysis of official legal transcripts represents in itself a very vast area of analysis 
(see inter alia Eades 1996), but this line of enquiry goes beyond the scope of this work. 
Other important sources of information collected are media reports, press coverage, and 
relevant legislation. They are not treated as specific subjects of the current analysis but 
have nonetheless been constantly referred to and have proved invaluable in facilitating a 
higher familiarity with the case and the context within which it developed.  
The use of video recordings would also potentially allow an analysis of non-verbal 
communication. It may certainly be argued that visual signs related to proxemics, 
graphics, artifacts, insignia, colors, dress code (Isani 2006: 51), as well as chronemics, 
haptics and other areas, play a significant role in the way different dynamics develop 
within a trial. Without wishing to disregard the crucial functions played by other 
aspects, the focus of the current analysis is primarily restricted to the verbal aspects of 
the interaction. The importance of visual semiotics in the courtroom is by no means 
neglected here, but full examination in that perspective would go beyond the purpose of 
this study.  
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2.3 Theoretical background   
 
 
The study of a particularly complex field of analysis such as courtroom discourse may 
require venturing into a variety of different theoretical approaches, with the awareness 
that, as Popper observes:   
    
―[A]t any moment we are prisoners caught in the framework of our 
theories; our expectations; our past experiences; our language. But we are 
prisoners in a Pickwickian sense; if we try, we can break out of our 
framework at any time. Admittedly, we shall find ourselves again in a 
framework, but it will be a better and a roomier one, and we can at any 
moment break out of it again‖. (Popper 1970: 56) 
 
First of all, I consider it necessary to delve into the multifaceted notion of discourse, and 
to clarify the approach to discourse that will be adopted here, as a specific view of 
language and discourse inevitably shapes the theoretical, argumentative and analytical 
framework.  
 
 
2.3.1 The notion of discourse  
 
Despite the limits intrinsic in any definition, it is clear that one needs to explicitly 
delimit the theoretical perspective that is being adopted. It is also obvious that while 
limiting one‘s perspective, one is deliberatively deciding not to look at other aspects of 
a certain theory; however, as van Dijk remarks, that too is necessary, lest the theory 
employed become a ―Theory of Everything‖, a blunt instrument which is too broad to 
be incisive (van Dijk 2009: 3). 
The conceptualization of ‗discourse‘ is fundamental to the application of any form of 
discourse analysis and, inexorably, for any reflection upon the theme of language and 
the law. Therefore, some preliminary observations on the interpretation of the term 
‗discourse‘ used in this work will now be presented, though not without an awareness of 
the risk of attempting to offer any definition, and keeping in mind that the ubiquity of 
66 
 
the word ‗discourse‘ in different fields of analysis inevitably complicates any attempt to 
define it.  
As has been mentioned, the core of this study is an analysis of courtroom discourses. 
However, defining complex concepts such as ‗discourse‘ and ‗discourse analysis‘ would 
probably be too much to ask of one work, to the extent van Dijk describes his two 
extensive volumes on discourse (van Dijk 1997b, 1997c) as a mere attempt to answer 
the basic question of what discourse is.   
There is little consensus as to the meaning of the term ‗discourse‘. While some 
definitions associate discourse exclusively with the notion of ‗language‘, it is generally 
agreed that the concept of discourse somewhat refers broadly to ‗a form of language 
use‘ (e.g. van Dijk 1997a: 2), or ‗language in use‘ (e.g. Fairclough 2003). Obviously, a 
fully fledged overview of all the interpretations of the concepts of language and 
discourse is not feasible here. However, one of the basic assumptions I embrace is Lee‘s 
view that ―language is not just to communicate information. Language is, in addition, 
also a device to think and feel with, as well as a device with which to signal and 
negotiate social identity‖ (Lee 1992: 78); moreover, the idea that ―language has 
meaning only in and through practices‖ (Gee 1999: 8) constitutes a central theoretical 
postulation in this work.  
De Beaugrande colorfully illustrates the complex nature of language by highlighting 
that ―in the world of human beings, you won‘t find a language by itself – the Dutch 
language strolling by the canals, or the English language having a nice cup of tea, or the 
German language racing madly along the autobahn. You only find discourse, that is, 
real communicative events‖ (de Beaugrande 1997a: 36, original emphasis). The notion 
of ‗communicative event‘ is also seen by van Dijk as a characterization of discourse that 
embodies some functional aspects, such as who uses language, why, when, where and 
how (van Dijk 1997a: 2). 
A complementary interpretation of the concept of discourse is suggested by Tomlin et al 
(1997: 64-65) using the concept of the ‗blueprint metaphor‘ of discourse. From this 
perspective, discourse can be explained through two different metaphorical constructs. 
According to the idea of ‗conduit metaphor‘ (Reddy 1979), the meaning intended by the 
speaker is contained within a ‗textual artifact‘ which is then ‗conducted‘ to the listener, 
and the latter then extracts the meaning from this artifact. Language in this view is 
considered a ―precision instrument, which is used to craft precise meaning, fully 
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embodied in the text‖ (Tomlin et al 1997: 64). Conversely, the theoretical interpretation 
of the concept of discourse that underlies this work is akin to the idea of ‗blueprint 
metaphor of discourse‘ (Tomlin et al 1997: 65). That means that the listener is given a 
highly active role in the conceptual representation of meanings. The text itself is 
therefore seen as a scheme, a reference, or a guide to help the listener or the reader to 
construct meanings through a series of conceptual models. 
As has been noted, we can take as a point of departure the idea that, as Brown and Yule 
note, ―the analysis of discourse is, necessarily, the analysis of language in use‖, (Brown 
/ Yule 1983: 1). Consequently, ―it cannot be restricted to the description of linguistic 
forms independent of the purposes or functions which these forms are designed to serve 
in human affairs‖ (Brown / Yule 1983: 1). 
Some of the basic postulations shared by different approaches to discourse analysis are 
summarized by Johnstone (2008: 8-19): 
 
- Discourse is shaped by the world, and discourse shapes the world 
- Discourse is shaped by the possibilities and limitations of language, and 
discourse shapes language 
- Discourse is shaped by relations among participants, and discourse shapes 
relations 
- Discourse is shaped by prior discourse, and discourse shapes present and future 
discourse 
- Discourse is shaped by the medium, and discourse shapes the medium 
- Discourse is shaped by purpose, and discourse shapes possible purposes. 
 
Van Dijk further explores the idea of discourse by specifying that the notion of 
language use is also integrated with two other dimensions, namely the  communication 
of beliefs and social interaction, and it is highlighted that the aim of discourse studies 
should be to investigate these three dimensions in an integrative way (van Dijk 1997a: 
2). Moreover, the crucial role played by social practice for any analysis of discourse is 
emphasized by Fairclough, who states that ‗discourse‘ is ―more than just language use: 
it is language use, whether speech or writing, seen as a type of social practice‖ 
(Fairclough 1992b: 28, original emphasis). 
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Consequently, applying this notion of discourse to the study of legal discourse, it goes 
without saying that legal discourse goes beyond legal vocabulary. In Cornu‘s terms, ―le 
discours juridique est, par opposition au vocabulaire juridique, l‘autre versant du 
langage du droit: c‘est le langage du droit en action‖ (Cornu 2005: 207).  
 
 
2.3.2 Discourse in/as/and context? 
 
The debate arising around the possibility/necessity of including ‗context‘ in the analysis 
of conversation (Schegloff 1998, Wetherell 1998, Billig 1999, van Dijk 2007, 
Fairclough 2008) is particularly pertinent to this work. Studies in the area of 
Conversation Analysis (CA) tend to assume that contextual information is significant in 
the analysis of discourse only when it is noticeably ‗oriented to‘ by the participants and 
is therefore considered ‗procedurally relevant‘ (Schegloff 1992); however, a 
considerable number of studies within CA acknowledge the importance of certain 
aspects of context in the analysis of conversation (Boden 1994, Drew / Heritage 1992). 
Crucial to this investigation is the assumption that the complex nature of discourse, the 
inextricability of discourse and context, and the inherent interdiscursivity of any 
discourse cannot be overlooked. As Fairclough and Wodak remark: ―Discourse is not 
produced without context and cannot be understood without taking context into 
consideration. […] Discourses are always connected to other discourses which were 
produced earlier, as well as those which are produced synchronically and subsequently‖ 
(Fairclough / Wodak 1997: 277). 
All dimensions of discourse seem, therefore, to depend to some extent on what has been 
defined as the ―discourse relativity principle‖ (van Dijk 1997a: 9), the idea that any 
element of discourse is influenced by (and in turn influences) all the other verbal and 
non-verbal elements that surround (and in turn constitute) it. Indeed, the role of 
contextual features is fundamental because they ―not only influence discourse, but also 
vice versa‖ (van Dijk 1997a: 19), and this reciprocal influence is at the heart of the 
interpretation of discourse and context adopted here. It is further assumed, therefore, 
that ―discourse and its users have a ‗dialectic‘ relation with their context: besides being 
subject to the social constraints of the context, they also contribute to, construe or 
change that context‖ (van Dijk 1997a: 20). 
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On the basis of these assumptions, any effective analysis of discourse must entail a 
holistic approach that considers (in a Faircloughian view) texts, discourse practices and 
social practices as interdependent entities. Indeed, any communicative event is not only 
embedded in a certain social context, but also socially situated and constructed, and in 
turn constructive. In other words, it is widely agreed that the meaning of any discourse 
cannot be alienated from the social context or situation in which it develops; moreover, 
beyond being socially constructed, discourses are in turn constructive, as they frame, 
shape and reshape the institutional and social practices they go hand-in-hand with. 
Discourse may therefore be seen as ―a means which both reproduces and constructs 
afresh particular socio-discursive practices‖ (Candlin 1997: VIII). Put differently, 
discourses are understood as being inseparable from society at large. 
As Merry remarks: ―Discourses are aspects of culture, interconnected vocabularies and 
systems of meaning located in a social world‖ (Merry 1990: 110). The investigation of 
discourses in highly institutionalized contexts also calls for a reflection on the high 
intricateness of the idea of ‗systems of meanings‘ and on the concept of appropriation of 
meaning (see Section 1.1.2). As Wetherell observes, meaning can be seen as 
conventional in that it is the result of a series of conventions and practices, but it is also 
inevitably relational, in that discourse constantly ―adds to, instantiates, extends, and 
transforms the cultural storehouse of meanings‖ (Wetherell 2001: 18). Merry‘s 
definition of discourse also emphasizes the importance of the well-established notion 
that a dialectic relationship exists between discourses and the specific institutions to 
which they are intrinsically linked: 
 
―A discourse is not individual and idiosyncratic but part of a shared 
cultural world. Discourses are rooted in particular institutions and 
embody their culture. Actors operate within a structure of available 
discourses. However within that structure there is space for creativity and 
actors define and frame their problems within one or another discourse‖. 
(Merry 1990: 110) 
 
What emerges, without neglecting the presence of specific structures that frame/demark 
the structures of possible discourses, is the enormous creative potential of the actors 
/participants involved. Indeed, the analysis of courtroom discourse will show instances 
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of manifestly standardized talk which coexist with highly multifaceted and creative 
instances of talk.  
The verbal dimension will be the privileged field of analysis; the aim is not to carry out 
a sterile description of words, but to understand not only what is being said (or written), 
but also by whom, how, when and why (see Section 2.3.1); this is in line with the idea 
that ‗text‘ cannot be separated from ‗context‘, intended as ―the other characteristics of 
the social situation or the communicative event that may systematically influence text or 
talk‖ (van Dijk1997a: 3). In other words, I will examine not only the result of the 
interaction, but also a number of (constituent) elements that determine it.  
In operationalizing these notions of discourse, and applying them to the analysis of a 
communicative event, we can ask, from a primarily descriptive perspective, what is 
being said and how, and from a more explanatory point of view we can try to 
understand the reasons behind these choices, considering the immense richness of 
potential resources actors can choose from within a language. In doing so, it must be 
highlighted that context is an object of study in itself, and not just a contour to 
artificially isolated words and sentences: contexts do not only constrain; they also 
create. In other words, discourse cannot be seen as an epiphenomenon of specific 
contexts and specific contextual dynamics.  
 
 
2.3.3 Social context and context models 
 
I have argued that an analysis of discourse cannot fail to take the notion of ‗context‘9 
into account, but the definition of this concept is highly complex. Context may 
generally be described as a communicative situation or environment; it may also refer to 
a verbal context, or co-text. However, texts, co-texts and social situations are highly 
interdependent and reciprocally co-construct, in a fluid and dynamic way. An attempt to 
visualize this interdependence is offered in Figure 4:  
                                                 
9
 For a deeper discussion of the notion of context see inter alia Duranti / Goodwin 1992, van Dijk 1977, 
2006, 2007, 2009.  
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Figure 4: Interdependence of text, co-text and social situation 
 
Figure 4 is to be intended exclusively as a preliminary visualization which attempts to 
show the interrelation between contextual elements, such as text, co-text and social 
situation. However, a more comprehensive description of contexts must also take into 
account their high subjectivity and relativity: contexts are subjective, in that they are 
―embedded in set of autobiographical representations in episodic memory‖ (van Dijk 
2009: 249) and are inevitably relative, as the participants themselves define what is 
relevant in the social situation (van Dijk 2009: 5).  
Central to the current study are the strong bonds of interdependence and mutual 
construction which link the concepts of discourse and social context. It is important to 
highlight, however, that social contexts and their characteristics do not exercise a direct 
influence on discourse; indeed, ―there is no direct link between situational or social 
structures and discourse structures‖ (van Dijk 2009: VII) and to assume the existence of 
an inevitable causal relationship between the two would be a deterministic fallacy (van 
Dijk 2009: 4). 
This is not to neglect the fundamental relationship between these two structures, but 
merely to emphasize that the link is not directly a causal one, for the very intuitive 
reason that, if it were, all language users sharing specific situational or social structures 
would therefore use language in exactly the same way (van Dijk 2009: VII). The 
relationship is understood here as being mediated by ‗context models‘, which draw on 
co-text
social 
situation
context
Text
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the idea of ‗mental models‘10 (see Johnson-Laird 1983). Context models are defined as 
―subjective definitions of the communicative situation as they are construed and 
dynamically updated by the participants‖ (van Dijk 2009: VII). These models determine 
the social, personal and situational variability of language use (van Dijk 2009: VIII). 
This notion is in line with the idea that ―visible language is only the tip of the iceberg of 
invisible meaning construction‖ (Fauconnier 1997: 1); indeed, as van Dijk remarks, 
participants in a communicative event are not ‗blank slates‘, but bring with them their 
sociocultural knowledge and their personal background. The influence that social 
contexts have on the participants, therefore, is not automatically causal, but rather it is 
mediated by the individuals‘ ‗context models‘ (van Dijk 2009: VIII-IX). According to 
van Dijk (2009: 251), context models are formed and constantly evolve, in accordance 
with the following elements: 
 
- Previous context planning yielding a provisional context 
- Observation and analysis of the current social and communicative situation 
- Inferences from previous discourse in the situation 
- Inferences from ongoing activities of participants 
- Recalling previous context models 
- Instantiation of general knowledge about contexts 
- Application of general personal and social aims and goals (van Dijk 2009: 251). 
 
In light of the fact that ―simply getting one‘s hands on the shape of context is a major 
analytical problem‖ (Duranti / Goodwin 1992: 13), these reflections do not aim to offer 
a comprehensive definition of context; rather, they merely aim to address the 
complexity which underlies the concept, to stress the idea that contexts are not simple, 
objectively observable contours of discourse, and to point out that the strong 
relationship between discourse and social structures cannot be assumed to be automatic 
                                                 
10
 For a deeper discussion of mental models see inter alia Norman (1983) and Young (1983). In 
particular, Norman writes: ―Mental models are naturally evolving models. That is, through interaction 
with a target system, people formulate mental models of that system. These models need not be 
technically accurate (and usually are not), but they must be functional. A person, through interaction with 
the system, will continue to modify the mental model in order to get a workable result. Mental models 
will be constrained by such things as the user‘s technical background, previous experience with similar 
systems, and the structure of the human information processing system‖ (Norman 1983: 7-8). 
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and linear. In this respect, Wodak, too, confirms that simplistic causal models fail to fit 
the complexities of most of the phenomena of modern society (Wodak 2001b: 63).  
  
 
 
2.3.4 Analyzing discourse  
 
The discussion of the interpretation of discourse offered here is by no means exclusive. 
It simply aims to foreground some of the issues related to language in use and to place 
its analysis within a framework that goes beyond mere linguistic description. Following 
van Dijk (1997a: 29-31), I will now summarize some of the main principles of discourse 
analysis on which the approach adopted in this study is based: 
 
1. Naturally occurring text and talk: unlike other approaches to language studies, 
discourse analysis focuses on authentic instances of discourse, and not on 
utterances that are artificially invented or created in order to illustrate a specific 
point. Indeed, the current analysis is based on authentic data drawn from a real 
event.  
 
2. Context: as I hope to have illustrated, the interdependence between text and 
context is one of the most crucial aspects to be considered by discourse analysts. 
I will therefore try to offer an explanatory approach that is also based on the 
analysis of a series of contextual elements; therefore, several factors, such as the 
setting, the participants and the relationships between them, or the institutional 
constraints, will also be taken into account. 
 
3. Discourse as talk: the modes that characterize discourse are generally defined as 
written or spoken and may be seen as one of the features used to identify a 
typology of discourse (van Dijk 1997a: 7). The term ‗text‘ will here be used 
according to the well established conception that ‗text‘ may be intended as a 
superordinate term which may refer to different modes (such as written, spoken 
or visual) and not exclusively to the written mode. In this study the analysis of 
spoken interaction will be predominant, but, as discourse studies are also fashion 
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victims, it has also been pointed out that the interest in spoken texts should not 
lead to a sort of ―neglect‖ of written ones (van Dijk 1997a: 30). It has often been 
stated that ―everything in a trial is achieved through the spoken word‖ (Walter 
1988: 225), even though this interpretation may be seen as an oversimplification. 
In this respect it is crucial to highlight that different modes constantly interrelate 
in trial communication, and written texts play a crucial role within a trial. It will 
suffice to say that, although trial proceedings are conducted orally, they are 
simultaneously transcribed, in order to assume the form of official records, 
whose importance in the context of legal proceedings is evident. Moreover, the 
interaction between different modes is constantly present, and there are 
continuous references to written texts
11
. An in-depth analysis of all the written 
texts produced in the course of a trial would simply be an unfeasible task and 
would certainly go beyond the scope of this dissertation. It should not be 
forgotten, however, that a strong interrelation exists between texts characterized 
by different modes.  
 
4. Discourse as social practice of society members: discourse is to be intended as a 
form of social practice that is shaped by (and in turns shapes) a specific context. 
This assumption inevitably leads to the concept of constructivity. 
 
5. Constructivity: the constructive aspect of discourse, in van Dijk‘s sense, refers to 
the idea that the constitutive units of discourses ―may be functionally used, 
understood or analysed as elements of larger ones‖ (van Dijk 1997a: 30, original 
emphasis). Following one of the paradigms that are axiomatic in most variants 
of CDA (see Section 2.4), discourse is not only socially constructed, but is also 
constructive. For instance, in the case of a trial the different discourses are 
socially constructed, are determined by social, cultural, institutional, 
professional practices, values and principles and are in turn constitutive of such 
practices.  
 
                                                 
11
 For instance, jury instructions may be primarily understood as written texts which are meant to be 
spoken, but they are also generally made available in the written mode for future reference (see Section 
4.4). 
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Other important concepts to be highlighted in the current analysis are the fluidity of 
discourse boundaries and the ideas of intertextuality and interdiscursivity. Discourse 
may be intended according to different degrees of abstractness-concreteness and 
generality-specificity. From a general and abstract perspective, ‗discourse‘ may be used 
to refer to language in use or to certain domains of language use. We may also use the 
term to refer to more concrete and specific instances of language use. More specifically, 
in his seminal discussion of the notion of discourse, van Dijk distinguishes between an 
abstract use of the term intended as a ―type of social phenomenon in general‖ and a 
more concrete use when employed to refer to ―a concrete example token of text or talk‖ 
(1997a: 4, original emphasis). Obviously, his distinction is not clear-cut, because the 
identification and establishment of boundaries of discourse is not unproblematic. For 
instance, if I give a 5-minute speech, there may be a vast (although not unanimous) 
consensus in defining that communicative event as an instance of discourse, but in the 
case of more complex events several complications arise.  
In the analysis of a trial it is unavoidable that a simplistic description may not be 
applicable, as we are trying to analyze an authentic instance of complex human 
interaction and communication. Is it possible to understand a trial as representing a 
single discourse? Is it to be intended as a series of micro-discourses, or as a sequence of 
interrelated discourses? More specifically, in van Dijk‘s terms, ―we might have to 
distinguish between ‗simple‘ and ‗compound‘ discourses, or between discourses and 
‗discourse complexes‘‖ (1997a: 4-5). The intricacy of these notions is evident if we 
reflect upon what parameters should be taken into consideration in order to distinguish 
between these potential types of discourses. What level of simplicity should we be 
dealing with to be able to say that we are talking about a ‗simple‘ discourse, especially 
given the interdiscursive nature of all instances of discourse? Indeed, the intertextual 
and interdiscursive nature of discourses
12
 (see Kristeva 1970, Bakhtin 1981, 1986) is 
another fundamental element to be taken into consideration in their analysis.  
Hansen observes that the phenomenon of intertextuality allows different texts to 
mutually construct their legitimacy: 
 
                                                 
12
 For a discussion of interdiscursivity in legal genres see Section 1.3.3. 
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―As a text makes references to older texts it constructs legitimacy for its 
own reading, but it also simultaneously reconstructs and reproduces the 
classical status of the older ones. Rather than seeing new texts as 
depending on older ones, one should therefore see the two as interacting 
in an exchange where one text gains legitimacy from quoting and the 
other gains legitimacy from being quoted. This construction of an 
intertextual link produces mutual legitimacy and creates an exchange at 
the level of meaning‖. (Hansen 2005: 57)  
 
More specifically, according to Fairclough, ―intertextuality is basically the property 
texts have of being full of snatches of other texts, which may be explicitly demarcated 
or merged in, and which the text may assimilate, contradict, ironically echo, and so 
forth‖ (1992a: 84). Intertextuality is not only ‗manifest‘, but also ‗constitutive‘, and the 
idea of ‗constitutive intertextuality‘ is defined as ‗interdiscursivity‘ (Fairclough 1992a: 
85). In this respect, Fairclough adds: ―On the one hand, we have the heterogeneous 
constitution of texts out of specific other texts (manifest intertextuality); on the other 
hand, the heterogeneous constitution of texts out of elements (types of convention) of 
orders of discourse (interdiscursivity)‖ (Fairclough 1992a: 85). In Fairclough‘s view, 
interdiscursivity is defined as the phenomenon of a text‘s drawing upon a ―particular 
mix of genres, of discourses, and of styles‖ (Fairclough 2003: 218).  
The crucial constitutive role played by intertextual and interdiscursive elements is also 
emphasized by Candlin and Maley, who also reflect further on the evolving and 
dynamic character of discourse:  
 
―Discourses are made internally variable by the incorporation of such 
intertextual and interdiscursive elements. Such evolving discourses are 
thus intertextual in that they manifest a plurality of text sources. 
However, insofar as any characteristic text evokes a particular discoursal 
value, in that it is associated with some institutional and social meaning, 
such evolving discourses are at the same time interdiscursive‖. (Candlin / 
Maley 1997: 203, original emphasis) 
 
Consequently, such considerations also call for an interdiscursive analytical approach: 
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―What emerges is a requirement for a parallel and complex 
interdiscursivity of analysis, matching the interplay between the micro 
and the macro, the actual and the historical, the ethnographic and the 
ethnomethodological, the interactively sociolinguistic and the 
discoursal/textual and to acknowledge the need to offer explanations of 
why rather than merely descriptions of how‖. (Candlin 1997: XII, original 
emphasis) 
 
 
 
2.4 Methodological framework  
 
 
This study is primarily guided by a qualitative approach, and it draws on different 
research orientations, in the light of the assumption that these orientations are not 
mutually exclusive, but can instead be seen as complementary. Indeed, they are not 
necessarily in conflict with one another and can be profitably combined to offer deeper 
insights into the same event. Social research is intrinsically sensitive to the complexity 
of social reality and therefore interdisciplinarity and multiple research methodologies 
are often adopted, in line with the idea  that ―different research perspectives may be 
combined and supplemented‖ (Flick 2002: 25). Discourse studies constitute no 
exception to this wider trend, and the application of different approaches, deriving from 
both qualitative and quantitative orientations, is becoming increasingly common within 
the discipline. 
An approach based on multiple methodological standpoints might intuitively call for an 
association with the concept of triangulation (Denzin 1978); to some extent, this study 
applies the concept of ―methodological‖ triangulation (Denzin 1978: 295), derived from 
the idea that ―each method reveals different aspects of empirical reality‖ (Denzin 1978: 
28). However, I would like to point out that this approach is not naively intended as an 
opportunity to obtain a complete and objective picture of such a complex event. The 
combination of different methodological orientations can simply constitute a means of 
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achieving a deeper understanding of the phenomenon being investigated, but it is clearly 
not an automatic and mechanical test of validity. 
More specifically, some of the main aspects of a case study (Yin 2009) are integrated 
with different approaches drawing on discourse analysis, and the overall qualitative 
approach is also combined with instances of quantitative-based analyses. In particular, 
the use of computer-based analysis may be fruitfully employed for testing and 
corroborating purposes, and can prove revealing in investigating, for instance, specific 
(linguistic) features.  
In the traditional dichotomy between a large-N cross-case method and a case study (or 
within-case) method (Gerring 2007: 1-13), this work may be seen to fall within the 
latter approach. However, as mentioned above, the two approaches are not necessarily 
mutually exclusive. Although case studies tend traditionally to be associated with 
qualitative research, quantitative methods are not therefore excluded a priori and 
Gerring notes that ―[t]o study a single case intensively need not limit an investigator to 
qualitative techniques‖ (Gerring 2007: 10). However, the definition of this project as a 
case study is not unproblematic, as different forms of case study research may overlap 
with other approaches. One of the particularities of case studies is their grounding in the 
examination ―of a single entity bounded by time and place‖ (Daymon / Holloway 2002: 
105), but the definition of what may be labeled as a single entity may not be automatic. 
For instance, the case analyzed is a specific communicative and social event, i.e. a 
criminal trial by jury, with particular attention being devoted to some specific phases of 
the trial, but it is plausible to wonder whether an entire trial may be labeled as a single 
entity, given its compound and complex nature
13
. Case study research is, however, 
particularly relevant to this study, as it is guided by the intrinsic purpose of increasing 
―knowledge about real, contemporary communication events in their context‖ (Daymon 
/ Holloway 2002: 105); moreover, concentration on one single phenomenon allows an 
in-depth investigation in order ―to uncover the manifest interaction of significant factors 
characteristic of this phenomenon‖ (Berg 2004: 251). 
 
 
                                                 
13
 See in this respect van Dijk‘s (1997a) discussion of the concepts of ‗simple‘ and ‗compound‘ 
discourses, and ‗discourse complexes‘ (see Section 2.3). 
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2.4.1 Discourse analytical approach  
 
The approach used in this work can be defined as primarily descriptive-explanatory. 
Indeed, a description of some of the linguistic features and the discursive practices that 
emerge in courtroom communication will be a point of departure, and it will be 
intertwined with the attempt to explain the linguistic, discursive, societal, and legal 
reasons underlying such practices. 
Discourse Analysis
14
 (DA) therefore plays a crucial role in this investigation. DA is not 
primarily concerned with language as an abstract system (Johnstone 2008: 3) and can be 
understood, in very general terms, as a discipline that goes beyond textual analysis and 
explores who uses language in certain contexts, how, why and when (van Dijk 1997a: 
2). Indeed, the aim of this study is not only to describe discourse, understood as 
language in social practice, but also to uncover and explain some of the several complex 
dynamics beyond the text. In this sense discourse analysis cannot abstract from a 
contextual analysis that goes beyond the microtextual level. Different forms of DA tend 
to combine a descriptive approach (according to the idea that ―describing texts and how 
they work is always a goal along the way‖, cf. Johnstone 2008: 27) and a more 
explanatory and critical goal. 
It is widely agreed that DA has developed into (and according to) different approaches, 
and Wood and Kroger observe that ―there seems to be a move toward recognizing the 
strengths of different approaches and the possibility of drawing on more than one 
approach within the same project‖ (Wood / Kroger 2000: 24-25). 
First of all, some of the theoretical assumptions derived from Critical Discourse 
Analysis (CDA) will be discussed, even though the work is not purely CDA-oriented
15
. 
Furthermore, the fact that in courtroom communication spoken interaction plays a 
crucial role may call for a reflection upon the potential use of Conversation Analysis 
(CA) in this investigation. A communicative event consists of myriad types of 
interaction, and studies in CA have dealt with a variety of aspects that characterize such 
interactions, such as turn-taking, sequence organization, repair, etc. Each of these 
                                                 
14
 For an overview of discourse analysis see inter alia Blommaert 2005, Brown / Yule 1983, Gee 2005, 
Schiffrin 1994, Titscher et al 2000. 
15
 Given the heterogeneity of methodological and theoretical orientations included in the notion of CDA, 
it could certainly be argued that the definition of any work as purely CDA-oriented would be inevitably 
problematic.  
80 
 
properties of talk may prove to be particularly revealing in the comprehension of 
interactions. Consequently, certain concepts derived from CA will be taken into 
consideration; however, the study will not include their systematic methodological 
application. This choice is based on the idea that, as Fairclough explains, conversation 
analysis has generally been reluctant to make or highlight connections between the 
―‗micro structures of conversation‘ and the ‗macro‘ structures of social institutions and 
society‖ (Fairclough 2001b: 9) and the connection between these two levels constitutes 
one of the focal points of this study.   
Furthermore, on a more practical note, the data have not been transcribed in line with 
the conventions which are crucial in CA studies (Jefferson 1983, 2004). Obviously, this 
is by no means intended to neglect the significance of their use, especially in the light of 
the idea that a transcription constitutes not only a way of preparing the material to be 
analyzed, but also a ‗research activity‘ itself (Atkinson / Heritage 1984). As has often 
been suggested, discourse analysts generally study ―records of discourse‖. In the case of 
spoken discourse, texts are usually recorded and transcribed; their existence is therefore 
dependent on the analyst‘s choices regarding their ‗entextualization‘ (Johnstone 2008: 
20-21). As Johnstone remarks (2008: 21), ―[e]very choice about what to count as a text 
for analysis is a choice about what to include but also about what to exclude. Such 
choices about what and how much to treat as a complete unit and where to draw its 
boundaries have important ramifications for the conclusions we draw‖. Indeed, it must 
be underlined that the transcriber‘s decisions have significant theoretical and practical 
implications, and consequently a transcript is necessary partial (Ochs 1979a, Bucholtz 
2000). 
I have elsewhere (Anesa 2010: 211-212) highlighted that I share Pallotti‘s view that 
transcribed data cannot be considered as authentic data as they have inevitably 
undergone a process of transposition (Pallotti 2007: 41-42), and they are based on 
approximations that frequently depend on ―the target language‘s alphabet‖ (Pallotti 
2007: 41). As has often been stated, by choosing not to include certain details the 
transcriber is deliberately making a selection, but is not necessarily making a mistake. 
From this perspective, it may be misleading to assume that transcripts that do not record 
certain details are necessarily imperfect, especially if we admit that ―[t]here cannot be a 
perfect transcript‖ (Silverman 1993: 124, original emphasis) and that ―[n]o transcription 
system could possibly be ideal for all purposes‖ (Johnstone 2008: 23). Furthermore, in 
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the inevitable trade-off between precision and readability that is inherent in any 
transcription, the latter aspect has been privileged for the purpose of this study. 
 
 
2.4.2 Critical discourse analysis  
 
Different approaches to discourse analysis are integrated in the current study. The 
perspective adopted partially draws on what Fairclough defines as ―textually oriented 
discourse analysis‖ (Fairclough 2003: 2, cf. Fairclough 1992a), one of whose main 
assumptions is that ―language is an irreducible part of social life, dialectically 
interconnected with other elements of social life‖ (Fairclough 2003: 2). Fairclough 
observes that this approach has its point of reference in Systemic Functional Linguistics 
(SFL) (see Halliday 1978, 1994, Halliday / Hasan 1976, 1989), in that ―SFL is 
profoundly concerned with the relationship between language and other elements and 
aspects of social life‖ (Fairclough 2003: 5). However, the author also points out that the 
two perspectives diverge in terms of aims (Fairclough 2003: 5-6; see also Chouliaraki / 
Fairclough 1999).   
This perspective may somehow be positioned within the broader framework of Critical 
Discourse Analysis (CDA). There is general consensus upon the idea that CDA cannot 
be classified as a single method, but may be seen as an approach including different 
theoretical and methodological perspectives, ranging from Faircloughian approaches 
(Fairclough 1992b, 1995b, 1995c, 2000a, 2000b, 2001a, 2003, Fairclough / Mauranen 
1997, Chouliaraki / Fairclough 1999) to more socio-cognitive oriented studies (van Dijk 
1993, 1997a, 1997b, 2009), from Wodak‘s discourse-historical line (Wodak 2001b) to 
Gunnarsson‘s applied discourse analysis (1997) or Scollon‘s definition of mediated-DA 
(Scollon 1998, 2001a, 2001b). Even though CDA does not represent the only approach 
adopted in this work, some of the theoretical perspectives related to it are particularly 
relevant.  
As has been highlighted, crucial to the understanding of any discourse analytical 
approach are the notions of text and discourse. In Fairclough‘s approach to CDA (e.g. 
Fairclough 1993) ‗text‘ refers to ―the written or spoken language produced in a 
discursive event‖ (Fairclough 1993: 138) and the multi-semiotic value associated to the 
notion of text (see Fairclough 1995a) is also emphasized. ‗Discourse‘ can be interpreted 
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at a more abstract level referring to the ―language use conceived as social practice‖, but 
it may also be described, especially when used as a countable noun, as a ―way of 
signifying experience from a particular perspective‖ (Fairclough 1993: 138). 
A discursive event will here be defined, following Fairclough, as an ―instance of 
language use, analysed as text, discursive practice, social practice‖ (Fairclough 1993: 
138), as outlined in Fairclough‘s oft-quoted three-dimensional model of discourse 
(Fairclough 1992a: 73). Even though the model may tend to mask several complexities, 
it nonetheless helps to show the main approach adopted to the analysis of discourse and 
its shifting foci. Fairclough clearly states that ―text analysis is an essential part of 
discourse analysis, but discourse analysis is not merely the linguistic analysis of text‖ 
(Fairclough 2003: 3). Indeed, the analysis of discourse fluctuates between the 
investigation of textual units and discursive and social practices. 
In line with the assumption that language assumes a socially constitutive function, 
Fairclough also affirms that ―[l]anguage use is always simultaneously constitutive of (i) 
social identities, (ii) social relations and (iii) systems of knowledge and beliefs‖ 
(Fairclough 1993: 134). Language is simultaneously socially constitutive and socially 
shaped. The latter phenomenon, too, is noticeably complex, as the relationship between 
language use and social factors is not automatic (Fairclough 1995a), particularly in light 
of the fact that multiple discourses coexist within the same event. 
Different variants of CDA share some of the principles of CDA highlighted in 
Fairclough‘s (e.g. 1992, 1993) and Fairclough and Wodak‘s (1997) seminal works. One 
of these fundamental principles is the focus on social problems. CDA focuses on 
language in use, with the aim of critically unraveling the dynamics behind social issues, 
and the results of such investigations have social, political, cultural and economic 
implications. Indeed, most variants of CDA see discourse as ‗a form as social practice‘ 
(Fairclough / Wodak 1997). CDA analysts also insist on the discursive character of 
power relations, in that CDA aims to investigate how power dynamics are exercised and 
negotiated in and through discourse. More specifically, Luke remarks: 
 
―CDA involves a principled and transparent shunting back and forth 
between the microanalysis of texts using varied tools of linguistic, 
semiotic, and literary analysis and the macroanalysis of social 
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formations, institutions, and power relations that these texts index and 
construct‖ (Luke 2002: 100)  
 
Luke (2002: 101) also points out that ―the actual power of the text, its material and 
discourse consequences, can only be described by reference to broader social theoretic 
models of the world‖ (Luke 2002: 102, see also Pennycook 2001), otherwise there is a 
tangible risk of running into ‗logocentric fallacies‘ (Luke 2002: 102).   
Adopting a different but related perspective, Stubbs also emphasizes the strong 
interrelation between discourse and ideology and starkly highlights the danger that can 
spring from a conceptualization of language as clear and self-evident: ―It is the view 
that language is natural and transparent, and that texts merely record rather than 
interpret, which conceals ideology and leads to indoctrination‖ (Stubbs 1996: 94). 
Inherent in the notion of CDA is the concept of critique, which according to Wodak 
entails ―having distance to the data, embedding the data in the social, taking a political 
stance explicitly, and a focus on self-reflection as scholars doing research‖ (Wodak 
2001a: 9), often adopting an interpretative and explanatory focus (Fairclough / Wodak 
1997, Wodak 1996, 2001a, 2001b). Moreover, Wodak‘s interpretation of the ‗critical‘ 
aspect of analysis is related to the idea of ―not taking things for granted, opening up 
complexity, challenging reductionism, dogmatism and dichotomies, being self-
reflective‖ (Kendall 2007: 3). 
 
 
2.4.2.1 Critiques of CDA  
 
Various approaches to CDA have attracted criticism, often being accused of lacking 
clear methodological foundations. From this perspective, Schegloff remarks:  
 
―I understand that critical discourse analysts have a different project, and 
are addressed to different issues, and not to the local co-construction of 
interaction. If, however, they mean the issues of power, domination, and 
the like to connect up with discursive material, it should be a serious 
rendering of that material…Otherwise the critical analysis will not ‗bind‘ 
to the data, and risks ending up merely ideological‖. (Schegloff 1997: 20)  
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Criticism along these lines primarily comes from more CA-based perspectives, but it 
has to be pointed out that, although CA and CDA adopt considerably different 
orientations, they are not necessarily incompatible and may potentially be adopted in a 
complementary way (Wetherell 1998). Indeed, as I also hope to illustrate in this work, 
the argument which holds that CA tools are adequate for analyzing single textual units 
only, while critical discourse studies are only appropriate for wider units of texts as they 
aim to investigate texts at a higher structural level, is misconceived. The fact that CDA 
is, by definition, concerned with the analysis of elements ‗beyond the sentence level‘ 
does not mean that it should necessarily neglect the observation of single lexical or 
syntactical items (Fairclough 2003). 
Exponents of CDA have often replied to criticism regarding the lack of a clear specific 
methodological and theoretical approach by suggesting that CDA is, essentially, diverse 
and multidisciplinary (van Dijk 2001: 95-96) in its very nature. CDA approaches have 
also been accused of bias in the selection of texts, and of failing to guarantee 
representativeness (Koller / Mautner 2004, Stubbs 1997). In this respect it has been 
highlighted that: ―The hidden danger is that the reason why the texts concerned are 
singled out for analysis in the first place is that they are not typical, but in fact quite 
unusual instances which have aroused the analyst‘s attention‖ (Koller / Mautner 2004: 
218).  
A related criticism commonly leveled at CDA is that of ideological biases, with such 
biases impeding an objective and neutral analysis. In his well-known critiques of CDA, 
Widdowson (1995, 1998) argues that ―CDA is, in a dual sense, a biased interpretation: 
in the first place it is prejudiced on the basis of some ideological commitment, and then 
it selects for analysis such texts as will support the preferred interpretation‖ 
(Widdowson 1995: 169). In response to such criticism, Fairlcough has often highlighted 
the explicit position and commitment of CDA approaches: ―there is no such thing as an 
‗objective‘ analysis of a text, if by that we mean an analysis which simply describes 
what is ‗there‘ in the text without being ‗biased‘ by the ‗subjectivity‘ of the analyst‖ 
(Fairclough 2003: 15, cf. Fairclough 1996). However, as Fairclough remarks, ―if we 
assume that our knowledge of texts is necessarily partial and incomplete […], and if we 
assume that we are constantly trying to extend and improve it, we have to accept that 
our categories are always provisional and open to change‖ (Fairclough 2003: 15).   
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2.4.2.2 CDA and courtroom discourses 
 
By and large, CDA aims primarily at an interpretive and deconstructive reading of 
discourse, and one of its goals is ―to investigate critically social inequality as it is 
expressed, signalled, constituted, legitimised and so on by language use (or in 
discourse)‖ (Wodak 2001a: 2). Indeed, the notion of social inequality plays a 
fundamental role in most variants of CDA, even though investigated from different 
perspectives (e.g. Fairclough 2001b, 1992a, van Dijk 1993). In this respect, Gee writes: 
   
―The fact that people have differential access to different identities and 
activities, connected to different sorts of status and social goods, is a root 
source of inequality in society. Intervening in such matters can be a 
contribution to social justice. Since different identities and activities are 
enacted in and through language, the study of language is integrally 
connected to matters of equity and justice‖. (Gee 1999: 13) 
 
Intuitively, this holds true for every action, event, situation or phenomenon, but it is 
clearly essential in a trial, as it represents, par excellence, a context in which equity and 
justice must be pursed.  
However, applying a CDA perspective to the analysis of communicative events taking 
place in the courtroom is certainly complex. According to Fairclough ―power in 
discourse is to do with powerful participants controlling and constraining the 
contributions of non-powerful participants‖ (Fairclough 2001b: 38-39, original 
emphasis), particularly in what he defines as ―unequal encounters‖, i.e. face-to-face 
interactions in which the relationship between the participants is unequal in terms of the 
possibility of exercising power. 
Nonetheless, the identification of ―powerful‖ and ―non-powerful‖ participants calls for a 
deeper investigation in all contexts, and it is particularly complex within the framework 
of a jury trial. A dogmatic view that sees the legal experts as the ones possessing power 
is not in itself critical, and power dynamics developing in the courtroom display a high 
level of complexity. Indeed, what types of power are there? In whose hands does the 
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power lie? Power relationships and persuasive processes are undeniably present 
throughout a trial and will be more deeply analyzed in the following chapters. However, 
deciding on a priori grounds that in the interaction between, for instance, lawyers and 
jurors, the former represent the ―powerful‖ participants, whereas the latter are to be 
intended as ―non-powerful‖ participants may be misleading. A dichotomy between 
people possessing power in discourse and people lacking such power does not seem to 
take into consideration the obvious fact that a fundamental type of power (the decisional 
power) belongs to the jurors. I am not arguing that the relationship is not unequal, but 
simply that the asymmetries characterizing this relationship may differ according to the 
variables considered. Categories such as ‗powerful‘ and ‗non-powerful‘ are not obvious, 
self-explanatory concepts, and they cannot be identified merely according to the 
belonging to a certain professional or social dimension, or according to the 
communicative role assumed in a certain event. As will be shown, in a jury trial 
different types of power (such as the communicative or the decisional power) are 
strictly inter-related, and identifying a definite allocation of power is highly 
problematic. 
Nonetheless, this study places considerable emphasis upon what Fairclough (2001b: 2) 
describes as ―‗common-sense‘ assumptions which are implicit in the conventions 
according to which people interact linguistically, and of which people are generally not 
consciously aware‖. In the context of a jury trial, such assumptions would derive from 
the idea that, for example, the legal professionals are the participants who have a high 
level of legal knowledge, whereas the jurors, by definition, are not so acquainted with 
this kind of specialized knowledge. These are intuitively and generally accepted 
concepts and are fundamental to the determination of the communicative dynamics, 
even though they have to be placed within a broader and more problematized 
framework. The level of awareness that the different interactants display as regards 
these dynamics, the role they play, and the way in which they determine/influence the 
communicative process is a highly debatable matter. As these ‗implicit conventions‘ are 
often perceived as natural and are automatically accepted, the possibility of interactants‘ 
being consciously aware of their presence may be reduced. However, in the specific 
context of a jury trial, considering the crucial role these assumptions play, and the 
consequences they may have, it seems plausible, or at least desirable, that people may 
be inclined to reflect upon these issues.  
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2.4.3 Computer-assisted analysis  
 
The study aims to combine a fine-grained linguistic analysis with a wider investigation 
of social and cultural factors, therefore ranging from a micro-textual to a macro-textual 
approach and vice-versa, and embedding such approaches into each other (Fairclough 
2003). It is assumed here that ―the specific contribution that qualitative discourse 
analysis can make lies in making explicit the linguistic means through which 
representations of reality and social relationships are enacted‖ (Mautner 2008: 48).  
As Taylor remarks, ―Discourse analysis is best understood as a field of research, rather 
than a single practice‖ (Taylor 2001a: 5). Following the interpretation that DA may 
include apparently divergent approaches, the orientation adopted with regard to the 
analysis of discourse is not presented as including an exclusive methodology. Indeed, in 
this work the overall qualitative approach is also integrated with approaches that are 
generally defined as more quantitatively oriented and, more specifically, this work also 
draws on computer-assisted analysis, as it is also here assumed that the harmonization 
of different approaches may lead to revealing complementary insights. 
Data have been stored in an electronic format; consequently, beyond the obvious 
advantage in terms of efficiency in analyzing the data, this method allows data to be 
processed through concordancers and other language analysis software, such as 
Wmatrix or AntConc 3.2.1. Even though this approach does not represent the focus of 
this study, these tools may prove useful in a qualitative-based study (Stubbs 1996, 
2001), as elements drawn from corpus linguistics and related disciplines may assist in 
adding extra information and understanding certain patterns, frequencies and 
tendencies. Even though the idea of eclectism may suggest a lack of rigor in the 
methodological choice, combining different approaches may often lead to a fruitful 
―methodological synergy‖ (Baker et al 2008). Indeed, the merits of combining machine-
based methodologies and more qualitatively oriented have often been highlighted 
(Hardt-Mautner 1995, Stubbs 1996, 1997, de Beaugrande 1997b, Koller / Mautner 
2004). Fairclough also states that textual analysis can usefully incorporate findings 
offered by quantitative analysis, even though he remarks that such findings ―need to be 
complemented by more intense and detailed qualitative textual analysis‖ (Fairclough 
2003: 6).  
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In this respect, Partington clearly points out the rationale for the use of corpus 
linguistics in CDA studies: 
 
―At the simplest level, corpus technology helps find other examples of a 
phenomenon one has already noted. At the other extreme, it reveals 
patterns of use previously unthought of. In between, it can reinforce, 
refute or revise a researcher‘s intuition and show them why and how 
much their suspicions were grounded.‖ (Partington 2003: 12) 
 
For the specific aims of this study the approach adopted here is not to be interpreted as a 
corpus-based/driven
16
 analysis, and I will not refer to the data collected as constitutive 
of a corpus. Indeed, even though it has been stated that the term ‗corpus‘ could be used 
to refer generally to ―any body of discourse data‖ (Taylor 2001b: 313), the instances of 
discourse collected are not here labeled as ‗corpus‘, as it has to be noted that data were 
not (primarily) sampled according to the basic criteria of corpus design, such as 
representativeness and balance. More specifically, representativeness is generally 
intended as ―the extent to which a sample includes the full range of variability in a 
population‖ (Biber 1993c: 243) and another important aspect is that ―a corpus must be 
‗representative‘ in order to be appropriately used as the basis for generalizations 
concerning a language as a whole‖ (Biber 1993c: 243). The principal aim of the current 
study is not to achieve generalization (even though further investigation could evolve in 
that direction), but to focus on one specific event and its peculiarities.  
Indeed, computer-based approaches may be complementarily employed for reaching a 
deeper understanding of specific phenomena. For instance, the investigation may 
include the analysis of word frequencies: in this case the aim is not to offer a 
comprehensive quantitative analysis and provide wide-ranging statistical results, but to 
use text frequency as an additional tool to describe and understand certain processes.  
As mentioned above, the computer-based approach embraced in this study primarily 
includes the use of two main tools, namely Wmatrix and Antcon 3.2.1 (see Chapter 4). 
Wmatrix (Rayson 2003, Rayson 2009), developed at the University of Lancaster, is an 
                                                 
16
 For a discussion of the distinction between the corpus-based and corpus-driven approaches see 
McEnery / Gabrielatos (2006). 
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online integrated software suite for corpus analysis and comparison. It allows analyses 
in terms of word frequencies, concordances, complex lexical frequency profiles, as well 
as statistical comparisons against standard corpus samplers. The corpora loaded are 
automatically tagged in terms of part-of-speech (using the CLAWS tagger, see Garside 
et al 1997), as well as semantically (using USAS, UCREL Semantic Analysis System). 
In particular, the available taggers allow a keyword analysis based on key grammatical 
categories and semantic concepts (Rayson 2003). On a more specific note, the use of 
semantic tags within a Wmatrix environment is generally related to the notion of 
―semantic concepts‖, rather than ―discourse fields‖ or ―category labels‖ (Archer et al 
2002: 16), and this notion is in line with the interpretation of ―concepts‖ intended as 
units of mental representation (Langacker 1987).  
AntConc 3.2.1 represents another useful text analysis software, which contains the 
following tools: 
- Concordance 
- Concordance Plot 
- File View 
- Clusters 
- N-Grams  
- Collocates 
- Word List 
- Keyword List 
The tools applied to the analysis are described in Chapter 4.   
 
 
2.4.4 Methodological concluding remarks  
 
This work is grounded in a deep desire to focus on real instances of interactions within a 
highly institutionalized communicative event, specifically a jury trial. The study is an 
analysis of discourse seen not as a fixed structure but as a dynamic process of 
spontaneous interaction. However, the word ‗spontaneous‘ assumes particular contours 
within the context of a trial: it is intuitively clear that spoken language tends to assume 
features of spontaneity but the concept is particularly complex, because of the high level 
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of formality and the pre-structured nature of several moments of interaction within a 
trial. 
As has been illustrated, even a single trial represents a complex and vast field of 
analysis; therefore, this work does not aim to describe in detail the developments of 
every communicative micro-event identifiable within a trial. A selection (which is 
inevitably a partial and subjective one) of the most salient communicative moments was 
carried out. In other words, given the uniqueness of this (and any) event, the focus here 
is on the actual use interactants make of language, without necessarily claiming 
generalizability, but with the awareness that a lot can be learned even from one single 
case, or event, or moment of interaction. The aim, therefore, is not to identify aspects 
that deviate from a normative conception of language or from generally accepted 
standards of correctness, but to observe, describe systematically, and explain actual talk. 
The aim is not to replicate an entire theory but to try to understand the specific 
dynamics of a specific event through an interdisciplinary approach, which is 
fundamental to my attempts to answer the current research questions in a 
comprehensive way. The use of different approaches is not intended to merely provide a 
means of mutual corroboration of theories and data, but brings with it issues related to 
the need to harmonize different epistemologies and practices. It is thanks to a multi-
perspective approach that a research focus which is not only descriptive but also 
explanatory may fruitfully be pursed. In this respect, it has also been suggested that one 
of the primary goals of discourse analysis is ―to achieve the wholeness of a 
transdisciplinary perspective‖ (de Beaugrande 1997a: 59, original emphasis). 
Inherent in discourse studies is the idea of going beyond systematic descriptions and 
what may be defined as ―pattern seeking‖ (Candlin / Sarangi 2004), with the aim of 
integrating description, exploration, and explanation. Indeed, the intent is not to offer a 
universally applicable description of trial discourse, as such a goal would not only be 
unfeasible but also misleading and would annihilate diversity. Conversely, I aim to 
highlight the complex nature of courtroom discourse, and to bring forward the essential 
interdiscursivity that underlies any discourse.   
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3. Communication processes in jury trials  
 
The Duchess: Be what you would seem to be—or  
or, if you‘d like it put more simply—never imagine 
yourself not to be otherwise than what it might 
appear to others that what you were or might have 
been was not otherwise than what you had been 
would have appeared to them to be otherwise. 
Alice: I think I should understand that better, if I had 
it written down: but I can‘t quite follow it as you say 
it. (Lewis Carroll) 
 
 
3.1 The legal system 
 
 
Any analysis of communication processes cannot be alienated from the socio-legal 
system within which they develop, as they are inevitably highly intertwined. Judicial 
systems around the world
17
 are characterized by several substantial (inter alia 
procedural) variations and, consequently, the specific procedure of a trial is inextricable 
from a specific system. As mentioned above, the focus of this study is on one specific 
trial (California vs Westerfield), which allows us to focus exclusively on the U.S. 
system, and on one specific jurisdiction.  
On a more specific note, even though the broader expression ‗Anglo-American system‘ 
is sometimes employed, the term ‗American system‘ (or, more specifically, ‗U.S. 
system‘) will be preferred here, given the peculiarities that typify the U.S. system in 
relation to other Anglo-Saxon countries. A comprehensive introduction to the American 
legal system would go beyond the scope of this work, but some specific areas of U.S. 
law will be addressed, with particular reference to criminal law, and some of the most 
relevant aspects of the functioning of American courts
18
 will be touched upon, in order 
to provide a framework for understanding the development of communication processes 
in this context. 
                                                 
17
 For a detailed discussion of different legal systems see Kritzer‘s (2002) encyclopaedic work.  
18
 In this respect see Baum 2001. 
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U.S. law is based on the Common Law system
19
. This system is sometimes broadly 
defined as ‗case law‘, but it should be noted that a remarkable proportion of U.S. law is 
also codified (Lee et al 2007). Moreover, it is also interesting to observe that to some 
extent case law ―is not judge-made but also attorney-influenced law‖ (Lee et al 2007: 
11), as it is ―created daily through the interaction of judges and attorneys in the 
courtrooms across the United States at all levels, from local courts to the U. S. Supreme 
Court‖ (Lee et al 2007: 11).   
The adversarial nature of the American system is one of its fundamental characteristics. 
The main difference between the inquisitorial and the adversarial system is concisely 
depicted by Cotterill as follows: ―Whereas the inquisitorial system, used throughout 
much of the world, views the evidence elicited from witnesses with an investigative and 
exploratory eye, the adversarial approach prioritises argumentation and persuasion, with 
its primary objective a dialectic and dialogic appraisal of the evidence‖ (Cotterill 2003: 
9). 
Von Mehren and Murray also highlight the peculiarity of the adversarial system: 
 
―American criminal justice remains adversarial to an extent that may 
seem extreme when compared to the standards of most other modern 
jurisdictions. The essential issue in any American criminal prosecution is 
not whether the defendant in fact committed the criminal act of which he 
or she is charged but rather whether the prosecution has proved, beyond a 
reasonable doubt, that he or she committed that act‖. (von Mehren / 
Murray 2007: 194) 
 
Similarly, Cotterill also states that the adversarial system is ―based on the adjudication 
of conflicting and competing versions of events presented by prosecution and defence‖ 
(Cotterill 2003: 9). Consequently, it may also be argued that it is ―not primarily 
concerned with establishing the true facts of the case; rather, it involves attempts to 
persuade the jury that one constructed version of reality is more plausible than another‖ 
(Cotterill 2003: 9). 
                                                 
19
 For a discussion of the main principles of the Common Law system see Arnheim 2004, and for a 
comparative analysis of Roman and Common Law see Buckland / McNair 2008. 
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The ultimate goal of a trial may be seen, from a jurisdictional point of view, as the 
solution of a conflict through the establishment of the factual truth. However, it is 
obvious that the goal pursued by some of the participants in the process is to impose a 
certain version of the facts upon the triers of facts. Bergman‘s remark, from this 
perspective, is self-explanatory: 
 
―The process of reducing human events to structure, vocabulary and 
detail is to inevitably distort those events. As long as they will be 
distorted anyway, you might as well try to distort them in favor of your 
client. All of this may seem very far from the notion of trial as a search of 
truth. But your job is to advocate for your client; let the factfinder 
discover where the truth lies‖. (Bergman 1982: 227, quoted in Jacquemet 
1996: 9)    
 
 
3.2 The jury system 
 
Prior to a discussion of the jury system in the U.S. it should be noted that every state has 
specific peculiarities. Indeed, in relation to criminal law, von Mehren and Murray 
observe: 
 
―From the earliest days of the nation, criminal law has been primarily law 
of the individual states. Each state possesses a fully developed law of 
crimes. Each state also has its own prosecutorial competence and 
facilities as well as a complete court system to process criminal cases and 
a penal system to punish the offenders.‖ (von Mehren / Murray 2007: 
189) 
 
It is also in the light of these observations that the expression ‗American jury system‘ 
does not seem to take into consideration the heterogeneity of possibilities in which this 
system may develop, as every jurisdiction may have relatively different laws and 
procedures. Nevertheless, it has often been confirmed that these systems ―share enough 
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essential characteristics to make it possible to talk about the American jury system‖ 
(Jonakait 2003: 1), in particular as regards criminal trials. Indeed, ―the same 
constitutional standards apply to all criminal cases throughout the country‖ (Jonakait 
2003: 2). 
The jury system represents one of the key features of the American legal system and it 
has been observed that the highest percentage of jury trials in the world takes place in 
the U.S.
20
 In defense of the jury system Jonakait writes: 
 
―No matter how strong the objections to the American jury system, it is 
not going away. It is firmly ensconced in our state and federal 
constitutions, history and traditions. Juries are required for all criminal 
trials except those involving the most minor offenses, and no serious 
movement exists to amend the Sixth Amendment to the federal 
constitution (which commands this), to limit the reach of civil juries, or 
to abolish all civil jury trials. The American jury system will endure. The 
most important debates are the ones to discuss how to make that system 
better‖. (Jonakait 2003: XXIV) 
 
However, even though it may be argued that in the U.S. the right to a jury trial is 
enshrined in legislation, it should also be noted that the percentage of cases tried by 
juries is constantly decreasing (Clermont / Eisenberg 2002); in this respect, Burns 
confirms that the trial in general as an institution is progressively disappearing
21
 (Burns 
2009: 2), and so are trials by jury (cf. Section 2.2).  
As regards the possibility of introducing changes to the jury system, SunWolf reports 
that in 2004 Robert J. Grey Jr., the incoming president of the American Bar 
Association, remarked: ―We‘ve looked at and worked to improve virtually every aspect 
                                                 
20
 Indeed, it has been calculated that every year in the United States, approximately three million jurors 
serve in some 300,000 cases, and that 85 per cent of the world‘s jury trials take place in the United States 
(Abraham 1998).  
21
 More specifically, Burns writes: ―The institution of the trial seems to be disappearing in one context 
after another, and this at a speed that has the sober social scientists who have chronicled it staring in 
disbelief at their own results. The percentage of federal civil cases that ended in trial declined from 11.5 
percent in 1962 to an amazing 1.8 percent in 2002, one-sixth as many. Though the absolute number of 
cases ‗disposed of‘—to use a telling metaphor—has increased fivefold, even the absolute number of trials 
has declined. Similar patterns have prevailed in civil, criminal, and bankruptcy proceedings, in federal 
and state courts, and in both jury and bench trials. The rate of decline has rapidly accelerated in the very 
recent past‖ (Burns 2009: 2, original emphasis). 
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of the system – except juries. No one focuses on jurors‖ (SunWolf 2007: 15). This 
remark appears debatable, considering the importance of certain reforms that have been 
implemented in order to improve certain aspects of the process (see, for example the 
reform concerning pattern jury instructions, cf. Tiersma 1999b, 2001). However, it may 
certainly be argued that the complexity of a jury trial seems to call for a wider reflection 
on the potential for achieving a better understanding underlying dynamics of this type of 
trial, in order that potential improvements may be implemented.  
 
 
3.3 Jury trials: criticism 
 
 
Even though the debate around the topic is not new, televised and highly publicized 
trials have catapulted issues related to the efficacy of a jury trial into the public 
conscience. On the one hand, some scholars define the jury system as one of the most 
fascinating aspects of American democracy (Aron et al 1996), and, similarly, it has been 
stated that ―to invest in a jury system is to invest in democracy‖ (Lempert 2001: 10). 
Convincing apologies for the American trial have often been offered, and the system has 
been described as one of America‘s ―greatest cultural achievements‖ (Burns 2009: 1). 
From this perspective, juries are also seen as the guardians of the justice system, as von 
Mehren and Murray state: ―the role of the jury in civil and criminal trials is central not 
only to the structure of the proceeding and functions of its participants but also to the 
fundamental values that the civil and criminal justice system protect and promote‖ (von 
Mehren / Murray 2007: 206).   
However, there is an ongoing debate about the validity of the jury system in 
contemporary society. An evaluation of the system would open a series of questions 
which are still unanswered, and it clearly lies beyond the scope of this study. 
Nevertheless, some particularly problematic areas, such as fairness, impartiality, 
representativeness and competency, will be touched upon as they are functional to the 
understanding of the main communicative dynamics taking place in a jury trial. 
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3.3.1 Issues of fairness, impartiality and representativeness  
 
The Sixth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution
22
 guarantees the right to be tried by an 
impartial jury. However, albeit impeding discrimination, it has been observed that this 
requirement ―does not guarantee that the criminal jury will in fact reflect an accurate 
cross-section of the community‖ (Fukurai 1999: 55). In 1968 the Congress laid the 
groundwork for the present jury selection process, by passing the Jury Selection and 
Service Act, which provides that juries must be ―selected at random from a fair cross 
section of the community‖23 and that no citizen shall be excluded from this service 
because of ―race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or economic status‖24. 
The main stages of jury selection can be generally summarized as follows (Fukurai 
1999: 61): 
- general population defined by the court jurisdiction 
- ROV
25
 pool 
- prospective jurors identified by multiples source master lists (or wheels) 
- qualified jurors 
- jury eligibles 
- jury panels 
- trial jurors. 
  
Today citizens who receive summons for jury service are selected randomly among 
registered voters or licensed drivers (King 1999: 55) or other lists, and the venire 
panel
26
 (or jury pool) constitutes the entire panel selected for jury duty from which the 
actual jury is drawn.  
It should also be noted that the use of pre-trial juror questionnaires has increased 
significantly in recent years. They constitute an important tool, and according to some 
scholars they can lead to more honest outcomes than face-to-face questioning (Babbie 
                                                 
22
 ―In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an 
impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall 
have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to 
be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his 
favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.‖ (U.S. Constitution, Amendment VI) 
23
 Jury Selection and Service Act of 1968, 28 U.S.C., Section 1861. 
24
 Jury Selection and Service Act of 1968, 28 U.S.C., Section 1862. 
25
 Registrar of Voters. 
26
 The citizens who appear at the courthouse in response to the summons constitute the venire. 
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2010, cf. Lieberman / Sales 2006: 119) and are generally considered quite cost and time 
effective. The contents of questionnaires may vary, but they usually tend to contain 
general questions about demographic information (related to, for example, gender, age 
and ethnic origins) and more specific questions concerning personal beliefs, behaviours, 
etc. Their length is very variable: they can range from a very limited number of pages to 
a large number, like in the O.J. Simpson criminal trial where the questionnaire included 
a total of 75 pages. In the Westerfield trial the total number of pages of the 
questionnaire was 22
27
. It included questions regarding, for instance, residence, family, 
employment and jury service; moreover, as in this case the death penalty was one of the 
possible sentences, an entire section of the questionnaire was devoted to ‗Views on the 
death penalty and the penalty of life in prison without the possibility of parole‘.  
The voir dire constitutes a preliminary examination to determine whether members of 
the venire meet the criteria to be qualified to serve as jurors. At the same time, 
therefore, what takes place is the identification of any bias which may compromise the 
jurors‘ impartiality. The voir dire phase is often referred to as ‗jury selection‘, but the 
term is somehow misleading, because what happens in this phase is actually a process 
of ‗juror exclusion‘ (Lieberman / Sales 2006: 21), as some prospective jurors are 
excluded. This can happen through challenges for cause or through peremptory 
challenges (see Norton / Sommers / Brauner 2007, Sommers / Norton 2007). The 
former constitute ―an attempt to convince the judge that a prospective juror cannot be 
impartial‖, whereas the latter ―allow for exclusion of individuals without explanation or 
evidence of potential bias‖ (Sommers / Norton 2007: 262)28.  
More specifically, a challenge for cause is exercised when a juror does not meet a 
specific statutory requirement and there is a specific and forceful reason to believe that 
someone cannot be fair, unbiased or qualified to serve as a juror. These reasons include, 
for instance, relationships or acquaintances with the parties, the lawyers or the 
witnesses, inability to serve (related for example to mental or physical disability), bias 
and prejudice, previous felony convictions, etc. When an attorney exercises a challenge 
for cause, the final decision lies in the hand of the judge. In the case of peremptory 
                                                 
27
 The number includes the cover page and two explanation sheets. 
28
 Significant variations regarding the voir dire are related to the jurisdiction taken into consideration. For 
instance, other jurisdictions rely significantly on case law to define the basis for granting a challenge for 
cause, whereas the California framework places relatively ―heavy reliance on statutory provisions‖  
(Hannaford-Agor / Waters 2004: 3). 
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challenges, each side must only inform the judge that they would like to exclude a juror, 
but they do not need to provide specific justification (Del Carmen 2006). In this case the 
number of challenges available is limited (see Hannaford-Agor / Waters 2004 for 
details). 
As Sommers and Norton report, in the U.S. the use of peremptory challenges was 
―unrestricted for two centuries before the Supreme Court ruled in 1986 that prospective 
jurors could not be challenged solely on the basis of membership in a ‗cognizable racial 
group‘ (Batson v. Kentucky)‖ (Sommers / Norton 2007: 262). However, the use of 
peremptory challenges has frequently been criticized to the extent that their abolition 
has been suggested (Broderick 1992, Hoffman 1997). Indeed, prospective jurors cannot 
be challenged on the basis of race or gender, but research shows a tendency by 
prosecution and defence to challenge different ethnic groups (Baldus et al 2001). More 
generally, it has been stated that ―attorneys systematically consider categories such as 
gender, occupation, and nation of origin in their efforts to eliminate jurors they believe 
to be unfavorable to their clients‖ (Norton / Sommers / Brauner 2007: 468; see also 
Zeisel / Diamond 1978, Hastie 1991, Olczak / Kaplan / Penrod 1991, Kovera et al 
2002). 
The result of the jury selection process is often defined as the most important aspect of a 
criminal trial (Mogill / Nixon 1986) and it is not surprising that jury selection has 
always received great interest, to the extent that the importance of trial consultants 
specialized in this crucial process is constantly growing (Kressel / Kressel 2002); they 
are usually registered with the American Society of Trial Consultants, but there is no 
State licensure and no specific education requirements (Lieberman / Sales 2006:  91). 
From a lawyer‘s perspective, the aim of jury selection is manifold. More specifically, 
Lubet identifies three main aims related to this phase: 
 
―1. Eliminating jurors who are biased or disposed against your case: 
2. Gathering information about the eventual jurors in order to present your case 
effectively; and 
3. Beginning to introduce yourself, your client, and certain key concepts to the 
jury‖ (Lubet 2004: 529). 
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Indeed, it is often argued that the voir dire phase represents an opportunity for the 
attorneys ―to develop a rapport with venire members and ingratiate themselves in the 
process‖ (Lieberman / Sales 2006: 27). 
The emphasis of the fair representation of a heterogeneous section of society seems 
paradoxically at odds with a process where the exclusion of potential jurors, in practical 
terms, aims to identify the jurors that are considered favorable to one‘s case, instead of 
aiming to the composition of a fair jury. It may also be argued, however, that the goal of 
defining a fair jury is somehow unachievable, in that ―fairness and impartiality, like 
beauty, often lies in the eyes of the beholder‖ (Hannaford-Agor / Waters 2004: 1). On a 
more practical note, given the subtle nature of bias, it is not easy to define exactly and 
quantify the impact of the jury selection process on the final outcome of a trial. 
However, it is self-evident that the possibility of intervening in the process that may 
exclude certain people from becoming the triers of fact has some crucial implications, as 
all the parties clearly aim to select members that will be more likely to accept their 
version of the story and to give a favorable verdict. 
Fairness and impartiality should be guaranteed by the concept of representativeness and, 
from this perspective, the fair cross-selection doctrine is at the core of the procedure. 
However, different issues arise as regards representativeness. For example, it has been 
noted that the use of registered voters or licensed drivers lists may lead to an 
underrepresentation of certain minorities of citizens (Piven / Cloward 1988); moreover, 
several states require a proficiency level of English in order to be eligible as jurors and 
this criterion contributes to the inadequate representation of ethnic minorities (Brown 
1994). 
 
 
3.3.2 Issues of competency 
 
Beyond representativeness, competency has also been identified as another critical 
aspect of the jury system. In Knight‘s words, jurors are ―asked to do superhuman 
things—things we know they cannot, and do not, do‖ (Knight 1996: 253-254) and they 
face multiple dilemmas:  
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―They are asked to wipe from their minds testimony they were not 
supposed to have heard; resolve conflicts in evidence no mortal could 
resolve with any confidence; identify thoughts that flickered through the 
consciousness of people at precise moments months and years in the past; 
absorb and apply pages of complex instructions concerning legal 
principles they have never heard of. And in reaching a verdict, they are 
asked to perform a feat of probably impossible schizophrenia: If they 
believe the defendant is guilty, they must nonetheless find that he is not if 
they have a reasonable doubt that he is. Each of them must find a way to 
agree with eleven random strangers on this elusive, difficult proposition, 
or their labors are in vain‖. (Knight 1996: 253-254) 
 
The debate around the appropriateness of the jury trial is not new and as early as 1873 
Twain noted: ―We have a criminal jury system which is superior to any in the world; 
and its efficiency is only marred by the difficulty of finding twelve men every day who 
don‘t know anything and can‘t read‖ (Twain 1873, quoted in Shapiro 1993: 223). 
Similarly, Herbert Spencer colorfully depicted the nature of the jury system as 
depending on ―twelve men of average ignorance‖ (quoted in Williams 1963: 271-72). 
Conversely, it has also been observed that such paradoxes are inevitable in that they lie 
in the nature of the system as ―[j]urors are used in trials for their knowledge of the law 
but for their knowledge of life‖ (Heffer 2008: 49). 
As will be described, knowledge asymmetries (see Marková / Foppa 1991) are indeed at 
the core of trial procedures. More generally, it may argued that asymmetries play a 
fundamental role in any communicative event, as remarked by Linell and Luckmann: 
―[I]f there were no asymmetries at all between people, i.e. if communicatively relevant 
inequalities of knowledge were non-existing, there would be little or no need for most 
kinds of communication!‖ (Linell / Luckmann 1991: 4). 
In a jury trial different types of knowledge asymmetries emerge and are highly 
interdependent. For example, legal knowledge is primarily associated with the legal 
professionals involved; moreover, it is interesting to observe that the inevitable disparity 
regarding the level of legal knowledge possessed by the jurors and legal professionals is 
also exacerbated by the fact that in certain jurisdictions a range of professions, including 
attorneys and judges, are automatically exempted from jury service (Fukurai et al 1993: 
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67). However, at the same time another crucial type of knowledge (potentially definable 
as ‗common-sense‘ knowledge) is a determining factor in the outcome of the trial. 
In any communication process knowing what our interlocutors know is essential 
(Bakhtin 1981, Nickerson 1999)
29
, and this assumption clearly holds true in the 
communication with the jury. In this respect, it has been stated that ―the better a 
lawyer‘s knowledge of the human nature of the average person, the better chance a 
lawyer has to communicate successfully with a lay jury‖ (Aron et al 1996). However, 
defining ―the human nature of the average person‖ is inevitably complex (if not 
unfeasible) in principle; moreover, the possibility of knowing the jurors involved is 
limited: this limitation is, first of all, procedural and is also determined by the highly 
constrained communicative process (see Section 3.5) where a monologic mode of 
communication seems to prevail.   
 
 
3.4 The procedure 
 
A trial represents one of the steps in the process of doing justice. In order to position it 
within the broader framework, Figure 5
30
 shows some of the main phases that are 
typical of the Criminal Justice System within the U.S. context. Given the nature of the 
trial in question, Figure 5 focuses primarily on the process concerning felonies: 
 
                                                 
29
 As regards expert-lay communication, also see the concept of ‗expert blind spot‘ (Nathan / Koedinger 
2000). 
30
 Adapted from the description offered by the American Bar Association available at: 
 http://www.abanet.org/publiced/courts/casediagram.html. Accessed: September 2, 2010. 
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 Figure 5: The sequence of events in the Criminal Justice System 
 
Reported crime 
Investigation 
Arrest 
Booking 
Initial Appearance 
Preliminary Hearing 
Pre-Trial Activities 
Sentencing 
Unsolved or not Arrested 
Released without Prosecution 
Released without Prosecution 
 
Charges dropped or Dismissed 
Charges dropped or Dismissed 
 
Acquitted 
Appeal 
Pardon 
and 
Clemency 
Out of the System 
Pardon 
and 
Clemency 
Capital 
Punishment 
Revocation 
Revocation 
Habeas 
Corpus 
Felonies 
Trial Guilty plea 
CRIME 
Bail or Detention 
Probation 
Parole 
Penitentiary 
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As this representation shows, a trial can be intended as one event within a longer and 
more complex process. A trial is then constituted of a series of macro-phases, which are 
themselves comprised of multiple micro-events. The different phases are also 
characterized by different communicative constraints and the communication develops 
in remarkably different ways according to the phase taken into consideration. 
Consequently, the communicative processes related to the development of a trial are 
intrinsically context-bound and situation-bound and vary significantly according to the 
specific phases, their aims, and their constraints.  
Table 2 offers an overview of the main phases on which a jury trial is based within the 
U.S. legal framework and, despite the limits that are typical of any schematization, it 
offers a preliminary understanding of how this process may develop
31
:  
 
Trial phases
32
 
Main participants and interactional 
dynamics 
1. Preliminary phase  
Jury selection 
Judge   ↔   jury pool 
Lawyers   ↔   jury pool 
2. Evidential phase  
Opening statements Lawyer   →   jury 
Witness examination Lawyers   ↔   witnesses 
Closing arguments Lawyers   →   jury 
3. Judicial phase  
Jury instructions and summing up Judge   →   jury 
Jury deliberation Juror   ↔   juror  
Verdict Jury foreperson   ↔   judge 
Sentencing/release Judge   →   defendant  
Table 2: Main interactional dynamics a jury trial (adapted from Cotterill 2003: 94) 
 
                                                 
31
 It should also be noted that, before the beginning of the trial, pre-trial motions are brought before the 
court by the prosecution and the defense. Through these documents the parties may ask the court, for 
example, to exclude certain physical evidence, to prevent witnesses from testifying, to change venue, etc. 
32
 The phases that represent the primary object of analysis of this case (Chapter 4) are highlighted. 
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As described in Section 3.3, the preliminary phase of a jury trial includes what is often 
defined as the jury selection process: jurors are asked questions by the court, the 
prosecution and the defense and may be excluded from the jury (see also Section 4.3). 
The second macro-phase of a trial can be defined as evidential and consists of a series of 
sub-phases (see Chapter 4 for details). First of all, it includes opening statements, an 
initial presentation of the case on the part of the prosecution and the defense. They 
constitute a crucial phase of a trial because they provide the incipit of a story the jurors 
will be confronted with throughout the trial. This phase is sometimes considered to have 
a fundamental influence on the final result, to the extent the Aron et al (1996: 21.15) 
remark that ―[s]ome lawyers feel that as many as 80 per cent of all jurors make up their 
minds by the end of the opening statement.‖ It has been suggested that opening 
statements contribute to creating a schema according to which jurors process and 
interpret the subsequent phases of the trial (Pyszczynski / Wrightsman 1981, 
Pyszczynski et al 1994). Wells et al (1985: 759) also confirm that ―an opening 
statement can be construed as a technique of schema instantiation in that it appears to 
guide memory‖33.  
Opening statements are generally followed by the examination phase, in which 
witnesses, expert witnesses and the defendant are generally examined and cross-
examined by the prosecution and the defense. This phase is particularly complex, as it 
consists of a series of interactions involving a highly variable number of participants. 
The communication process taking place in this phase is also highly influenced by legal 
and procedural constraints: for instance, one of the main rules regarding direct 
examination is that leading questions (containing suggestions or prompting answers) are 
not allowed, except in cross-examination. More specifically, Federal Rule of Evidence 
611
34
, regarding the mode and order of interrogation and presentation, states that 
―[l]eading questions should not be used on the direct examination of a witness except as 
may be necessary to develop the witness‘ testimony. Ordinarily leading questions 
should be permitted on cross-examination‖. Another principle applied in direct 
examination is that witnesses ―may not testify in ‗narrative‘ form‖ (Lubet 2004: 49). 
                                                 
33
 A schema has also been defined as ―any subset of existing knowledge, based on prior experience and 
relevant to a limited domain, which people use as a framework to guide their observation, organisation, 
and retrieval from memory of perceived events‖ (Lingle / Ostrom 1981: 401). 
34
 ‗Federal Rules of Evidence‘ is available at: http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Evidence_Rules_2007.pdf 
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However, the line between narrative and non-narrative presentation can sometimes be 
finely drawn, and in expert examination narratives are generally allowed. Indeed, the 
mode in which expert witness examination is conducted varies significantly from the 
examination of lay witnesses (also called ordinary witnesses or percipient witnesses); 
moreover, ―[a]n expert witness is not limited to personal knowledge and may base her 
testimony on information that was gathered solely for the purpose of testifying in the 
litigation‖ (Lubet 2004: 213). It has been argued that direct examination of witnesses 
represents a fundamental part of the trial, as it provides an opportunity to present the 
core evidence of a case, and to corroborate the lawyer‘s version of the story. In this 
phase establishing the credibility of a witness is fundamental, as it is mainly according 
to his/her level of credibility that the information presented will be accepted by the 
audience (Jacquemet 1996). 
The evidential phase is concluded by closing arguments. Summation or closing 
arguments represent the phase where the attorneys can state what has been proved 
during the trial and argue their case, and this stage can therefore be seen as ―the moment 
for pure advocacy‖ (Lubet 2004: 467). 
The final macro-phase of a trial is the judicial one, which includes jury instructions
35
 
and summing up, jury deliberation, verdict and sentencing/release. In the event of 
conviction, the penalty phase, in which the sentence to be applied, is determined also 
takes place. Moreover, trials may naturally be followed by appeals to a higher court.  
 
 
3.5 The communicative complexity of a jury trial  
 
Following Cotterill (2003: 93-94), it is possible to identify two main modes of 
interaction during a jury trial, namely a monologic and a dialogic mode. Focusing on 
the jurors‘ perspectives and on their interaction with legal experts, crucial phases such 
as opening statements, closing arguments and jury instructions may be definable as 
monologic (Cotterill 2003: 94, see Table 2), as the right to speak lies exclusively in the 
                                                 
35
 During jury instruction the judge explains the legal standards to be applied by the jurors in order to 
decide the case. It should also be noted that different types of instructions may be given at several 
intervals during the trial (see Chapter 4). 
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hands of a group of participants (in this case, the lawyers or the judge), while others (the 
jurors) assume the role of listeners. A dialogic mode characterizes the voir dire phase, 
where jurors are questioned directly in order to ascertain their impartiality. If we take 
the plausible and often confirmed assumption (cf. e.g. Watzlawick et al 1967) that a 
dialogic mode is more likely to facilitate understanding (as people actively participate in 
the conversation and may ask for clarification when needed), the prevalence of 
monologic events may seem to hinder understanding on the part of the jurors. Indeed, it 
has been argued that ―[t]raditionally, the Anglo-American jury has functioned as a 
passive audience in its reception of information and finding of facts at trial‖ (von 
Mehren / Murray 2007: 213). The communication process may to some extent be seen 
as paradoxical, as ―[t]he model juror is expected to sit like a sphinx and listen to the 
testimony and argumentation without betraying any reaction or indication of how she or 
he is receiving the material‖ (von Mehren / Murray 2007: 213). 
 
 
3.5.1 Emerging Asymmetries  
 
The attribution of institutional roles (and the relations between them) is crucial in all 
types of human interaction and access to communication is significantly dependent on 
the institutional roles assumed by participants (Adelswärd et al 1987). As has been 
shown, a trial represents a highly institutionalized setting, where roles are clearly 
defined and the divergence in the roles assumed by experts and laymen emerges more 
evidently than in other contexts. 
It may be stated that ―lay participants in courtroom interaction, unlike participants in 
conversation, are not in full control of their verbal contributions‖ (Heffer 2005: 47). 
Indeed, their right to speak and to intervene verbally in the communication process is 
considerably limited by specific procedural constraints and conventions, and it is 
generally assumed that lawyers ―control the flow of information‖ (O‘Barr 1982: 55) in 
this context.  
From an institutional perspective, roles are pre-established and strictly defined within a 
jury trial, but the complex relations between the interactants may also assume dynamic 
contours. It is easy to hypothesize that the status of experts and non-experts may 
determine asymmetrical relations between the participants, but defining (and 
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distinguishing between) experts and non-experts is a complex (and often misleading) 
activity; whenever we engage ourselves in such a task, the emerging picture is always 
more nuanced and complex than the binary one expected. Indeed, the concept of experts 
has manifold ramifications, whose exploration goes beyond the scope of this study.  
Even though professional, institutional and social ‗labels‘ are always simplifications, in 
a jury trial, the participants‘ roles seem to be clearly defined, and these labels cannot be 
disregarded, as they are at the core of the discourse developing in and through the 
interaction of distinctive socially constructed identities and roles. In other words, roles 
are fundamental in the development of discourse, as, in the simplest terms, a certain 
perception of role influences the production and the reception of any piece of discourse, 
and the degree to which participants are aware of this aspect is inevitably extremely 
variable. On a more practical note, the items of analysis (see Chapter 4) relate 
exclusively to subjects that prototypically represent certain communities of experts (i.e. 
legal experts, namely the judge and the lawyers) and laymen (i.e. the jurors). However, 
it should be remembered that a wide range of categories of interactants are involved in a 
jury trial, and an easy identification of participants as ‗experts‘ or ‗laymen‘ is often 
difficult, as in the case of the so-called semi-experts, such as police officers (Heffer 
2005).  
We all assume a variety of social identities
36
; in many situations, for example in the 
case of expert witnesses, the professional identity
37
 is crucial and is not only 
presupposed, but is made verbally salient and is explicitly expressed, so that it can be 
explicitly shared with all the participants. The reasons underlying this explicit 
manifestation of professional identity are several, and among the main ones is the 
procedural necessity of having expert witnesses officially recognized as such. 
Moreover, the persuasive strategy of qualifying a certain witness as an expert is used in 
order to confirm his credibility in the eyes of the other participants, and in particular the 
jurors (see Section 4.6).  
                                                 
36
 For a discussion of social identity theory see Tajfel 1982, Turner 1982, Tajfel / Turner 1986. 
37
 The theoretical approach on identity here adopted stems from van Dijk‘s consideration that it may be 
improper to talk about ―one, new, ad hoc or ‗hybrid‘ identity‖, as identity is not constructed afresh 
according to the contextual situation; rather, it would be more appropriate to talk about a ―dynamic, 
contextually and textually controlled, activation and manipulation of various ‗given‘ identities‖ (van Dijk 
2009: 213). 
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We all continuously draw on different identities, and lawyers are no exception. While 
presenting and construing their identity of credible professionals, they also try to convey 
aspects of perceived similarity in their relation with the jurors, in order not to distance 
themselves from laymen and from their presumed attitudes and values.  
The analysis of the complexity of the communicative dynamics that take place in the 
courtroom calls for a reflection on socially constructed power and power asymmetries. 
Even outside the courtroom setting (or any other institutionalized social setting) power 
is omnipresent, and so are power relationships. Drawing on a Foucauldian 
conceptualization of power, it can be argued that ―power is co-extensive with the social 
body‖ (Foucault 1980a: 142) and any instance of social interaction, synchronous as well 
as asynchronous, entails phenomena of power.  
As the Foucauldian ideology suggests, power in this sense is not necessarily ‗evil‘, in 
that it may assume both (generally considered) negative (e.g. domination and coercion) 
and positive (e.g. spurring on productivity, creating healthy resistance) functions. 
Foucault‘s reflection on power goes beyond the good-evil dichotomy and the antithesis 
between, on the one hand, a (more sociological) conception of power as the sine qua 
non for the existence of a community and its social cohesion and, on the other hand, the 
interpretation of power as the expression of coercion and repression. This, in turn, leads 
Foucault to state that ―power is not an institution, and not a structure; neither is it a 
certain strength we are endowed with; it is the name that one attributes to a complex 
strategic situation in a particular society‖ (Foucault 1980b: 93).  
Power relations in communication are always intricate and complex and the context of a 
jury trial constitutes no exception. In particular, although jurors may appear to be 
passive spectators of a show being conducted by others, ultimately, they are the sole 
holders of decisional power. They are not able to interact directly with the other 
participants and the communication process seems to be led entirely by others, but it is 
nonetheless entirely up to them to reach the final verdict. In other words, apparently 
paradoxical dynamics emerge: on the one hand, the decisional power lies in the jurors‘ 
hands, as they are the sole decision makers regarding the verdict to be reached; on the 
other hand, it is clear that other expressions of power determine the conduct of the trial 
and its development. For instance, the label ‗communication power‘ used here indicates 
that the communication process is mainly guided by members of the legal profession, 
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whereas jurors seem to be relegated to observers of the event taking place (Heffer 
2005). 
 
 
3.6 Narrative structures of a jury trial  
 
 
The importance of narrativism in communication is essential (Bruner 1986, 1990, 
1991), and it can be argued that it fundamentally allows us to frame experience (Bruner 
1990: 56). The role played by narrative in a jury trial is no exception to this rule, as the 
decisional process is significantly based on a narrative model (Pennington / Hastie 
1992, Spiecker / Worthington 2003). 
More specifically, the development of a trial has often been described using the 
metaphor of a story or highlighting its distinctive narrative aspect (Papke 1991, 
Pennington and Hastie 1992, Cotterill 2003, Spiecker / Worthington 2003). The 
association between the trial and a story telling process can be identified at different 
levels. At a macro-level the trial itself can be analyzed through Labovian structures 
(Labov 1966, 1972, 1981, Labov / Waletzky 1967) and, in particular, Cotterill remarks:  
 
―[A trial] offers an introduction and background information to the case 
during opening statements, a presentation of the crime events in witness 
examination, and a final evaluative summary in the closing arguments. 
The trial then builds to a climax during the deliberation process, 
concluding with a resolution in the form of a verdict and a sentencing or 
release coda.‖ (Cotterill 2003: 23) 
 
This passage can be used to identify the Labovian narrative components, i.e. abstract, 
orientation, complicating action, evaluation, resolution and coda, and to observe how 
they develop within a trial (Cotterill 2003: 23-28). It is interesting to note that, from this 
perspective, the jury also assumes an active role in the narration, as the resolution (in 
Labovian terms) depends on the verdict issued by the jurors. Looking upon the trial as a 
piece of narrative allows us to see the trial‘s intrinsic, rudimentary narrative pattern. 
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At a different level, a trial is also composed of a series of micro-narratives (or sub-
narratives), which are in effect embedded within the macro-narrative and may be seen 
as competing stories (Goodpaster 1987: 120). These narratives are to some extent 
divergent, but they are at the same time also closely interwoven. At this level of analysis 
the jurors are confronted with different narrations of stories, and they seem to assume 
the role of spectators. On the other hand, they cannot be seen as passive observers as 
they are still given the responsibility of choosing what story to accept, and they have to 
―construct the truth out of competing partisan presentations‖ (Jonakait 2003: 175). 
Furthermore, these observations are clearly in line with Toolan‘s (1988: 8) remark that 
the ratification of a text lies in the hands of the perceiver/addressee, and not of the teller. 
 
 
3.6.1 Story framing and construction 
 
Before analyzing what communicative and persuasive strategies are typically employed 
in a jury trial, it is interesting to highlight the fact that advocate training manuals often 
present ‗script-theory‘ as a precious tool to be taken into consideration while planning 
how a story should be constructed and delivered. Schank (1986) develops script theory 
as the point of departure for the application of a dynamic model of memory. According 
to this model all new information is understood in terms of ‗scripts‘, that could defined 
as ―a person‘s mental image or understanding of a certain context or set of events‖ 
(Lubet 2004: 32). Drawing on Lubet, it is easy to understand how script theory is 
applicable to the communicative processes within a jury trial. Indeed, new information 
is not evaluated in isolation, and fact finders (in this case the jurors) will tend to 
harmonize new inputs in accordance with the script they have been creating (Lubet 
2004: 32-39).  
The story presented by a lawyer during the trial will certainly have certain gaps, 
omissions or missing points – be they intentional or unintentional. This clearly happens 
in the everyday process of storytelling, but it may be even more evident in the 
development of a trial, where certain evidence may not be admitted and other 
information may not be presented. In this respect, Lubet writes: 
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―[S]cript theory informs us that many of the gaps will be filled by the fact 
finder‘s reconstruction (some would say imagination). Recall that you are 
telling a story whenever you present evidence or argue a case. You have, 
more or less, active control over the information that you choose to 
present. Whenever you leave out a detail, however, that void is likely to 
be filled—consistent with a script—by the fact finder‘s own supposition. 
This is a process where you have little or no control‖. (Lubet 2004: 34) 
 
Another aspect related to the construction (and constant modification) of scripts on the 
part of the jurors is related to the concept of inference, which means that people tend to 
infer conclusions from certain information (Lubet 2004: 35). Furthermore, Lubet (2004: 
37) suggests that ―[t]he best way to neutralise a script is with a counterscript—provide 
the fact finder with a different and equally compelling context into which she can fit the 
trial‘s information‖.  
Jurors are generally asked to accept one of the versions that have been presented and 
Klonoff and Colby (2007: 17) remark that ―[t]he jury will generally choose either one 
counsel‘s position or that of his opponent (or a compromise between the two). Rarely 
will it venture beyond these bounds‖. It is therefore very unlikely that they would ―stray 
from the boundaries set by the advocates‖ (Klonoff / Colby 2007: 17). 
It is clear that in order for the story to be likely to be accepted, it generally has to 
comply with certain specific features. For instance, Aron et al (1996: 14.29) suggest 
that the story presented by the lawyer should meet three fundamental requirements: it 
should be short, consistent and easy to understand. Most scholars suggest delivering a 
certain version of the story following similar criteria. Indeed, it is easy to understand 
that brevity can allow the jurors to concentrate on the main points the attorney wants to 
make and reduce the potential degree of distraction and confusion. Consistency is 
another crucial aspect, as one of its purposes is to cause the story to be more easily 
accepted on the part of the jury. The fact that the story should be kept simple may seem 
obvious, considering that the jurors are not legal professionals. However, on the one 
hand it is clear that simplicity and understandability are essential features, but on the 
other hand showing a high level of topic-related knowledge is often considered 
fundamental in trial advocacy. For example, Lubet (2004: 40) highlights that ―[a]n 
apparent command of relevant information correlates strongly with believability‖. 
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Indeed, given that credibility is one of the most important features related to the 
acceptance of a story on the part of the fact finders, advocates consider it very important 
to show their level of expert knowledge to the jury. 
From Tomlin et al‘s (1997) perspective, the interaction between speakers and listeners 
may also be understood as a complex process that entails a wide range of dynamics, two 
of which may be defined as ‗knowledge integration‘ and ‗information management‘. 
The former refers to the listeners‘ need to ―integrate utterances heard into a coherent 
representation‖ in order to ―access or construct concepts and events that are virtually 
identical to those held by the speaker‖ (Tomlin et al 1997: 65). The concept of 
information management in its most basic terms refers instead to the process through 
which the speaker tries to manage the flow of information in order to ―help the listener 
succeed in knowledge integration‖ (Tomlin et al 1997: 65). It is easy to understand that 
these processes are fundamental to any communicative interaction, and that professional 
communicators, such as attorneys, constantly exploit their knowledge of these processes 
and their dynamics. In the case of a trial, diverging representations are suggested and 
the jury is confronted with competing versions of a certain event; consequently, the 
main aim of the speaker is ultimately to lead the listeners to a representation of ideas or 
actions identical to the speaker‘s representation.  
 
 
3.6.2 Narrativism  
 
One simply cannot imagine a trial without narrative; indeed, it is through narrative that 
stories are presented and the use of stories allows the jurors to make sense of the 
process they are involved in. More specifically, it may argued that ―[i]n courtroom 
disputes, the raw materials for constructing stories are the pre-existing attitudes of 
jurors, and the arguments and evidence presented at trial‖ (Huntely / Costanzo 2003: 
235). The term ‗account‘ is also widely used, as ―creating an account highlights the 
need to present messages most easily perceived as real and believable, not only in the 
context of the story of the story, but also in the context of the jurors‘ histories‖ (Lisnek / 
Oliver 2001: 10). James Boyd White gives a very graphic description of the role played 
by accounts in the legal process: 
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―The process is at heart a narrative one because there cannot be a legal 
case without a real story about real people actually located in time and 
space and culture. Some actual person must go to a lawyer with an 
account of the experience upon which he or she wants the law to act, and 
that account will always be a narrative. The client‘s narrative is not 
simply accepted by the lawyer but subjected to questioning and 
elaboration, as the lawyer sees first one set of legal relevances, then 
another. In the formal legal process, that story is then retold, over and 
over by the lawyer and by the client, and by others, in developing and 
competing versions, until by judgment or agreement an authoritative 
version is achieved.‖ (White 1985: 692) 
 
As Gee remarks, ―[n]arratives are important sense-making devices‖ (Gee 1999: 134). 
The listener has to construe his own narrative and has to untangle a certain story from 
different elements that are presented; the aim of the narrator is, therefore, to suggest and 
inspire his version of the story, by presenting it as the most easily acceptable (in terms 
of logic, coherence, etc). 
It is also interesting to observe that narratives in a jury trial are also subject to complex 
phenomena of co-authorship, intended as the process through which a narrative is 
simultaneously constructed by different interactants involved in a communicative 
event
38
. For instance, witness and expert witness examination is a manifest realization 
of a narrative that develops mainly through a series of questions and answers and is 
evidently constructed by different interactants
39
.  
As previously mentioned, the interrelation between multiple narratives is at the core of a 
trial and its dynamics. Figure 6 attempts to visualize the complex relationship (and 
interdependence) between emerging narratives:  
 
 
                                                 
38
 At a deeper level co-authorship may also be understood as the process of co-construction in which the 
active role of the receivers is emphasized. For a further discussion of this well-established concept see, 
inter alia, Goodwin 1986, Duranti 1986. 
39
 Co-authorship need not necessarily be understood as a form of cooperation toward the same goals, as in 
several circumstances (as often happens in cross-examination), the final aims of the interactants may be 
divergent. 
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Trial as narrative
Defense’s narrativeProsecution’s narrative
P1's narrative P2's narrative
P3's narrative
P1's narrative P2's narrative
P3's narrative
P4
 
Figure 6: The circularity of narratives in a trial 
 
Figure 6 is by no means intended as an exhaustive representation of the totality of the 
narrative processes that characterize the development of a jury trial. Simply, it aims to 
visually show the strong interconnection of narratives and their circularity. As shown, at 
a macro-level the trial can be intended as a macro-narrative, which is constituted by a 
series of other narratives. Given the nature of the system, and for the sake of 
convenience in the visual representation, the two main narratives have been identified as 
developing within the framework suggested by defense and by prosecution. They are 
mainly narrated by the respective attorneys, but they consist of and draw upon multiple 
narratives. This multiplicity can be seen as related to the fact that the attorney‘s 
narrative derives from the combination of stories narrated in different moments and in 
different phases (e.g. opening statements, examination, closing); moreover, each 
narrative encompasses a series of micro-narratives. Indeed, narratives in a jury trial are 
interdependent and circular, and the stories presented by different participants
40
 (e.g. P1, 
P2, P3, etc.) are reciprocally referred to, confirmed, denied and integrated.  
The discussion of narrative frameworks emerging in a trial can be further complexified 
by noting that they include a series of different events which could be broadly identified 
as ‗kernel‘ events and ‗satellite‘ events (Chatman 1969), where the former are intended 
                                                 
40
 P1, P2, P3, P4 in Figure 6 simply refer to hypothetical participants (i.e. Participant 1, Participant 2, 
Participant 3, Participant 4). The vast array of participants involved in the construction of a narrative is 
not to be seen as comprising exclusively the participants who personally narrate some events during the 
trial. They are rather intended as all those participants (even in absentia) whose narratives somehow 
emerge in the trial (for example, via reference to their narrative offered by another participant).  
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as the key events and the latter as secondary events. As Cohan and Shires note, ―kernels 
advance and satellites amplify the transformation of events which a sequence lineates to 
produce a story‖ (Cohan / Shires 1988: 55). As will be shown, the complex network of 
narratives emerging in a trial develops not only around the main events, but also 
according to a series of secondary events. Following Cohan and Shire (1988), events 
may be ‗enchained‘, that is tied by a direct causal connection, where an event is 
presented as the direct consequence of another; events may be also be ‗embedded‘, as 
they may result in a series of embedding processes where different events are 
concomitant and interdependent.  
 
 
 
3.6.3 Competing stories 
 
As has been shown, courtroom proceedings in the U.S. are based on the adversary 
system. It is easy to understand that according to this system ―juries receive information 
selected, managed and controlled by the parties and their attorneys‖ and they have to 
―construct the truth out of competing partisan presentations‖ (Jonakait 2003: 175). In its 
simplest terms, the communication process underlying a jury trial is based on the idea 
that ―[j]urors take in the information presented by lawyers and witnesses and ‗decode‘ it 
into terms that fit their own experience‖ (Lisnek / Oliver 2001: 4). Therefore, a jury trial 
represents a unique communicative situation in which a variable number of agents 
present (considerably) different versions of a certain event to an audience (primarily, the 
appointed jurors) which is in charge of making the final decision about the case. 
Goodpaster remarks that the adversary criminal trial tends to assume the contours of a 
―regulated storytelling contest between champions of competing, interpretative stories‖ 
(Goodpaster 1987: 120). The versions presented may at times overlap, supplement, 
contradict or be incompatible with one another. However, the final goal of this input 
from the various agents is to present a story that can be perceived as credible, in the 
sense that the story told by a particular agent (e.g. the district attorney) is presented in 
such a way as to be perceived as more credible than the story of another agent (e.g. the 
defendant‘s counsel). The role played by lawyers in controlling the elements of the 
story displayed is self-evident. O‘Barr affirms that ―[l]awyers enjoy a unique freedom 
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of movement in the courtroom; they control the flow of information; they are able 
simultaneously to converse with judges in the obscure language of the law and with 
jurors in everyday English‖ (O‘Barr 1982: 55). Lawyers to a certain extent hold a 
privileged position in the communication exchange, even though the idea that one of the 
interactants can be in total control of the flow of information would be an overly 
simplistic view of the extremely complex process that is taking place. While lawyers are 
certainly the main agents in charge of framing, organizing and presenting the content 
matter dealt with in the courtroom, it is interesting to note that they are not the only 
direct sources of information, and one of the most complicated tasks they have to 
accomplish is to combine the different elements presented by different other agents. 
One of the principal functions attributed to courtroom communication is persuasive, as 
persuasion can be understood, in general terms, as ―a symbolic process in which 
communicators try to convince other people to change their attitudes or behaviors 
regarding an issue through the transmission of a message in an atmosphere of free 
choice‖ (Perloff 2010: 12). In the context of a jury trial, persuasion may be broadly 
interpreted as the process which allows lawyers presenting their case to make their case 
credible and acceptable (Rieke / Stutman 1990). The narration is therefore strictly 
related to a constant process of persuasion, as persuading the jurors about the credibility 
and the acceptability of a story can be considered, to some extent, as the ultimate goal of 
this communicative process. Indeed, ―[p]ersuasion is, in sum, the purpose of trial 
communication‖ (Aron et al 1996: 1.26). In this context it is clear that the persuasive 
process is crucial, as ―the concept of persuasion goes hand in hand with decision 
making‖ (Lubet 2004: 31). 
 
 
3.7 The hybridity of courtroom language  
 
 As will be seen in more detail in Chapter 4, the nature of courtroom language is highly 
hybrid from a variety of perspectives. Firstly, courtroom language offers a clear 
manifestation of the interdependence of the spoken and the written modes. Indeed, on 
the one hand, orality is a key feature, as remarked by Walter: ―The American courtroom 
trial is a speech situation. Everything occurs through the spoken word‖ (Walter 1988: 
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VII). In this respect, Cotterill adds: ―The overwhelming primacy of the oral over the 
written in court also means that the verbal dexterity of the speaker becomes a significant 
factor in the presentation of credible testimony‖ (Cotterill 2003: 10). On the other hand, 
the relationship between the two modes is particularly complex. The significant 
dependence of trial procedures on orality has also often been criticized for not being 
conducive to a complete and clear understanding of the material being presented. In 
particular, von Mehren and Murray aptly remark: 
 
―Reliance on purely oral communication limits the amount and 
complexity of material that can be communicated, tends to protract 
proceedings, and may jeopardize the retention by the jurors of complex 
details. For this reason, some courts have recently begun to experiment 
with allowing jurors to take notes during long or complex proceedings‖. 
(von Mehren / Murray 2007: 213) 
 
With the aim of facilitating comprehension, some reforms have been introduced, and 
they also suggest a reflection on the relationship between the spoken and the written 
mode. For example, in certain cases some jurors are allowed to pose questions, and they 
may generally do so via a written note
41
. In this respect von Mehren and Murray write: 
  
―Recent reforms in some jurisdictions provide juries with the ability to 
pose written questions to be submitted to the judge who can then 
determine whether they are proper to be posed to a lawyer or witness. So 
far, there has been little use of this procedure in practice.‖ (von Mehren / 
Murray 2007: 214) 
 
The interdependence of the written and the spoken modes often emerges during the 
trial; for instance, jury instructions are originally produced in a written format, but are 
first conveyed to the jurors orally by the judge, who may also integrate them with other 
                                                 
41
 Reforms in this direction are also particularly relevant for the discussion of communication processes in 
the courtroom in that they manifest the potential for a relatively dialogic process, and somehow 
controvert the claims of total passivity of the jurors, even though their use is limited and highly 
constrained. 
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oral observations; then in certain circumstances (as in the case analyzed here) the 
written text is also given to the jurors for reference. Moreover, the jurors have to rely 
primarily on what they have heard, but in this case they are also provided with notepads 
for taking notes, and they may refer to those notes during their jury deliberations. 
At a more general level, it should also be noted that the entire trial is carried out through 
the spoken word, but is also transcribed. Furthermore, accusations are also based on the 
record of what has been said before the trial, for example in the interviews carried out 
by the police with the defendant and in the statements made by him
42
.  
Legal/lay discourse in jury trials has been defined as ―[v]erbal communication produced 
by legal professionals and received by lay participants—primarily the lay jury‖ (Heffer 
2005: 10). However, it is evident that in the context of a trial verbal communication is 
always intertwined with non-verbal aspects. It has been shown that narrative plays a 
crucial role in the communicative dynamics of a jury trial. Integrating these 
considerations with a reflection on modality, it should also be noted that ―[w]hile a 
narrative may be crafted through a single modality, more often narrators intertwine a 
multiplicity of modalities‖ (Ochs 1997: 186). This also happens in a trial where the 
narration is conducted through various means and strategies, which may be, for 
instance, auditory or visual. More specifically, speakers constantly point to charts, 
maps, diagrams, photos, other figures, or they present sound recordings (such as 
telephone calls) or video material
43
. 
Beyond modality, trial discourse may further be seen as hybrid in terms of styles and 
registers. Indeed, it is highly formal and technical in certain circumstances, but 
formality and technicality are also combined with ordinary language and even instances 
of oversimplification. Such variants correspond to the heterogeneity of the interactants 
involved in a jury trial, who, by definition, have considerably different backgrounds. It 
is clear that attorneys adapt their talk in relation to the jurors, as ―[t]he more the sender 
reflects the receiver‘s own mode of communication, the more easily will his message be 
understood‖ (Giles / Powesland 1975: 159)44. However, if we consider attorney/jury 
                                                 
42
 Other issues also emerge in relation to the fact that however accurate the transcripts may be they will 
never express the words pronounced in their perfect completeness. Moreover, the police are not often 
specifically trained in the issues related to the transcription processes.   
43
 As mentioned in Chapter 2, a multi-modal analysis would, however, go beyond the scope of this study. 
44
 For a discussion of accommodation theory see Giles / Powesland 1975 and Bell 1984. Cf. Section 
4.5.4. 
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communicative processes, it may be difficult to establish what the jurors‘ ‗mode of 
communication‘ is, given the predominantly monologic nature of the process (see 
Section 3.5, cf. Cotterill 2003). In order to define a mode of communication with such 
scarcity of information, advocates may work along the lines of what they may consider 
the prototypical juror to be, and they may also attempt to acquire a considerable amount 
of information about the jurors (e.g. during the voir dire phase).  
Moreover, jury trials may be seen as a combination of relatively planned and relatively 
unplanned discourse
45
 (Ochs 1979b, Tannen 1982), even though the former appears 
predominant. The nature of a trial is also hybrid as the context is a highly 
institutionalized and standardized one, but, at the same time, displays a highly 
individual and personal character.  
Courtroom discourse presents the use of legal language, characterized by a certain level 
of rationality and logical development, as well as a constant use of emotional language. 
Rationality plays an important, but not hegemonic, role. The situation is particularly 
complex, because rational language and emotional language are not mutually exclusive, 
but continuously interrelated, and it is exactly this interplay that often determines the 
effectiveness of an interactant‘s speech. Merry (1990) argues that emotional language 
enters the courtroom when the appropriation of the terms of legal discourse is 
ineffective, but, more generally, it may be argued that one of the factors inherent to 
successful legal advocacy is an ability to constantly move between emotion-laden and 
more aseptic words throughout the trial. Furthermore, different types of law, (such as 
institutional or moral) are constantly contrasted and negotiated. Legislation (which 
shows elements of general applicability as well as specificity) may often be in conflict 
with the customs and values of society, and this sort of tension is fundamental within 
the context of a jury trial.  
In sum, courtroom language is intrinsically hybrid in that it is, in turn, hypercomplex 
and oversimplified, extremely formal and humorous; it combines parataxis and 
hypotaxis, it is personal and impersonal, clear and ambiguous, precise and 
indeterminate, general and specific, technical and emotional. 
                                                 
45
 It should, however, be observed that such distinction is not clear-cut. For a further discussion see 
Tannen 1982a, Ochs 1979a, Chafe 1982. 
120 
 
  
121 
 
4. Analysis: the David Westerfield trial 
 
The power of the lawyer is the uncertainty of the 
law. (Jeremy Bentham) 
 
 
 
Having highlighted in the previous chapter some of the main features and issues that 
typify courtroom communication in jury trials, the analysis based on one specific trial 
will now be presented. Considering the vastness of the material available related to this 
case, a selection had inevitably to be carried out. I will primarily focus on the 
communicative dynamics that characterize the interaction between legal professionals 
(i.e. the attorneys and the judge) and the jurors, in the attempt to show which 
communicative strategies and techniques are used and to examine the principles that lie 
behind such choices. This endeavor will be carried out by also observing the emergence 
of knowledge asymmetries between the interactants and how they are made 
―communicatively salient‖ (Marková / Foppa 1991: 5), in light of the procedural 
standards that are to be followed in the different phases of the trial.  
 
 
4.1 The case 
 
The case related to the death of Danielle van Dam will be briefly outlined in this section 
for clarifying purposes
46
. 
Seven-year-old Danielle disappeared from her home in Sabre Spring, San Diego, 
California, in the night between February 1 and February 2, 2002. The last person to 
have seen her was her father as he tucked her in, while her mother was spending the 
night out with some friends. David Westerfield, a 50-year-old neighbor, soon emerged 
as the only suspect and was questioned by the police on February 4. He was arrested on 
February 22 and was charged with murder, kidnapping and possession of child 
                                                 
46
 The case received considerable media attention, and press coverage about the case was extensive. For 
details about the case see, for instance, http://articles.cnn.com/keyword/david-westerfield. 
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pornography. During the investigation, Danielle‘s blood, fingerprints and strands of hair 
were found in Westerfield‘s mobile home. On February 27 Danielle‘s corpse was found 
by two volunteers who were acting on a hunch in Dehsea, California, in a thicket of 
oaks 25 miles from Danielle‘s house. Paul Pfingst, the San Diego County District 
Attorney, affirmed that it was not possible to determine immediately the cause of death 
because of the body‘s state of decomposition; whether the girl had been sexually 
assaulted could not be determined either.  
In June 2002 the trial started, and in opening the trial Judge William Mudd cautioned 
jurors to avoid news reports about the case. The defense tried to turn the spotlight away 
from his client and to demonstrate that Danielle‘s parents, Damon and Brenda van Dam, 
behaved coarsely the night their daughter was kidnapped. It was the parents‘ lifestyle to 
be put on trial and they were depicted as a promiscuous, immoral and irresponsible 
couple. Under cross-examination, Ms. van Dam testified that after spending the night in 
the local bar, she went home with four friends, and Danielle‘s parents admitted to 
smoking marijuana the night of her disappearance. The attempt was to lay groundwork 
for an alternate theory, assuming that anyone could have committed the crime. The 
ultimate aim was to create reasonable doubt about Westerfield‘s guilt, insisting on the 
negligence on the part of Danielle‘s parents instead of dwelling on forensic evidence. 
Indeed, predictably, during the trial forensic evidence was in turn cited to confirm the 
defendant‘s responsibility or to raise doubt about whether he could have committed the 
crime. On August 21 the verdict was read and David Westerfield was found guilty on 
all counts.  
The following week the penalty phase of the trial started with the aim to decide whether 
Mr. Westerfield should be given life in prison without parole or death by lethal 
injection. On September 16 the jury recommended the death penalty, but the decision 
was quite problematic, as it had initially appeared to be a deadlocked jury. Criticism 
arose because jurors had originally said that they could not reach a unanimous 
sentencing and needed further guidance; Judge Mudd had set a hearing for the 
afternoon, but, after lunch, the jury asked for more time to deliberate and ten minutes 
afterwards a verdict was reached. In January 2003, California Judge William Mudd 
sentenced David Westerfield to be executed. At the time of writing, he is detained in 
San Quentin State Prison. 
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4.2 The trial  
 
This study is definable as the analysis of a single discourse event, as it is confined to 
one specific trial, namely California vs Westerfield. However, defining a trial as a single 
event is problematic because of its complex (although clearly pre-defined) structure and 
because it inherently consists of different sub-phases (see Section 3.4). The focus on 
one trial allows a more in-depth investigation and limits the risk of running into 
fallacious conclusions originating from the comparison of events characterized by 
significant differences. Indeed, every trial has a certain degree of specificity deriving 
from a variety of factors that determine its nature and its development (such as the 
specific procedures contemplated by a certain jurisdiction at a specific point in time).  
Even though material was available for the entire process (from the preliminary 
hearings to the sentencing phase), only some phases of the trial will be analyzed, given 
the clear time, space and target constraints of this work. The analysis will focus 
specifically on the communication between the court and the jurors (with particular 
reference to the jury instruction phase) and between the attorneys and the jurors 
(principally during opening statements and closing arguments). The other parts of the 
trial will be briefly touched upon mainly for clarifying purposes and in order to position 
the different phases under scrutiny within a broader framework.   
The Westerfield trial was conducted in 2002 and the time span that is primarily 
considered in this analysis goes from June 4 (starting with preliminary jury instructions 
and opening statements) to August 21 (verdict). Table 3 is to be intended as a merely 
introductory representation of the different phases of the Westerfield trial, which can be 
briefly outlined as follows
47
: 
                                                 
47
 For the sake of completeness, it should be remembered that these events were also preceded by other 
phases, such as pre-trial hearings and pre-trial motions.  
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Dates Phase 
May,  2002 Jury selection 
June 4 Initial instructions by the judge
48
  
Prosecution Opening statements  
Defense Opening statements 
Witness examination 
June 4 - August 1
49
  Witness examination 
August 6 Jury instructions
50
  
Closing arguments 
August 7 Closing arguments  
August 8  Final closing arguments 
Jury instructions
51
 
August 8 - August 21 Deliberation  
August 21 Verdict 
August 28 - September 16 Penalty phase 
January 3, 2003 Sentence
52
 
Table 3: Outline of the Westerfield trial
53
  
 
The main participants involved in the trial are: 
 
Judge: William Mudd 
Defendant: David Westerfield 
For the People of California: Jeff B. Dusek; George W. Clarke  
For the defendant: Steven E. Feldman; Robert E. Joyce; Laura G. Schaefer. 
 
                                                 
48
 Identified in the analysis as ‗Jury instructions, day 1‘ 
49
 The period between opening statements (June 4) and jury instructions (August 6) also includes motions 
(in particular, on June 27, July 23, July 29, August 2). 
50
 Identified in the analysis as ‗Jury instructions, day 28‘. 
51
 Identified in the analysis as ‗Jury instructions, day 30‘. 
52
 The trial of a person charged with a capital crime also includes the sentencing phase. Once the verdict 
has been reached, if the defendant is found guilty, the sentencing phase leads to the selection of a 
sentence. As mentioned above, this analysis will not focus on this phase. 
53
 The phases that represent the primary object of this analysis are in bold. 
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The present analysis primarily focuses on legal experts-jurors interaction, and the main 
agents investigated will be Judge Mudd, Mr. Dusek (prosecuting attorney) and Mr. 
Feldman (defense attorney). 
 
 
4.3 Jury selection: who will be the audience? 
 
The selection process
54
 is a complex phase and is jurisdiction-specific (Mauet 2009: 
40). In the Westerfield case, the process may be briefly summarized as follows: Nearly 
500 prospective jurors were randomly selected and were asked to complete the 22-page 
juror questionnaire, which comprised 123-questions. After the review of the 
questionnaires, the prospective jurors (in groups of 20) were questioned by the judge, 
the prosecutors and the defense attorneys to determine whether they could be fair and 
impartial in that case. As described in Section 3.3, when it is believed that a person 
would not render an impartial verdict based on the evidence, a challenge for cause takes 
place; the lawyers may also dismiss a potential juror without cause (peremptory 
challenge). The process continued until the twelve jurors (and six alternates) were 
approved by both sides and sworn in.  
The jury selection aims to identify a fair and impartial jury, but attorney training 
manuals highlight that this phase is functional to the attorneys not only in order to 
attempt to select jurors that may be favorable to their side, but also to learn about jurors‘ 
attitudes and behaviors
55
. As Mauet notes:  
 
―The jurors also bring with them their personal experiences, deep-seated 
beliefs, and attitudes about life and how things work in the real world. 
They have expectations about how a trial should be conducted; how 
lawyers should act; how they want witness testimony, exhibits, and 
visual aids to be presented; and how they want to be treated during the 
course of the trial. Effective lawyers recognize the jurors‘ needs, 
                                                 
54
 For details on jury selection see inter alia Kaye 2006, Mauet 2009. 
55
 See also Section 3.3.1. 
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attitudes, and expectations and respond to them throughout the jury 
selection process.‖ (Mauet 2009: 25) 
 
Moreover, in the selection phase lawyers should also try to recognize the types of jurors 
involved, e.g. distinguishing between ‗persuaders‘, ‗participants‘, and ‗non-participants‘ 
(Mauet 2009: 51) and to identify who the most influencing speakers during 
deliberations could be.  
As noted in Section 3.3.1, the issue related to the impartiality of the jurors is at the core 
of the procedure. The case analyzed here was a high-profile case and its media coverage 
was extensive; under those circumstances the selection of unbiased, fair and impartial 
jurors is even more challenging as there is a higher potential danger that ―jurors will 
judge the case based on pre-existing biases or media reports rather than trial evidence‖ 
(Hans 2006: XIV). The final composition of the jury included six men and six women 
and the alternates were five women and one man. Figure 7 offers a general overview of 
the jurors involved in the case: 
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Figure 7: Jury composition in the Westerfield trial
56
  
 
 
4.4 Jury instruction:  what should the audience do? 
 
Jury instructions consist of a set of legal principles and procedures that have to be 
applied to the case in question. More specifically, a distinction should be made between 
‗jury instruction‘ intended as a comprehensive expression for the process of instructing 
the jurors and ‗jury instructions‘ intended as the specific texts delivered (see Heffer 
2008: 47-52).  
In California vs Westerfield, jurors were instructed in different moments. The analysis 
will primarily focus on the three main moments when jury instructions were given: pre-
                                                 
56
 Cragin, Brian. The Westerfield jury. Available at: 
 http://legacy.signonsandiego.com/news/metro/danielle/images/jurors.html. 
Accessed: January 7, 2009. 
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instructions before opening statements (June 4, day 1), instructions before closing 
arguments (August 6, day 28), and final instructions after closing arguments (August 8, 
day 30). The present analysis also takes into consideration other instances of interaction 
between the judge and the jurors, in which the former addresses the latter with the aim 
of informing and instructing them about a specific issue that has been raised or a 
relevant procedure that the judge deems necessary to illustrate.  
The importance of the jury instruction phase cannot be overestimated, in that the 
potential erroneous comprehension of instructions and the consequent risk of an 
improper application of the law raise crucial issues about the legitimacy of jury verdicts. 
The aim of this phase is essentially ―to create a legal structure to guide juror decision 
making‖ (Lieberman / Sales 2000: 587). Its ultimate purpose appears highly 
challenging, in that instructions have to condense considerably a vast set of intricate 
legal principles and trial procedures, and such instructions have to be followed by jurors 
who are likely to lack any legal background.  
The debate around jury instructions has always been particularly vivid. As early as 1973 
Friedman wrote that, generally, these texts are ―stereotyped, antiseptic statements of 
abstract rules‖ and concluded that ―often juries may not understand them at all‖ 
(Friedman 1973: 137). Friedman also observed that in the past, for instance in the 
eighteenth century, the judge explained the law to the jurors in a much more informal 
and accessible way, and such instructions were ultimately more informative for laymen. 
Later, especially in the nineteenth century, different statutes eliminated the possibility 
for the judge to comment on the evidence; then, the use of stereotyped instructions has 
constantly proliferated in the last decades. These types of instructions have often been 
described as confusing for the jurors, but it has been argued that, on the other hand, they 
may contribute to preserving the fundamental principle of the autonomy of the jury 
(Friedman 1973: 137). 
Issues related to the drafting, the delivery and the reception of jury instructions have 
been addressed in a long strain of cases and have been the object of a large set of 
empirical and non-empirical studies. In particular, problems related to the 
comprehensibility of jury instructions have attracted considerable attention (see inter 
alia Lieberman / Sales 1997, Tiersma 1999b, Conley 2000, Dumas 2000, Ellsworth / 
Reifman 2000, Heffer 2008), especially after some seminal work carried out in this 
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direction in the seventies (Elwork et al 1977, 1982, Sales et al 1977, Charrow / Charrow 
1979) showing the limited comprehensibility of such texts.  
Much work has been done in the last few years in order to promote advancements in 
jurors‘ understanding of instructions. The State of California, where the Westerfield 
trial took place, carried out some pioneering work in the drafting of more accessible 
pattern jury instructions
57
; indeed as early as 1938, the Book of Approved Jury 
Instructions (BAJI) was published in California (Lieberman / Krauss 2009: 154). 
Pattern instructions, also defined as ―model, uniform, approved and standardized‖ 
instructions, can be described as ―tools designed to simplify the process of issuing jury 
instructions and to promote consistency among judges‖ (Williams 2000: 123). The work 
aiming at improving the understandability of pattern instructions has continuously 
evolved (see Tiersma 1993, 2009, Tiersma / Curtis 2008). In particular, such 
instructions are written applying principles that may facilitate understanding, such as: 
avoidance of an extensive use of legal jargon; avoidance of intricate syntactical patterns; 
clear organizational structure (e.g. including the use of numbered lists). It has also been 
suggested that instructions should be tailored to the individual case (e.g. including the 
names of parties instead of general definitions).  
Jury instructions can be said to have two primary objectives: ―achieving legal accuracy 
and effectively conveying information to jurors‖ (Severance / Loftus 1982: 155), and 
the two aims are often inevitably in contrast. Legal accuracy is indeed a fundamental 
aspect, in that under certain circumstances a jury verdict may be appealed to a higher 
court on the basis of a claim of error in the instructions delivered to the jury. Pattern 
instructions were introduced with the aim to reduce cases of appeals based on this type 
of claimed errors in instructing the jury, as well as with the objective to render the 
process of selecting the appropriate jury instructions quicker and simpler for judges and 
attorneys (Nieland 1979). 
 
 
                                                 
57
 Pattern instructions are sets of standard instructions that are generally applicable; they are usually 
selected by the judge and the attorneys and are slightly adapted to the specific case in question. 
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4.4.1 Jury instruction as a multi-phase 
 
The moment in which instructions are delivered, and the amount of times jurors are 
exposed to them, can also affect comprehension. It has now for decades been argued 
that it is irrational to provide jurors with instructions related to basic principles, such as 
the notion of ‗reasonable doubt‘ (see Section 4.7.3 for details), at the end of the trial, 
when significant impressions about the innocence or guilt of the defendant have already 
been formed and it is iniquitous to ask jurors to apply these instructions retrospectively. 
The use of instructions exclusively before deliberation has been described as an 
unreasonable practice, and it has been compared to ―telling jurors to watch a baseball 
game and decide who won without telling them what the rules are until the end of the 
game‖ (Schwarzer 1991: 583). 
Conversely, pre-instructions (also called preliminary or initial instructions) are given 
before opening statements and generally deal with some basic procedural matters and 
legal principles. It is often argued that giving pre-instructions on substantive legal 
principles and on trial procedures prior to the beginning of the trial may facilitate jurors‘ 
understanding. Indeed, initial instructions allow the jurors to organize the testimony and 
the evidence they are exposed to in a more meaningful legal framework and to focus 
more carefully on the relevant issues. Pre-instructions may also contribute to helping the 
jurors to frame the evidence ―according to legal rather than personal criteria‖ (Heuer / 
Penrod 1989: 413). Moreover, repeated exposures to instructions may also improve 
recollection, even though this hypothesis has not always been confirmed (for a detailed 
investigation of preliminary and written instructions see Heuer / Penrod 1989). 
California court rules provide that the point in the trial when instructions should be 
given is at the discretion of the judge. In the Westerfield case, beyond preliminary 
instructions, the jury was instructed also before closing arguments. This practice is also 
generally saluted positively as it allows jurors to frame the attorneys‘ arguments in light 
of specific instructions. Finally, in California vs Westerfield, jurors received instructions 
also after closing arguments; this is a traditional practice, as it is deemed functional that 
the jurors hear instructions just before starting deliberating and scholars often remark 
that it is also considered appropriate that the last words in the jurors‘ ears should be the 
judge‘s and not one of the lawyers‘.   
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Before providing the jurors with preliminary instructions, Judge Mudd highlights that 
instructions will also be given at a later stage, and that no instruction is of higher 
importance than another, even though the task of disregarding the order of presentation 
of instructions may be psychologically unattainable
58
: 
 
THE COURT: I shall now instruct you as to your basic functions, duties, 
and conduct. At the conclusion of the case I will give you further 
instructions on the law that applies to this case. All of the court‘s 
instructions, whether they are given before, during, or after the taking of 
testimony, are of equal importance. (Jury instructions, day 1) 
 
Jurors are also reminded that they will receive a written copy of the instructions, which 
they could refer to during deliberations: 
 
THE COURT: You will have these instructions in written form in the 
juryroom to refer to during your deliberations. (Jury instructions, day 28) 
 
In this respect, it has been suggested that written jury instructions made available to 
juries are more easily understood, recalled, and applied (Elwork et al 1977). 
 
 
4.4.2 Humor in court 
 
One of the elements that characterize the judge‘s talk is the presence of humor. 
However, the very definition of humor is not straightforward. For example, using 
consequent laughter as a defining criterion is not appropriate, as Richards notes (2006: 
93), and Attardo confirms that ―humor and laughter, while obviously related, are by no 
means coextensive‖ (Attardo 2003: 1288). In general terms, humor may be intended as 
―anything done or said, purposely or inadvertently, that is found to be comical or 
amusing‖ (Long / Graessner 1988: 37). In this specific context, given the dramatic case 
being tried and the (generally perceived) formality of a courtroom, it is implausible to 
                                                 
58
 In light, for example, of primacy and recency rules. 
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expect open laughers from the juries. The judge‘s words are not used with an openly 
comic function, as that would not be appropriate, but a subtle humorous vein emerges 
quite frequently in his words. As Tannen notes, humor is a ―highly distinctive aspects of 
a person‘s style‖ (Tannen 1984: 130), and humor is a feature that clearly typifies Judge 
Mudd‘s style. Conversely, the use of puns or punch-lines or other humorous remarks is 
less evident in the attorneys‘ words. This choice may be fundamentally related to a 
specific personal style, but it is also true that humor generally tends to be used more 
sparingly by attorneys, as it may be counterproductive. Humor serves both an inclusive 
and an exclusive function; if listeners are excluded, as they do not respond positively to 
the humorous remark, this process may be detrimental to the attempt to establish strong 
bonds with the juries.   
At the beginning of the instruction phase, instead of starting immediately to read the 
jury instructions, the judge spends a few words on extra-textual references and tries to 
create a more familiar and relaxed atmosphere, given that a courtroom may be an 
unknown and untried setting to many jurors. Indeed, the judge‘s comments may be used 
to alleviate the tension the jurors may feel, given that it is the first day of the actual trial 
and for some of them it may be the first time they serve as jurors.  
Judge Mudd starts his talk with a comment on the Padres, the San Diego Major League 
Baseball team. An introductory remark of this type is used both before reading the 
preliminary jury instructions (on day 1), but also before reading the second main set of 
instructions (on day 28):  
 
THE COURT: Good morning, ladies and gentlemen, and welcome back. 
I had hoped when we next met that the Padres would be on a lengthy 
winning streak. Unfortunately that was not to be. (Jury instructions, day 
1) 
 
THE COURT: Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. Welcome back. 
About the best we can say about the Padres‘ performance since you left is 
that the football season is about ready to start. (Jury instructions, day 28) 
 
As is often the case, the judge begins the instruction phase by offering some preliminary 
information about the general procedure and the unfolding of a trial: 
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THE COURT: As you all know, having gone through the orientation 
program that was put on by the jury commissioner, trials in this state are 
conducted in various phases or stages. You folks have already been 
through the jury-selection process and are now the twelve jurors and six 
alternates that have been selected to hear this matter. The next phase of 
the trial is another orientation. This orientation, however, is a little more 
specific, because it now deals with some of the dos and don‘ts of this 
new job that you have. Like everything else in this state, this has been 
reduced to a script for me to read. When you realize that this script was 
prepared by lawyers and judges, it will soon become very apparent to you 
that this is not only not the most entertaining material you’ve ever heard, 
but, in addition to that, it might sound confusing and a little convoluted. 
Don‘t worry about it. We‘re going to be talking about very basic 
concepts, and I will try to interject where all the legalese is some 
common-sense approach to this. As soon as I‘m done with these 
comments, you‘ll hear the opening statements of counsel and the actual 
trial will begin. (Jury instructions, day 1) 
 
In this passage the judge also offers a preamble announcing that the instructions are 
now going to be read. His attempt to introduce the instructions in a simple and 
somehow engaging manner is made evident; for instance, the judge refers to the 
contents of the instructions in a deliberately simplistic way, by defining them as ‗some 
of the dos and don‘ts of this new job that you have‘. A (relatively) sarcastic remark is 
also made in relation to the nature of the instructions (‗like everything else in this state, 
it has been reduced to a script for me to read‘). 
The judge enhances his role as a facilitator of understanding. He points out the complex 
and tedious nature of the texts, euphemistically defined as ‗not the most entertaining 
material you‘ve ever heard‘, and he also presages that, as the authors are legal 
professionals, the texts may appear bewildering and tortuous. However, the judge 
attempts to reassure his audience by declaring his willingness to explain the instructions 
in a simple and understandable way which goes beyond pure ‗legalese‘. 
134 
 
Some information about basic practicalities (e.g. the use of notebooks) and procedural 
practices is initially presented:  
 
THE COURT: I want to talk to you a little bit about these notebooks. As 
you can see, it‘s basically a steno pad. Attached to that is a county of San 
Diego ink pen which means it has about a fifty/fifty chance of having ink 
in it throughout the course of this trial. But the county has spared no 
expense, and we have as many of these cheap pens as we need. So if 
yours runs out of ink or you happen to get the notebook of a prior juror 
who took copious notes, just let one of the staff know, and they will 
replenish your supply. (Jury instructions, day 1) 
 
The judge‘s language in this phase of the trial appears in stark contrast with the highly 
formal, routinized, and conventionalized language that is generally associated with legal 
procedures. In particular, humor and wittiness emerge constantly; for example, jurors‘ 
badges are euphemistically presented as ‗not the most stylish thing to go walking 
around downtown San Diego with‘:  
 
THE COURT: In that regard, I must insist that you wear your jurors‘ 
badges from the time you arrive here at the courthouse until you leave in 
the afternoon. Now, I also request that you wear them over the lunch 
hour. I know they are not the most stylish thing to go walking around 
downtown San Diego with, but by wearing those badges, others that are 
interested in court proceedings know you‘re a juror. (Jury instructions, 
day 1) 
 
Humorous remarks are also integrated with personal references to the judge and his 
family. The judge continues to adopt a very entertaining tone, using vivid and figurative 
language (‗my wife will have my head‘): 
 
THE COURT: Also, if the trial is still going, and I‘m not sure whether it 
will be, but the week of July 15
th
 through 19
th
, the court is gone. I 
treasure my thirty-three-year marriage; and if I don‘t make this trip, my 
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wife will have my head. And this was part of my agreement with 
everybody in taking this case. So I will not be here the 15
th
 through the 
19
th
. So I have no idea if the case will be over by then or whether we‘ll 
be in second phase, I have no way of knowing. But for planning 
purposes, for your employer purposes, you can mark this week down. 
You will not be in session. (Jury instructions, day 1) 
 
The jurors are initially informed about very basic practical matters, which are 
introduced with a constant dose of witty humor: 
 
THE COURT: I‘m anticipating a ninety-minute lunch break. As 
taxpayers I think you have a reason to know why since most of you never 
had lunch breaks that long. (Jury instructions, day 1) 
 
The judge‘s language also presents the use of intertextual references, which are 
creatively and entertainingly adapted to the specific context (‗Toto, we‘re not in San 
Diego anymore‘):  
 
THE COURT: Welcome back, ladies and gentlemen. To butcher a line 
from the Wizard of Oz, Toto, we‘re not in San Diego anymore. Ladies 
and gentlemen, I did something in this trial that I do in every trial I have 
ever done for almost 20 years of doing this job, and that is, I gave you the 
phone number for this courtroom. And I gave you the phone number with 
the understanding you would use it in case of an emergency. Little did I 
know that every weirdo, wacko and dimestore comedian in this country 
was going to call my line with suggestions about my hairdo, my weight. 
(The Court, day 1) 
 
It is interesting to note that in this excerpt the judge somehow establishes his credentials 
and reinforces his identity of expert by highlighting the length of his career (‗almost 20 
years‘). The judge, at the same time, continues to use a particularly informal style, 
which includes a significant dose of colloquialisms; this approach may appear to 
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diverge considerably from the purely ‗legalistic‘ style that is often associated with legal 
professionals.   
As mentioned, the judge has to use legally precise and appropriate terms in the jury 
instruction phase, as the delivery of understandable jury instructions has to deal with the 
primary concern of maintaining legal accuracy. A myopic insistence upon the use of 
legal jargon, without any clarifications regarding specific terminology and procedures, 
is more likely to fulfill the objective of preserving correctness and precision and may 
limit the potential danger of appeals based on improper jury instructions; however, an 
approach of this type may fail the other essential objective of this phase of the trial, 
which is to provide clear and understandable instructions for their final users, i.e. the 
jurors. This tension leads to an interesting blend of technical and specific definitions 
and ordinary language (even combined with colloquialisms).  
 
 
4.4.3 Issues in instructing the jurors 
 
The understandability and the effective applicability of instructions may be hampered 
by a series of factors, such as the linguistic complexity, the level of abstractness, and the 
mode of the delivery. Beyond comprehensibility, the correct applicability of the texts 
may also be highly problematic, as some of the principles mentioned appear to be in 
contrast with basic cognitive processes. For instance, the judge emphasizes that jurors 
should not be distracted by the note-taking process, but maintaining a constant level of 
concentration throughout the trial is obviously not possible: 
 
THE COURT: A word of caution. You may take notes. However, you 
should not permit note-taking to distract you from the ongoing 
proceedings. (Jury instructions, day 1)  
 
Moreover, jurors are explicitly asked to accept and follow the law, disregarding their 
own opinion about it 
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THE COURT: You must accept and follow the law as I state it to you, 
whether or not you agree with the law. (Jury instructions, day 1; Jury 
instructions, day 28) 
 
Even if we assume that the law has been correctly understood, its complete acceptance 
may not be automatic, and it may not be feasible to ask the jurors to mechanically apply 
it disregarding completely their personal opinions. Another problematic principle 
emerges in the following instruction: 
 
THE COURT: Statements made by the attorneys during the trial are not 
evidence. However, if the attorneys stipulate or agree to a fact, you must 
regard that fact as proven. (Jury instructions, day 1)  
 
Attorneys are not witnesses and their utterances do not represent evidence, but it is not 
possible to definitively exclude that jurors will attribute some evidential value to the 
attorneys‘ words. For example, as regards the examination phase, it can be argued that 
―[j]urors are unable to effectively and consistently make distinctions, during the 
interactive flow of examination speech, between bona fide evidence and advocate 
contributions.‖ (Gaines 2006: 170).  
Jurors are instructed to disregard certain type of evidence, but Wagner et al (1987) show 
the paradox of a task that requires un-thinking of a process, as such a request actually 
increases thinking about the topic:  
 
THE COURT: Do not consider for any purpose any offer of evidence 
that is rejected or any evidence that is stricken by the court. Treat it as 
though you had never heard of it. (Jury instructions, day 1) 
 
It has also been demonstrated that admonitions to ignore inadmissible evidence are 
often ineffective and may even have a ―back-fire‖ effect, ―resulting in jurors relying 
more heavily on information that have been instructed to disregard‖ (Lieberman et al 
2009: 90). In a similar vein, jurors are instructed before the beginning of the actual trial 
that they must not be influenced by pity or prejudice towards the defendant. They are 
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asked to mechanically apply the law that has been read to them, without letting 
emotions play any role in the way they process the message and evaluate it:  
 
THE COURT: You must not be influenced by pity for the defendant or 
by prejudice against him. You must not be biased against the defendant 
because he has been arrested for this offense, charged with a crime, or 
brought to trial. None of these circumstances is evidence of guilt, and 
you must not infer or assume from any or all of them that he is more 
likely to be guilty than not guilty. During this phase of the trial you must 
not be influenced by mere sentiment, conjecture, sympathy, passion, 
prejudice, public opinion or public feeling. Both the people and Mr. 
Westerfield have a right to expect that you will conscientiously consider 
and weigh the evidence, apply the law, and reach a just verdict regardless 
of the consequences. (Jury instructions, day 1)  
 
A significant strain of research (e.g. Feigenson et al 1997, Voss / Van Dyke 2001, 
Feigenson 2003) confirms the intuitive assumption that bias and emotional reactions 
inevitably affect jurors‘ evaluation of the case. In particular, different types of bias have 
been identified (e.g. Kramer et al 1990, Kerr et al 1996), such as factual (deriving from 
the consideration of factual information that is not legally probative in that specific 
case) and emotional biases. In other words, it can be argued that even though judgments 
inexorably derive from an inextricable combination of reason and emotion
59
, the law 
admits only the former (Maroney 2006: 119). 
 
 
4.4.4 Judge-jurors interaction and knowledge asymmetries 
 
In a jury trial, the relationship between the legal professionals involved and the jurors is 
inherently asymmetrical from a variety of perspectives, e.g. in terms of communicative 
dynamics and level of legal knowledge. 
                                                 
59
 For a wider reflection on the relation between law and emotion see Pildes 1992, Bandes 1999, Little 
2001, 2002, Posner 2001. 
139 
 
Jurors are often described as passive spectators of an event whose communicative 
dynamics are predominantly seen as monologic (Cotterill 2003; see Chapter 3). It has 
often been argued that the traditional passive role attributed to jurors is inevitably 
detrimental to comprehension, leads to a lack of involvement and to apathetic 
participation and, consequently, is cause of poor decision-making. However, 
involvement promoted by questions asked to the court may result in a higher degree of 
involvement and a higher level comprehension. 
Moreover, the jury is often depicted as holding a disadvantageous position derived from 
a total or partial lack of specific legal knowledge. If we observe knowledge asymmetries 
between jurors and legal experts, they are sometimes made verbally explicit during the 
trial. Indeed, in the Californian jurisdiction jurors are generally allowed to ask for 
clarifications when needed by submitting a written note to the judge, who will then 
evaluate how to clarify a certain concept in order to allow the jurors to better 
comprehend a specific point or a certain procedure. 
In the following passage an example of knowledge asymmetry about terminological 
issues (related to sustained and overruled objections) is made explicit and manifested:  
 
THE COURT: Okay. Welcome back, ladies and gentlemen. Before we 
continue questioning this witness, I have received a note from one of you 
who filled out the note properly, simply wrote me the note and signed the 
seat number, not the name, which is the way we want you to do it. And it 
basically asks about some terminology. Now, this is probably a question 
many of you might ask. (The Court, June 4) 
 
Before explaining the concept in question, the judge refers to the assumption that other 
jurors may have the same difficulty in understanding the same concept (‗this is probably 
a question many of you might ask‘). It can certainly be argued that this assumption is 
highly justified, as this issue has been brought up directly by one juror. The judge seems 
willing to use a very friendly tone and a style that should offer a higher level of 
comprehensibility: 
 
THE COURT: […] and so I’ve never personally taught any law school 
class, but I’m going to give you a judge’s version of legalese 101. 
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Whenever…we are ruled, the lawyers and I are ruled by what we call 
objections. Basically the ground rules for how a trial is conducted. And 
they are rules of evidence. And from time to time a question might be 
asked and the one lawyer will think that the answer to that question might 
be objectionable for some reason. So that lawyer is going to say objection 
and will give me a reason why I should either sustain or overrule the 
objection. Now, the reason I’m basically here is sort of the referee of this 
match that’s going on. So my job is to make the call. If I overrule the 
objection, what that means is you‘re going to hear the question and you 
will hear the answer. (The Court, June 4) 
 
Figurative language is also used by the judge in order to facilitate the juror‘s 
understanding of the legal procedure he is explaining (‗the reason I’m basically here is 
sort of the referee of this match that’s going on. So my job is to make the call’). 
Moreover, the explanation of how objections work, and how jurors should evaluate 
them, is clearly presented and the concept is repeated more than once, as it is believed 
that repeated exposure may facilitate understanding and recollection: 
 
THE COURT: Remember that a question isn‘t evidence. Evidence is the 
answer to the question. So when I overrule the objection, that means the 
lawyer made the objection, I overruled it, you will hear the question and 
the answer. If I sustain the objection, what that means is you‘re going to 
hear the question, but you won‘t hear the answer. Again, like was 
covered in voir dire, remember, a question or implications or inferences 
in a question is not evidence. It‘s only the answer that is really the 
evidence. So overruled means that you get to hear the question and the 
answer. Sustained means you‘ll hear the question but no answer. Don‘t 
dwell on it, worry about it, or hold it against one or the other lawyers. 
They‘re doing their jobs. In other words, that‘s just part of the process by 
which we control the trial. (The Court, June 4) 
 
Extensive simplification efforts occur and the judge fruitfully blends specialized legal 
terminology with everyday language. He also openly acknowledges the difficulty the 
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jurors may find in applying certain concepts and processes, such as disregarding 
questions that have been heard: 
 
THE COURT: Also, occasionally before I get to respond an answer has 
already been given. And I‘ll say something like the jury is to disregard 
the last portion of the answer. That‘s a very difficult concept because 
what I‘m telling you to do basically is disregard what the person just 
said. Now, about the best way to do that is treat it as though you had 
never heard of it. I don‘t think that will be a problem, but those are sort 
of the groundrules that you are going to see played out in this courtroom 
in the next couple weeks. (The Court, day 1)  
 
In another situation knowledge asymmetries between jurors and legal experts do not 
emerge directly, but they are dealt with on the basis of more general assumptions. In the 
following excerpt, the judge explains the purpose of a sidebar conference, as, thanks to 
his experience, he assumes that it is necessary and the jurors would benefit from it (‗I 
think we ought to talk about that‘). In this case the jurors do not explicitly ask for 
clarifications about the purpose of that specific event, but the judge presupposes that all 
or some members of the jury may be in need of such an explanation. This can be seen, 
to a certain extent, as an assumed knowledge asymmetry, as it derives from the judge‘s 
assumption: 
 
THE COURT: Ladies and gentlemen, since this is the first of probably 
many of these sidebar conferences, I think we ought to talk about that. 
The purpose of a sidebar conference is very simple. I have a choice when 
the lawyers want to talk to me before something that doesn‘t directly deal 
with you. And that is, I can have all of you leave the courtroom or I can 
make Ophelia here come over here and sit on a step, and we have a little 
football huddle and we discuss it. Now, don‘t strain an ear trying to hear 
what it is we‘re talking about, because if it‘s meant for you to hear you‘re 
going to hear it, and if you don‘t hear it, you weren‘t going to hear it 
anyway. (The Court, June 4) 
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Interestingly, metaphorical language
60
 drawing on the field of sport is also vividly used 
in this case to graphically describe what happens in a sidebar conference (‗we have a 
little football huddle‘). 
In sum, it can be argued that the highly formal and specialized form of language used in 
the written form of jury instructions is hybridized by conversational language which is 
used by the judge to clarify and complement such instructions. This hybridization 
process is, however, circular and there is a continuous alternation between technical and 
everyday language. This circularity is identifiable also from a historical perspective, as 
this phase of the trial originally displayed a higher level of informality, which was 
subsequently abandoned (see Friedman 1973) and which is nowadays often introduced. 
 
 
4.5 Opening statements: the story begins 
 
The content of opening statements was traditionally limited to a presentation of what the 
parties expected to prove in the rest of the trial through evidence and testimonies. 
Instead, as Mauet notes, ―[t]he modern view is broader and permits themes and the 
parties‘ positions on disputed facts and issues. The modern view recognizes the 
significance of opening statements in informing and orienting the jury to the facts of the 
case and the disputed issues‖ (Mauet 2009: 84). Case law identifies elements that are 
improper in opening statements, such as discussing inadmissible evidence, offering 
purely argumentative statements, asserting personal opinions, commenting about the 
evidence or the credibility of a witness, or discussing the law.  
The opening phase is meant to offer a preview of what the evidence will show and not 
to be an occasion for argumentation, as argument cannot precede the presentation of 
evidence. Jurors, therefore, should not come to a decision about the case before all the 
evidence has been presented, but it does not seem to be cognitively possible to avoid 
making any sort of judgment. Consequently, as Aron et al aptly note, ―it is improper to 
argue during the opening statement, but if the lawyer can succeed in arguing without 
giving the impression that he or she is arguing, that will facilitate the understanding of 
the attorney‘s case on the part of the jury‖ (Aron et al 1996: 12.17). 
                                                 
60
 For a further discussion of the use of metaphors in court see Section 4.7. 
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Opening statements represent the first moment of the trial where the jurors are 
confronted with a presentation of the case. Walter mentions the possibility that opening 
statements may determine the outcome of the trial even in 80-90% of the cases (Walter 
1988: 224) and it has been confirmed that ―[s]ome lawyers feel that as many as 80 per 
cent of all jurors make up their minds by the end of the opening statement‖ (Aron et al 
1996: 21.15). Similarly, Jeans writes that ―jurors, interviewed after verdict, have 
confirmed that their ultimate decision corresponded with their tentative opinion after 
opening statements in over 80% of the cases‖ (Jeans 1975: 305). However, this data has 
often been criticized and accused of being apocryphal, as they do not seem corroborated 
by clear evidence (Burke et al 1992, Tanford 2002).  
Going beyond debatable quantifications, a significant area of research assigns to 
opening statements a remarkably important function for the outcome of the trial. As 
Burns notes, ―[t]he lawyer in opening provides an important service in trying to propose 
to the jury the best account, given the story expected to be told by the opponent and the 
anticipated evidence, of what the evidence means, what it adds up to‖ (Burns 2009: 24). 
The importance of opening statements primarily lies in the oft-cited consideration that 
they create a lens through which the rest of the trial will be seen and interpreted. It is 
also argued that it is obviously not excludible a priori that the lens may be discarded or 
that its focal point may change during the course of the trial, but this type of process 
will take a more significant effort.  
It has been suggested that opening statements contribute to create a schema according to 
which jurors process and interpret the subsequent phases of the trial (Pyszczynski / 
Wrightsman 1981, Pyszczynski et al 1981). A schema may be broadly defined as ―any 
subset of existing knowledge, based on prior experience and relevant to a limited 
domain, which people use as a framework to guide their observation, organisation, and 
retrieval from memory of perceived events‖ (Lingle / Ostrom 1981: 401). Even though 
the creation of a schema may develop even prior to opening statements (especially in 
high-profile cases), it is plausible to assume that opening statements still play a 
significant role in this process. In particular, two fundamental types of schemata may be 
identified: the role schema and the event schema. The former is used by jurors ―to 
organise their existing knowledge about what behaviors are appropriate to what social 
roles‖ (SunWolf 2007: 188). Similarly, event schemata help the jurors to mentally 
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organize new information that is trial-related according to their perception of the 
appropriateness of a certain event (SunWolf 2007: 189). 
 
 
4.5.1 Narrativism in opening statements 
 
The role of narratives as a form of social action and as an on-going constitutive element 
of reality is well-established (Bruner 2002, Atkinson / Delamont 2006) and in this 
respect Atkinson (2007) suggests: 
 
―We are a storytelling species. Storytelling is in our blood. We think in 
story form, speak in story form, and bring meaning to our lives through 
story. Our life stories connect us to our roots, give us direction, validate 
our own experience, and restore value to our lives.‖ (Atkinson 2007: 224) 
 
In MacIntyre‘s words, it may be argued that if we tried to imagine human actions 
without a narrative framework, we would be dealing with ―the disjointed parts of some 
possible narrative‖ (MacIntyre 1981: 200). It is plausible to assume that it is because of 
our continuing acquaintance with stories since an early age that stories help us frame the 
world and are constantly used as critical tools to understand different stimuli, and also 
to construct and express our identity. More specifically, cognitive psychology has 
offered precious insights into the production and processing of narrative constructs, by 
investigating concepts such as script theories (e.g. Schank / Abelson 1977), story 
schema (Mandler 1984) and narrative thought (Britton / Pellegrini 1990).  
The use of stories in jury trials plays a crucial role in the decision making process 
(Pennington / Hastie 1992, 1991). In its simplest terms, the ‗story model‘ (Bennett / 
Feldman 1981, Pennington / Hastie 1986) suggests that while processing the 
information in order to reach a verdict, jurors develop a story and attempt to match it 
with a specific verdict category (Hans 2006: 15). Moreover, effective information 
management may be achieved by speakers, for example, by putting emphasis on pieces 
of information that the speakers share as a sort of ―prelude‖ (Tomlin et al 1997: 65); 
this process allows to set positive ground for the rest of their talk and to encourage in 
the listeners the kind of representation the speakers would like to achieve. 
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The use of narration also plays another crucial function within the context of a trial, 
which is to create solidarity (Goodwin 1994: 220). Indeed, attorneys strategically use a 
―universal, shared, common mode of presentation‖ (Goodwin 1994: 220) which may be 
perceived by jurors as a desire on the part of the legal experts to create solidarity and 
cooperation, instead of exercising power over them. 
 
4.5.1.1 Opening your story 
 
Opening statements often begin with formulaic expressions such as ‗Good morning 
ladies and gentlemen‘, which are then followed by other micro-phases. The opening 
phase is often described as consisting of three principal micro-phases: an introduction 
where the advocate introduces himself or herself and the client; the development of the 
case; a conclusion (see Aron et al 1996: 12.17). Similarly, Tanford suggests that 
openings could be divided into five stages, namely: ―(1) the introductory remarks; (2) 
the introduction of the witnesses, places, and instrumentalities involved in the case; (3) 
the identification of the major issues or contentions; (4) telling the story; and (5) the 
conclusion and request for a verdict‖ (Tanford 2002: 162).  
However, the introductory remarks employed somehow depend on what was covered 
during voir dire, given that the scope and the procedure of the different phases may have 
already been mentioned in the jury selection process. As Tanford confirms, traditional 
introductory remarks with explanatory content may be helpful to the jurors, especially 
to first-time jurors, but a ―more aggressive approach‖ is generally recommended 
(Tanford 2002: 163). Indeed, ―[t]he modern trend is to begin directly with remarks that 
summarize the nature of the case, state your theme, and arouse the interest of the jury‖ 
(Tanford 2002: 163). In this respect, Mauet confirms: 
 
―[T]he traditional way of starting an opening statement—thanking the 
jurors for being there, introducing the parties, analogizing the opening 
statement to an ―overview‖, comparing the evidence to ―pieces of a 
jigsaw puzzle‖, and eventually getting to ―what we expect to prove‖—do 
not work today. Jurors will quit listening before you ever get to anything 
important‖. (Mauet 2009: 88) 
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This reflection confirms Coffin et al‘s more general consideration that ―although 
language and indeed social conventions or norms usually develop for functional 
reasons, this does not mean that they remain functional or effective, particularly if there 
are changes in the surrounding social and cultural context‖ (Coffin et al 2010: 10). 
The opening offered by the prosecuting attorney is in line with the recommendation of a 
more direct approach typical of modern trials. Indeed, Mr. Dusek does not open with an 
introduction about himself and his client, as that may be seen as superfluous 
(considering, for example, that the attorney is however introduced by the judge when he 
is given the floor) and it is deemed more important to focus immediately on the core of 
the case.  
In light of the rule of primacy
61
, the first part of the opening statements is particularly 
crucial, and the following example shows the beginning of the prosecution‘s opening62: 
 
MR. DUSEK: Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. Welcome back. This 
trial will be about two people. Two people. David Westerfield and 
Danielle van Dam. More specifically, it will be about what David 
Westerfield did to Brenda…or Danielle van Dam. Because of that, we‘ll 
be talking about three primary time periods. The first begins, the first and 
primary begins February 1
st
 and goes until Danielle‘s body was 
recovered. The two other periods will be the week before, a Friday, when 
Brenda van Dam and some of her friends had minor contact with the 
defendant. The other period of time will be in the middle of that week, 
when Brenda van Dam and her two children went out selling girl scout 
cookies to the defendant. So we will be talking about the three times the 
van Dam family had contact with David Westerfield. (Dusek‘s opening) 
 
The defense attorney opens his statements by alerting the jurors that they should not 
make up their mind too soon, as another version of the story will also be presented:  
 
                                                 
61
 For a deeper discussion of the relative effect of primacy and recency in opening statements see Linz / 
Penrod 1984. 
62
 This part corresponds more specifically to the Labovian ‗abstract‘ (consisting of an introductory 
statement which has an attention-getting and a summarizing function) and ‗orientation‘ (see Labov 1981). 
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MR. FELDMAN: Would that the case were so simple. Would the cases 
were black and white. Would that this not be a case entirely determined 
by circumstantial evidence. This is what the evidence will show, ladies 
and gentlemen. David Westerfield is a 50-year-old man. He‘s a design 
engineer. He has patents. The patents that he‘s been involved in, the 
inventions that he‘s been involved, in relate to prosthetic devices that 
benefit many in our society. (Feldman‘s opening) 
 
This approach is in line with Tanford‘s suggestion that one of the purposes of the 
defense opening is to warn the jurors that they should not make up their mind too soon 
(Tanford 2002: 147). Moreover, the introduction of the client is particularly important 
as the jurors‘ verdict often depends on their verdict on the actors involved (Tanford 
2002: 164). The definition and description of actors (see also Section 4.5.2.1) is a 
crucial element within the narrative framework, and Mr. Feldman attempts to 
immediately personalize his client and depict him as a respectful and considerate man; 
in this respect, Tanford colorfully recommends: ―Imagine that you are trying to 
convince the jurors to go out on a blind date with your client‖ (Tanford 2002: 164). 
 
 
4.5.1.2 Multiple narratives 
 
The narrative presented by the attorney clearly consists of multiple narratives (see 
Section 3.6). In the prosecution‘s opening, for instance, the main narrative derives from 
the merger of different stories (offered by different participants) which are 
reconstructed, reported, or preannounced.  
 
MR. DUSEK: The defendant‘s story is that […] (Dusek‘s opening) 
 
MR. DUSEK: Brenda will tell you that […] (Dusek‘s opening) 
 
MR. DUSEK: The defendant told the detective Keene that […] (Dusek‘s 
opening) 
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Mr. Dusek‘s opening statements show the presence of interrelated and circular 
narratives (cf. Section 3.6): 
 
 
Dusek
Defendant Brenda
Keene
Defendant
 
Figure 8: Example of multiple narratives in opening statements 
 
Figure 8 rudimentally shows that the prosecutor‘s narrative embeds (and consists of) 
multiple narratives presented by different participants. Some stories implicitly or 
explicitly refer, or defer, to others in a spiral of different narratives, and attorneys have 
to establish chronologies and relationships among the different narratives and attribute 
stories to the different narrators maintaining coherence and clarity.  
The circularity of different accounts also emerges in the following passage, where 
different voices are merged within Mr. Feldman‘s speech, which, however, seems to 
have a lower level of clarity:   
 
MR. FELDMAN: Up comes rich Brady. Up comes Keith Stone. Rich 
Brady, how are you? You coached my kids‘ soccer team. You got any 
drugs? Got any marijuana? Rich, you‘ve sold me pot before. Come on. 
Rich Brady and Keith Stone, as Mr. Dusek told you, later are seen 
outside in the bar. The testimony will be that the women were dancing. 
(Feldman‘s opening) 
 
Ability in reporting other people‘s testimony is fundamental in trial advocacy and this 
process does not only have a mere reporting function, but also a constructive one 
149 
 
(Tannen 1986) and is functional to support the attorney‘s theory of the case. It is the aim 
of the attorney to present these multiple narratives within an understandable and 
coherent framework and it is crucial to avoid any remote possibility of dissonance in the 
events presented. The narratives offered must be acceptable in the eyes of the jurors and 
it can therefore be argued that they have to comply with common-sense principles and, 
in sum, ―[a]n opening statement cannot be successful if it doesn‘t jibe with everyday 
experience‖ (Lubet 2004: 414). 
It has been demonstrated that people tend to consider genuine stories that are narrated 
according to traditional story format, in particular where the events determining the 
endpoint are noticeably emphasized, the diachronic ordering of events is clearly 
signaled, and the causal links are evident, explicit and abundant (e.g. Bennet / Feldman 
1981). In other words, narratives respecting the canons of traditional storytelling are 
perceived as more rational, logical and acceptable. Indeed, the respect of narrative 
conventions can generate a sense of coherence and direction. 
The ordering of events may be said to be organized according to Baktinian chronotopes 
(Bakhtin 1981) intended as space-temporal conceptions. Such conceptions are 
dependent on cultural ontologies, and the trial shows a tendency towards a linear 
presentation of events, marked by temporal references that help organize events 
according to the typical features of storytelling, which generally lead to a higher degree 
of acceptability. Deictical markers, and in particular chronological and topical 
references, assume important functions for the acceptability of the story being narrated. 
They offer cues that help to frame and position the sequence of events, and, therefore, 
they improve clarity and contribute to the understandability of the story. Moreover, they 
are highly used as tools that can corroborate the veracity of a testimony. 
The use of chronological markers is widespread in the trial, as ―we are all used to 
thinking of life in chronological terms‖ (Lubet 2004: 432). Indeed, in his opening 
statements the prosecuting attorney describes the sequence of events by offering 
specific time references:  
 
MR. DUSEK: At about 10:00 o‘clock Friday night it comes time for the 
van Dam children to go to bed. He scoots them upstairs.  
(...) 
And eventually goes off to bed, into bed by 11:00 o‘clock that night.  
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(...) 
He wakes up some time between 1:30 and 2:00. (...) (Dusek‘s opening) 
 
Metalinguistic references to the order of events being presented may also be offered:  
 
MR. FELDMAN: That‘s discreet period number one. We‘ll call that the 
intro. Some days go by. (Feldman‘s opening) 
 
The narrative organization highly depends on the need to reconstruct the sequence of 
events in a limited amount of time and to offer a conceptualization of the facts that is 
understandable to the jurors; being able to provide precise temporal and spatial 
references contributes to the credibility of a version of the story presented.  
The conclusion of the opening statement should include an unambiguous message that 
leaves the jury with a clear understanding of the attorney‘s position and a basis for 
believing his side, as well as a clear recommendation of what conclusion they should 
reach: 
 
MR. DUSEK: You will find the evidence is sufficient to convict him of 
murdering, kidnapping, special circumstances, and possession of child 
pornography. Thank you. (Dusek‘s opening)  
 
Opening statements can therefore be considered a sort of tool that helps the jurors (and 
the other parties involved) to visualize the events in a perspective that leads them to 
accept the attorney‘s theory of the case. 
 
 
4.5.2 Engaging storytelling 
 
4.5.2.1 Defining the characters  
 
The different strategies employed in the definition of the characters involved in the 
story being narrated emerge evidently in the opening statements. The prosecution 
attorney tends to refer to Mr. Westerfield as ‗the defendant‘, as this process of 
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depersonalization aims to distance himself (and other participants) from the accused and 
suggests a form of dehumanization which is in line with the overall persecution‘s 
strategy. Conversely, the term ‗defendant‘ is never used by the defense attorney in his 
opening statements; he tries, instead, to humanize the protagonist in order to enhance 
sympathy towards him. 
These preliminary observations are confirmed by the use of computer-based analyses, 
for instance by employing AntConc3.2.1
63
. The software includes a variety of tools, 
such as a concordancer, a word distribution plot, word and keyword frequency 
generators, and tools for cluster and lexical bundle analysis. For example, the 
concordance tool can be used to show a key word in context (KWIC) from a target text 
(or corpus). In this case the opening statements by defense and by prosecution were 
selected. Figure 9 shows the concordance lines generated for the term ‗defendant‘:  
 
 
Figure 9:  Concordance list for the word ‗defendant‘ in opening statements 
 
                                                 
63
 The software developed by Laurence Anthony was originally intended for applications in the 
classroom, but it can also offer interesting quantitative insights into a wide area of discourse analytical 
studies. See also http://www.antlab.sci.waseda.ac.jp/software.html for details. 
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The concordance list shows that the prosecution opening statements include 31 hits for 
the word ‗defendant‘, whereas Feldman‘s opening shows no hit for this word. By 
repeatedly referring to Mr. Westerfield as ‗the defendant‘, the prosecution creates 
emotional distance from him, whereas the defense uses the defendant‘s name (and often 
exclusively the first name) in order to enhance the jurors‘ sympathy and sense of 
solidarity towards Mr. Westerfield.  
AntConc3.2.1 also offers the possibility of using a concordance search term plot
64
, 
which provides a visualization of KWICs focusing on where a certain term appears in a 
text and in which distribution, and it is particularly revealing for contrastive analyses of 
texts. In other words, a concordancer shows how the node is used and which words 
accompany it, whereas the plot shows where the word appears
65
. 
Figure 10 shows the position of the word ‗defendant‘ throughout the text. Only one bar 
is shown (referring to the prosecution‘s opening), as the defense‘s opening did not 
include any instance of this term: 
 
 
Figure 10: Concordance plot for the word ‗defendant‘ in opening statements 
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 This tool is similar to, for instance, the dispersion plot tool in Wordsmith Tools. 
65
 Both the concordance tool and the concordance plot tool allow the user to view the search term as it 
appears in the target file simply by positioning the cursor over the term or over a line of the plot.  
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A similar approach can be used to observe the distribution of the term ‗Danielle‘, the 
victim of the crime, in the texts. It is plausible to hypothesize that the prosecution, for 
strategic rhetorical reasons, may make use of the first name of the victim more often 
than the defense. This assumption is confirmed in Figure 11, which presents the position 
of the term within the file
66
: 
 
 
Figure 11: Concordance plot for the word ‗Danielle‘ in opening statements 
 
This form of visualization immediately demonstrates that prosecution‘s statements show 
a higher number of hits for the word Danielle
67
. The name of the victim is repeatedly 
mentioned, with particular emphasis at the beginning and at the end of the speech. This 
choice is in line with the general recommendation to ―personalize your characters and 
depersonalize the other side‘s‖ (Mauet 2009: 93). 
The prosecution‘s and the defense‘s opening can also be analyzed observing the relative 
frequency lists. Table 4 shows the frequency wordlist (generated in AntConc3.2.1) 
                                                 
66
 The tool also shows the total number of hits, as well as the length of each text. The plot can also be 
zoomed in or out.   
67
 This first observation has also been confirmed after the normalization of data, as well as by carrying out 
a ‗keyness‘ analysis both in AntConc3.2.1 and Wmatrix. In this case the mere presentation of the data 
through the concordance plot is simply functional to offer a clear visualization of the position of the target 
word within the texts. 
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concerning the prosecutor‘s opening. For the specific purpose of the section, the 
frequency list was elaborated by applying a ‗stoplist‘ excluding function words68, even 
though this is not to say that use and frequency of function words may not lead to 
revealing observations.  
  
Rank  Frequency Word 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
57  
54  
41  
40  
38  
37  
36  
36  
35  
35  
33 
33 
32 
31 
VAN_DAM 
BRENDA 
MOTOR_HOME 
WESTERFIELD 
DANIELLE 
FRIENDS 
FOUND 
WENT 
LITTLE 
TIME 
GOES 
PEOPLE 
NIGHT 
DEFENDANT 
Table 4: Wordlist (Dusek‘s opening) 
 
Keeping the focus on labeling choices used to define the characters, the wordlist shows 
that the terms ‗Danielle‘ and ‗defendant‘ occupy a high position in Mr. Dusek‘s 
opening. However, it is also true that ―[w]hile a word list highlights what is frequent in 
a corpus or text, it does not tell us what is important or unusually frequent‖ (Römer / 
Wulff 2010: 105). Conversely, a keyword list allows us to generate lists of words 
present in the file which may be ordered according to their frequency in comparison 
with another frequency wordlist, showing, therefore, the ‗keyness‘ value of the items. 
                                                 
68
 For a discussion of function words see inter alia den Dikken / Tortora 2005. 
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In Table 5 the terms ‗defendant‘ and ‗Danielle‘ have been extrapolated from the 
keyword list. The data confirm a higher keyness value for the two terms in the 
prosecution‘s closing in comparison with the defense‘s closing: 
 
Frequency Keyness  Keyword 
38 58.843  DANIELLE 
23 48.003 DEFENDANT 
Table 5: Keyword list (Dusek‘s opening) 
 
The linguistic choices that characterize the parties‘ opening statements can be further 
investigated thanks to another precious means for text comparison, Wmatrix
69
 (Rayson 
2003, 2008, 2009), the web interface to the USAS and CLAWS corpus annotation 
tools
70
. Wmatrix offers a variety of tools for text and corpus analysis and comparison, 
such as frequency lists, statistical comparisons, KWIC concordances. In particular, the 
keyword cloud
71
 allows to visually identify the main differences in the use of words in 
different texts. Figure 12 shows the keyword cloud derived from the comparison 
between Dusek‘s opening and Feldman‘s: 
 
                                                 
69
 See http://ucrel.lancs.ac.uk/wmatrix2.html. 
70
 For a broader description of Wmatrix see also Section 4.5.3. 
71
 The word cloud is calculated using the log-likelihood statistic, which is automatically employed by 
Wmatrix. The calculation automatically takes account of the size of the two corpora or the two texts, and, 
therefore avoids the need to subsequently normalize the figures.  
For a discussion of the log-likelihood calculator see Rayson / Garside 2000. 
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Figure 12: Key word cloud (Dusek‘s opening)72 
 
As the larger items are the most significant ones in the prosecutor‘s opening compared 
to the defense‘s, it can be immediately seen that the strategic use of labels to define the 
characters (e.g. ‗Danielle‘, ‗defendant‘) observed by using AntConc3.2.1 is here 
confirmed. 
 
 
4.5.2.2 Addressing the jurors  
 
Effective advocacy is dependent on the lawyer‘s ability to demonstrate remarkable 
storytelling skills. One of the strategies attorneys adopt to achieve successful 
storytelling is to create a relationship with the jurors and grab their attention; in order to 
do so they often make use of a direct way of addressing their main audience. 
It is therefore interesting to observe how and when the attorneys address directly their 
main audience during their narration. For example, the personal pronoun ‗you‘ is 
constantly used in opening statements, as Figure 13 shows:  
                                                 
72
 ―Key word cloud O1 is observed frequency in d-op/file.raw.pos.sem.wrd.fql. 
O2 is observed frequency in f-op/file.raw.pos.sem.wrd.fql. 
%1 and %2 values show relative frequencies in the texts. 
+ indicates overuse in O1 relative to O2, 
- indicates underuse in O1 relative to O2 
The table is sorted on log-likelihood (LL) value to show key items at the top. 
This shows up to 100 significant items from the top of the LL profile. 
Only items with LL > 6.63 (p < 0.01) are shown. 
Larger items are more significant.‖ See http://ucrel.lancs.ac.uk/wmatrix/ 
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Figure 13: Concordance plot for the term ‗you‘ 
 
A closer analysis shows that the term ‗you‘ is predominantly used to refer exactly to the 
jurors. The following example is only one in the vast array of occurrences of this type of 
approach: 
 
MR. FELDMAN: And you‘re going to hear the results. And when you 
hear those results, you‘re going to be convinced. (Feldman‘s closing) 
   
The choice to address the jurors directly is shared by both lawyers in order to establish a 
direct link with the jurors, to keep their attention, and to promote their involvement, as a 
juror-centered approach is vital for successful advocacy in a jury trial (Mauet 2009). 
The lack of a direct involvement of the jurors may instead result in an alien and distant 
narrative, with an inferior persuasive force.  
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4.5.3 Using Wmatrix for comparing stories 
 
As briefly mentioned in Section 4.5.2, the web interface Wmatrix can be fruitfully used 
to compare different texts (for instance, the prosecuting and the defense attorneys‘ 
speeches). The tool also offers the possibility of carrying out a computer-based semantic 
analysis. Before describing how the tool can be used for this purpose, it should be noted 
that one of the key features of Wmatrix is related to corpus annotation. Leech (1997) 
defines it as the practice of adding interpretative, linguistic information to an electronic 
corpus of spoken and/or written language data. A classic example is POS (part-of-
speech) tagging (or grammatical tagging), through which lexical items are assigned tag 
indicating their grammatical class in context (see Garside 1987). 
Wmatrix carries out POS tagging through Claws (Constituent Likelihood Automatic 
Word-tagging System) (See Garside 1987, Garside / Smith 1997), which ―achieved a 
success rate without manual intervention in the high 90s percentage accuracy‖ (Rayson 
2003: 27)
73
. In particular, CLAWS7 operates through different stages, which, following 
Rayson (2003), can be summarized as follows: segmentation of text into word and 
sentence units; initial part-of-speech assignment (non-contextual); rule-driven part-of-
speech assignment (contextual); probabilistic tag disambiguation; output (in vertical or 
horizontal format) (Rayson 2003: 64).  
Table 6 is a purely illustrative example and shows an instance of the tagging output in 
the vertical format:                                                       
                                                 
73
 More specifically, the accuracy of CLAWS is estimated to be around 96-97% (Rayson 2003: 63). 
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0000188 010 NP1 BRENDA brenda 
0000188 020 VM   WILL will        
0000188 030   VVI   TELL   tell   
0000188 040   PPY   YOU   you 
0000188   050   CST    THAT    that    
0000188 060 PPHS2 THEY    they 
0000188 070 VBDR WERE be          
0000188   080 MC 15 15          
0000188 090 NNT2 MINUTES minute      
0000188 100 II INSIDE inside 
0000188   110 DD1 THAT   that 
0000190       010 NN1 HOUSE house 
Table 6: Example of POS tagging (Feldman‘s opening)74 
 
Beyond POS tagging, Wmatrix also provides semantic tagging. The semantic tags
75
 
provided by USAS (see Rayson et al 2004) include an upper case letter indicating the 
general category, followed by a digit indicating a subcategory. They may also be 
followed by: a decimal and another digit for further subdivision; the symbols + or – to 
indicate a positive or negative position on a semantic scale (Rayson 2003: 66). For 
example: 
 
0000036 010 JJ   unusual                   A6.2- 
Table 7: Example of USAS output, vertical format
76
 
 
In this example ‗A6.2-‘ indicates that the term belongs to the general category of 
‗General and abstract words‘ (A), with its subcategory being ‗Comparing‘ (A6) and, 
                                                 
74
 The table is obtained after running a lemmatizer and shows the result of the lemmatization process.  
The reference number at the start of each line indicates the number of the line of the input file where the 
word is located.  
See Appendix 1 for the list of UCREL CLAWS 7 Tags. 
75
 See Appendix 2 for the list of Semantic Tags. 
76
For a further description see Rayson 2003.  
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more precisely, ‗Comparing:-usual/unusual‘ (A6.2). The minus sign shows the negative 
position on this semantic scale. 
The USAS tagger can be used to assign semantic field codes to the file related to the 
prosecution‘s opening (O1) and to the defense‘s opening (O2). Table 8 shows a 
comparison of the relative use of semantic categories in the two texts: 
 
Item         O1 %1        O2   %2      LL  
M6 376 3.30          98 1.55 +     51.42      Location and direction 
A10+           114      1.00      21     0.33 +     27.46      Open; Finding; Showing 
O1.1            56     0.49       6    0.09 +     22.52      Substances and materials: Solid 
B1      141    1.24      35 0.55 +     21.27      Anatomy and physiology 
W3        49      0.43       5 0.08 + 20.37      Geographical terms 
T2-             40 0.35 4 0.006+ 16.85 Time: Ending 
B5                 35 0.31       3   0.05 +     16.19      Clothes and personal belongings 
A6.1                16 0.14      0      0.00 +     14.18      Comparing: Similar/different 
M7                 57 0.50      11      0.17 +     12.92      Places 
M1                  298 2.62     113      1.78 +     12.82      Moving, coming and going 
X9.1+              26   0.23      2      0.03 +     12.74      Able/intelligent 
A6.2+           14     0.12      0      0.00 +     12.40      Comparing: Usual 
B4                 29 0.25      3      0.05 +     11.95      Cleaning and personal care 
X2.4                49 0.43      9      0.14 +     11.85      Investigate, examine, test, search 
N3.7            12     0.11         0    0.00 +    10.63      Measurement: Length & height 
Table 8: Frequency of semantic categories in opening statements
77
 
 
The two opening statements can further be compared by using a Key domain cloud, 
which shows the keyness analysis based on the comparison of the semantic frequency 
                                                 
77
 ―O1 is observed frequency in d-op/file.raw.pos.sem.sem.fql (prosecution‘s opening) 
O2 is observed frequency in f-op/file.raw.pos.sem.sem.fql (defense‘s opening) 
%1 and %2 values show relative frequencies in the texts. 
+ indicates overuse in O1 relative to O2,  
- indicates underuse in O1 relative to O2 
The table is sorted on log-likelihood (LL) value to show key items at the top‖. See: 
http://ucrel.lancs.ac.uk/wmatrix2.html. 
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lists for the two texts. Figure 14 shows the key domain cloud related to the 
prosecution‘s opening in comparison with Mr. Feldman‘s:  
 
 
Figure 14: Key domain cloud
78
 
 
Table 8 and Figure 13 show that the domain that is most emphasized by the prosecution 
is related to ‗Location and direction‘ (LL value 51.42): Mr. Dusek, indeed, often insists 
on giving spatial and topical references in his account in order to convey clarity, 
precision and coherence. Other prominent domains are ‗Open; Finding; Showing‘, 
‗Substances and materials: Solid‘, ‗Anatomy and physiology, ‗Geographical terms‘. 
Each domain would require a separate analysis, but, for mere illustrating purposes, it 
can be remarked that a significant difference emerges in the domain of ‗Anatomy and 
physiology‘79. Prosecution stresses (at times morbidly) the details related to the state in 
which the victim was found in order to charge his account with involving emotional 
features and to emphasize the cruelty and the brutality of the crime. At the same time he 
                                                 
78―This shows up to 100 significant items from the top of the LL profile. 
Only items with LL > 6.63 (p < 0.01) are shown. 
Larger items are more significant‖. See http://ucrel.lancs.ac.uk/wmatrix2.html 
79
Wmatrix allows us to immediately view the list of words included in every semantic domain and some 
of the terms included in the domain ‗Anatomy and physiology‘ are: hair, hairs, teeth, D.N.A., back, blood. 
The user can also view the corresponding concordance lines.  
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also stresses the importance of the scientific evidence that will be presented in order to 
corroborate his theory of the case.  
 
 
4.5.4 The quest for clarity and simplicity  
 
The main features traditionally attributed to legal language rarely emerge in attorney-
juror communication in a jury trial (see Section 1.5.4). For instance, opening statements 
have as their main target audience the jurors sitting in the jury box and, therefore, the 
convergence of the linguistic behaviors of the lawyers towards the jurors is one of the 
keys to successful communication. This is to some extent in line with the concept of 
accommodation (Giles / Powesland 1975, Thakerar et al 1982), in that accommodation 
may be described as based on ―a multiply-organized and contextually complex set of 
alternatives, regularly available to communicators in face-to-face talk. It can function to 
index and achieve solidarity with or dissociation from a conversational partner, 
reciprocally and dynamically‖ (Giles / Coupland 1991: 60-61).  
However, the relationship between attorneys and jurors is not based on a typical dyadic 
form of interaction and it may be argued that we are here dealing with an intentional 
presupposed form of accommodation. From this perspective, research on the jurors and 
their background is generally employed in order to make the linguistic choices that are 
more likely to be in line with the jurors‘ and their expectations.   
An American jury is by definition unfamiliar with the case they have to decide upon and 
it is the aim of the lawyer to present the case in the most comprehensible terms. For 
instance, from a syntactical point of view, opening statements present features that are 
in stark contrast with the features generally attributed to lawyers‘ speech. To give an 
example, the following excerpt does not present a high level of sentence complexity, or 
a significant use of other features such as passive forms, premodification, 
nominalization, or lexical density: 
 
MR. DUSEK: The two ladies left first. Barbara and Denise. They got in 
their car and headed back to Tierrasanta. And right after that the two 
guys leave, Rich and Keith. They head off. They go home. And 
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immediately Damon and Brenda van Dam go upstairs. They go to bed. 
(Dusek‘s opening) 
 
This passage shows, instead, syntactical simplicity, sentence brevity, lack of 
subordination and of passive forms. It may certainly be argued that the spoken mode of 
interaction determines simplicity. It should be noted, however, that the interaction 
between legal experts (e.g. during sidebar conferences outside the presence of the jury) 
is characterized by a significantly higher level of complexity (at a lexical, syntactical 
and textual level). Consequently, orality certainly contributes to the simplicity of 
language, but it cannot be seen as the only determining factor. 
 
 
4.5.4.1 The use of repetition 
 
Among the main linguistic features of opening statements, the use of repetition emerges 
significantly as regards the repetition of both lexical items and syntactical patterns. 
Simplicity and clarity are often pursued by attorneys while communicating with the 
jurors and repetition may also be seen as a strategy employed to reach such goals. 
However, the tactical use of repetitions serves a variety of purposes. Repetition 
contributes on the one hand to fluent production and easier understandability on the 
other hand. It also helps to negotiate meanings between speakers and listeners; indeed, 
―[e]ach time a word or phrase is repeated, its meaning is altered. The audience 
reinterprets the meaning of the word or phrase in light of the accretion, juxtaposition, or 
expansion; thus it participates in making meaning of the utterances‖ (Tannen 1987b: 
576).  
Repetition is frequently used in both casual and planned conversation
80
 (Tannen 1987a, 
1987b, 2007; see also Norrick 1987) and Tannen (1987b) identifies four main functions 
of repetitions: 
 
1) Production - Repetition allows a more efficient and fluent production of language. 
                                                 
80
 In this work, such distinction is not to be intended as a clear-cut dichotomy, but as developing along a 
continuum. 
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2) Comprehension - Repetition allows for semantically/lexically less dense discourse, 
facilitating comprehension. 
3) Connection - In line with Halliday and Hasan (1976), Tannen highlights the role of 
repetition as a cohesive device, in that ―it serves a referential and tying function‖ 
(Tannen 1987b: 583).  
4) Interaction - Repetition serves to tie participants to the discourse and to one another 
and functions as a conversational management tool.  
 
Both prosecution and defense make vast use of repetition in their openings: 
 
MR. DUSEK: There were fibers found in the motor home back by the 
bed of the motor home, the extreme rear of this motor home. On the 
driver‘s side they found some fibers back there that were collected and 
compared and found to be similar to fibers from the carpeting in 
Danielle‘s bedroom. There were fibers found in the hallway of the motor 
home. Same result. There were fibers found in the bath mat in the 
bathroom in the motor home. Same result. (Dusek‘s opening) 
 
MR. FELDMAN: And they’re drinking and they’re drinking and they’re 
drinking. (Feldman‘s opening)  
 
MR. FELDMAN: And you‘re going to hear the results. And when you 
hear those results, you‘re going to be convinced beyond any doubt that it 
was impossible, impossible for David Westerfield to have dumped 
Danielle van Dam in that location. The evidence will show beyond doubt 
it was impossible for him to have placed her there. Their evidence. So we 
have doubts. We have doubts as to cause of death. We have doubts as to 
the identity of Danielle van Dam‘s killer. We have doubts as to who left 
her where she resided, where she remained, and we have doubts as to 
who took her. (Feldman‘s opening)  
 
Repetition is a highly versatile device and it can be effectively used to stress critical 
propositional content (Danet 1980: 531). In opening statements the use of repetition is 
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strategically chosen for a series of purposes: for instance, it contributes to clarity; a 
dramatic sequence of repetitions has also an engaging and involving effect; it gives a 
particular rhythm to the speech that may lead to a mesmerizing effect; moreover, 
repeated items are more likely to be recalled, and, therefore, they assume an important 
function in the deliberation process. 
Advocacy manuals insist on the importance of repeating the most important (and 
convincing) points. First of all, repetition plays a crucial role as it is impossible to be 
certain that 12 people have contemporarily paid attention to the facts being mentioned; 
therefore, by repeating points that are particularly favorable to the attorney‘s case, he 
increases his chances that a higher number of jurors will focus on a specific point. As 
with any other technique, it is also recommended that it be used carefully in order to 
avoid the tedium effect or the risk that the jurors may feel that they are being patronized 
and their abilities are being underestimated. 
 
 
4.6 Examination: the plot thickens 
 
 
On June 4, after opening statements, examination in the Westerfield trial began
81
. As 
previously mentioned, the communication process taking place in the examination 
phase is not the primary object of this analysis. Therefore, this chapter does not attempt 
to offer a detailed investigation of the complexity of the linguistic and communicative 
structures that characterize this phase of the trial; rather, some of the main features and 
functions of examination will be briefly described to functionally show the transition to 
the subsequent phases. 
The examination phase of trials has attracted considerable scholarly attention both as 
regards eyewitnesses, especially since Loftus‘s (1975, 1979) seminal work, and expert 
witnesses (e.g. Jones 1994, Jasanoff 1995, Matoesian 1999a). In particular, speech and 
presentational style have been extensively analyzed (Conley et al 1978, Erickson et al 
1978, O‘Barr 1982) and some influential work on the complex dynamics of witness 
                                                 
81
 It should be noted that examination gave space to motions at different stages. For a discussion of 
motions see inter alia Jorgensen 2006. 
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examination regards the social judgments of witnesses deriving from their style of 
speech on the part of the jurors (Lind / O‘Barr 1979). For instance, O‘Barr‘s oft-quoted 
work (O‘Barr 1982) focuses on: Powerful vs powerless speech82; narrative vs 
fragmented testimony style; hypercorrect testimony style; interrupted and simultaneous 
speech. Moreover, it has also been shown that apparently minor variations in language 
use may affect the way the speaker is perceived in a considerable way (Loftus 1975, 
1979). 
The examination phase consists of a series of micro-events. The examination of every 
witness may be interpreted as a sub-phase, which in turn consists of a series of other 
specific events, such as calling, swearing in, direct examination, cross-examination, (re-
direct examination)
83
, (cross-re-direct examination)
84
, dismissal. 
By and large, the structure of direct examination can be said to be highly predefined, 
and, consequently, the communicative choices stemming from a specific strategic 
repertoire are easily planned. For example, it is generally recommended that ―every 
direct examination […] should strive to begin and end on strong points‖ (Lubet 2004: 
57). Conversely, even though the planning of discourse is obviously still essential
85
, it 
may be argued that cross-examination is ―perhaps the most unpredictable stage of the 
trial‖ (Aron et al 1996: 22.11). This phase of the trial may be defined as the clearest 
manifestation of the principle known as audiatur et altera pars (or audi alteram partem, 
let the other side be heard), and cross-examination
86
 is potentially risky, as the witness 
is, by definition, likely to be uncooperative
87
. Indeed, in cross-examination attorneys 
constantly test the veracity of the testimony and this type of examination can be defined 
                                                 
82
 Powerless speech is seen as including, for instance, higher frequency of disclaimers, hesitations forms, 
hedges, intensifiers, tag questions. It has been shown that powerful or powerless speech may in turn 
substantiate or hinder the witness‘s credibility; O‘Barr (1982) shows that powerful language users among 
witnesses are generally perceived as more confident and credible. 
83
 The party who called the witness may re-examine the witness regarding evidence presented during 
cross-examination. 
84
 At the discretion of the judge, the witness may be examined again by  the party who cross-examined 
him/her (such possibility is limited to  new subject matter brought out during the redirect examination 
85
 This is apparent, as the attorney‘s questions are obviously strategically planned in order to detect, 
highlight, and juxtapose possible inconsistencies within a testimony. 
86
 For a discussion see inter alia Gaines 2000. 
87
 This is also why it is recommended, unless in specific circumstances, that this phase be kept brief 
(Lubet 2004: 83). 
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as essentially hostile (Drew 1992: 470) and the credibility of witnesses is often 
explicitly addressed
88
. 
In witness examination the struggle for control over the representation of evidence is 
fundamental, and Pospisil aptly claims that ―the secular establishment of evidence 
almost universally employs the questioning of witnesses‖ (Pospisil 1971: 236). Indeed, 
from a procedural point of view sworn testimony is a crucial phase, as jurors have to 
rely on the evidence and the testimonies that have been presented during the trial in 
order to make their decision.  
Witness examination represents the phase where the facts and the evidence should be 
presented. Albeit the clear need to follow the rules of evidence, lawyers inevitably tend 
to project moral judgments about the witnesses being examined, their character and 
their behavior. In this respect, Heffer highlights the presence of a sort of ―tension‖ that 
arises ―between the need to conform to the evidentiary rules which prevent explicit 
construal of judgement and the desire to persuade a jury who might be influenced by 
such construals‖ (Heffer 2007: 145). Heffer places this phenomenon within a broader 
tension between two different modes of reasoning and talking, one defined as 
―paradigmatic‖, based on objectivity and logic, and one that assumes ―narrative‖ 
contours, where what emerges is the more evident subjectivity inherent in proving an 
account of personal experiences (Heffer 2005, 2007).  
 
 
4.6.1 The question-answer model of narration 
 
Witness examination is clearly characterized by an asymmetrical distribution of turns 
(Atkinson / Drew 1979, Matoesian 1997), in the sense that the unfolding of the 
conversation is guided by the attorneys‘ choices, and witnesses can only answer the 
questions they have been asked
89
. Beyond this apparent plainness, the mechanisms of 
this interaction reveal a higher complexity, and the attorney‘s aim to frame the evidence 
                                                 
88
 Federal Rules of Evidence, Rule 611 (b): Scope of cross-examination.—Cross-examination should be 
limited to the subject matter of the direct examination and matters affecting the credibility of the witness. 
The court may, in the exercise of discretion, permit inquiry into additional matters as if on direct 
examination. 
89
 For a discussion of the control of lawyers over witnesses‘ testimony see Philips 1987, Walker 1987, 
Ehrlich 2001. 
168 
 
in a way that is functional to his theory of the case has to follow specific procedural 
rules. The linguistic exchange has to develop within a clearly institutionalized 
environment and has to comply with specific evidentiary strictures. Procedural 
constraints
90
 may appear to limit the creative potential of the language used in this 
context; however, these constraints may actually determine the use of original and 
ingenious linguistic choices that are ―superimposed over the course of question/answer 
sequence‖ (Matoesian 1997: 140).  
More specifically, the unfolding of conversation in examination assumes a very clear 
structure, and narration is carried out via the question-answer model. The procedural 
and communicative restrictions of this model lead this phase of the trial to assume the 
contours of highly controlled interaction. It is generally argued that character and eye 
witnesses may especially be likely to passively follow the line of questioning proposed 
by the attorneys. Conversely, expert or professional witnesses, because of their 
experience and their familiarity with court procedures, may be more resistant to follow 
the way of reasoning paved by the attorneys. In particular, they may ―resist any word 
choice the cross-examining lawyer appears to want to embrace‖ (Pozner / Dodd 1993: 
22).  
As regards witness examination, the general rule of competency establishes that 
generally ―every person is competent to be a witness‖91, and a witness may only testify 
to a matter if he/she has some personal knowledge of the matter
92
. In this respect, Lubet 
specifies:  
 
―Witnesses are expected to testify from personal knowledge. The most 
common sort of personal knowledge is direct sensory perception 
information gained through sight, hearing, touch, taste and smell. 
Witnesses may also have personal knowledge of more subjective 
information such as their own intentions or emotions or the reputations of 
another person‖. (Lubet 2004: 314) 
 
                                                 
90
 For example, argumentative statements are not procedurally allowed. 
91
 Federal Rules of Evidence, Rule 601. The California Evidence Code (Section 700) also states: ―Except 
as otherwise provided by statute, every person, irrespective of age, is qualified to be a witness and no 
person is disqualified to testify to any matter‖. 
92
 Federal Rules of Evidence, Rule 602. 
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Direct examination constitutes a fundamental part of the trial as it is a possibility of 
presenting the core and the evidence of a case and to corroborate a lawyer‘s version of 
the story. In particular, the choice and the preparation
93
 of witnesses are clearly crucial 
to the success of examination. The identification of the ideal witness is a profoundly 
complex matter. Bailey and Rothblatt arguably write that ―[w]omen, like children, are 
prone to exaggeration; they generally have poor memories as to previous fabrications 
and exaggerations. They are also stubborn. You will have difficulty trying to induce 
them to qualify their testimony‖ (Bailey / Rothblatt 1971: 190-191). It is however clear 
that simplistic generalizations of this type are highly debatable. More interestingly, 
Aron et al (1996: 19.8) suggest that prospective witnesses should meet the following 
criteria: ―competence to testify; integrity; credibility; capacity to perceive; capacity to 
recall; capacity to communicate; capacity to understand and follow the lawyer‘s 
instructions; attractiveness‖. It can also be argued that the likability of the witness also 
contributes to the level of acceptability of his testimony, as ―likeable people are more 
apt to be accepted as truthful‖ (Lubet 2004: 438). 
Fundamentally, at the crux of the matter is the allocation of credibility. In particular, 
establishing the credibility of a witness is fundamental, as it is according to his/her level 
of credibility that the information presented will be accepted by the trier of facts. 
Indeed, a lawyer often elicits the basis of the witness‘s knowledge and, on the other 
hand, often attempts to affect negatively the reputation of the other party‘s witness. 
Techniques of this type are crucial in jury trials as they contribute to the likeability of 
your witnesses and may create negative biases against your opponents‘ witnesses. 
However, biased judgments do not regard exclusively lay jurors, and it has been shown 
that even judges are not exempt from psychological bias about witnesses (Wagenaar et 
al 1993). 
Jacquemet (1996) defines the credibility of the participants as one of the fundamental 
factors that determine the allocation of aspects of truth in relation to the statements 
pronounced. The level of credibility assigned to different groups of ―antagonistic 
participants‖ (Jacquemet 1996: 7) in the trial plays a crucial role for its outcome, as 
different participants try to impose their truths through authority. The main antagonistic 
                                                 
93
 However, advocacy manuals (e.g. Berg 1987) often warn against overpreparation of witnesses. 
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participants are the prosecuting and the defense lawyers, whose credibility is one of the 
determining factors for the acceptance of one of the antagonistic narratives they present. 
Similarly, lay and expert witnesses undergo an equivalent process of attribution of 
credibility. The dichotomy between credible and non-credible is however not always 
clearly identified, and credibility is a feature that is constantly negotiated within a 
―fighting arena‖ such as a trial (Jacquemet 1996: 10).    
Unlike expert witnesses, lay witnesses are generally not allowed to testify in the form of 
opinions or inferences
94
. Conley and O‘Barr also highlight the impossibility (from a 
juror‘s perspective) of distinguishing unerringly between facts and opinions in accounts 
offered in the specific context of a trial, as that is simply not in line with the standard 
conventions of everyday story telling (Conley / O‘Barr 1990: 177). This discrepancy is 
not seen here as the result of a cognitive limitation, but rather of abnormal institutional 
constraints. 
 
 
4.6.2 Expert knowledge at trial  
 
As previously mentioned, the nature of expert witnesses‘ testimony (see Wall 2009) is 
significantly different from that of lay witnesses (also defined as ordinary witnesses, 
percipient witnesses, or eyewitnesses), in that from a procedural point of view lay 
witnesses are not allowed to testify to their personal opinions, whereas experts may 
offer opinions based on their expertise
95
. 
It is clear that the opinion of the expert also assumes validity and legitimacy according 
to the witness‘s credibility. Perloff (2010) remarks the inherent dynamism of credibility, 
observing that ―it is part of two-way interaction between communicator and message 
                                                 
94
 Federal Rules of Evidence, Rule 701: If the witness is not testifying as an expert, the witness‘ 
testimony in the form of opinions or inferences is limited to those opinions or inferences which are (a) 
rationally based on the perception of the witness, and (b) helpful to a clear understanding of the witness‘ 
testimony or the determination of a fact in issue, and (c) not based on scientific, technical, or other 
specialized knowledge within the scope of Rule 702.(As amended Mar. 2, 1987, eff. Oct. 1, 1987; Apr. 
17, 2000, eff. Dec. 1, 2000). 
95
 Federal Rules of Evidence, Rule 702: If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist 
the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert 
by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or 
otherwise, if (1) the testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product of 
reliable principles and methods, and (3) the witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the 
facts of the case. 
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recipients‖ (Perloff 2010: 166). It may also be argued that credibility is a fluid concept 
which is shaped by and in turn shapes a series of interactions and it can be positioned 
within a wider process of social construction of identity.  
As Gee notes, ―socially situated identities are mutually constructed‖ (Gee 1999: 121). 
The construction of identities is always a dynamic and multifaceted process, and in 
witness examination the discursive construction of the identity of the expert derives 
from a series of interactions involving different participants. Instances of such processes 
are the testimony of the witness himself, the introduction offered by the attorneys (who 
introduce the experts and may try, in turn, to enhance or hamper their expertise, 
credibility and trustworthiness), and ultimately the attribution of credibility on the part 
of the jurors. 
Different techniques may be used in order to conduct a successful expert direct-
examination (see Kuhne 2007). The ones listed by Lubet include: the humanisation of 
the witness; the use of plain language; the use of examples and analogies; the use of the 
concept of consensus; and the encouragement of powerful language. It is also 
recommended not to stretch the witness‘ expertise (i.e. not to examine a witness beyond 
the specific scope of his expertise) (Lubet 2004: 229). In particular, law manuals also 
suggest eliciting not only the expert‘s professional background in order to emphasize 
his specific competence in the matter, but also ―the witness‘s personal background of 
probity and honesty‖ (Lubet 2004: 53).  
Conversely, cross-examination of the witness‘s credentials is based on the fact that the 
witness may be more or less discredited during the examination through different 
techniques. Lubet suggests that some of the most effective strategies are: 
- limit the scope of the witness‘ expertise 
- stress missing credentials 
- contrast your expert‘s credentials (Lubet 2004: 241-245). 
Indeed, as the credibility of a witness may derive from a comparison with another 
expert witness appointed by another party, it is often in the interest of the attorneys to 
severely deconstruct the trustworthiness of an expert whose position in not in line with 
their theory of the case.   
Expert witness examination is, from a historical, procedural and legal point of view, a 
fundamental phase. The increase in the use of science and technology in investigation 
determines the importance of the experts‘ testimony within the trial and the impact it 
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may have on the jurors. The importance of expert witness examination in contemporary 
trials is crucial, as ―both defense and prosecution attorneys increasingly call upon 
scientists and other expert witnesses to provide compelling testimony in cases ranging 
from patent infringement suits to murder trials‖ (Daemmrich 1998: 742). In other 
words, considering the increasing intricacy of the different types of scientific evidence 
presented in a trial, the use of expert testimony in court is inevitably going to augment 
(Jasanoff 1995, Matoesian 1999a: 491). 
Expert testimony often represents a particularly lengthy, complex, and controversial 
phase (Jones 1994, Matoesian 1999a), and the Westerfield case is no exception. For 
instance, entomology was one of the disciplines that played a major role in this trial and 
several contradictions emerged. To give an example, the defense‘s entomologists 
testified that eggs were laid by flies in Danielle‘s body in mid-February, but Faulker 
also admitted that his research was based on the fly larvae, which do not allow the 
determination of a precise time spectrum. Conversely, another entomologist, N. Haskell, 
testified that the insect infestation must have started immediately; Dr. Hall, instead, 
placed the colonization between February 12 and 23, whereas Dr. Goff placed it 
between February 9 and 14. 
Evidently, the impersonality and the objectivity of scientific truth that should be 
epitomized by the role of the expert are in conflict with the dynamics of a trial. An 
aseptic presentation of evidence on the part of the experts appointed by the parties is not 
the purpose of the examination, where the importance of loyalty often overcomes the 
need for truth (Jasanoff 1995, Matoesian 1999a). Such dynamics are inevitably related 
to the nature of the system, and it has been stated that ―the adversarial system, in stark 
contrast to science, is not necessarily about truth and falsity, but about winning and 
losing; and that depends on which side - and which witness - can best finesse reality 
through the use of language‖ (Matoesian 1999a: 492). Moreover, in revealing terms, 
Faigman remarks that ―[w]hile science attempts to discover the universals hiding among 
the particulars, trial courts attempt to discover the particulars hiding among the 
universals‖ (Faigman 1999: 69). 
The conception and, above all, the presentation of scientific evidence is obviously 
embedded within professional thinking and professional discourse, and the expert 
witness plays a crucial function in framing specialized (scientific) knowledge and often 
assumes the role of an expert mediator of knowledge (Jasanoff 1990). An expert should 
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obviously present his theory in a clear and understandable way so that it can be more 
easily accepted by the jurors, who are not likely to be familiar with the specificities of a 
certain scientific discipline. In this respect, it is often suggested that ―[t]he theory must 
not only state a conclusion, but almost always explain, in common-sense terms, why the 
expert is correct‖ (Lubet 2004: 217). 
In a jury trial, scientific evidence is often presented as intertwined with culturally 
entrenched common-sense. However, it seems clear that scientific theories and data may 
not be in harmony with more common-sense lay values, but in order to be accepted it is 
important that scientific knowledge be in line with those assumed values. In other 
words, specialized knowledge has to be accommodated to the lay participants in order to 
be understood, and it has to be presented as in accord with what are deemed to be the 
common moral and ethical beliefs. 
Even though similar issues also emerge in bench trials, where members of the legal 
profession may be confronted with highly technical scientific knowledge they are not 
familiar with, the crucial questions related to the presentation and the perception of 
specialized knowledge seem particularly salient in a jury trial. 
 
 
4.7 Closing arguments: the end of the story 
 
Different expressions, such as jury summation, closing speech, closing statement, final 
arguments, are used to refer to this phase (Walter 1988: 7). The use of the word 
‗arguments‘ clearly emphasizes the argumentative character of this event, which may be 
seen as ―the moment for pure advocacy‖ (Lubet 2004: 467). 
By and large, closing arguments represent the moment where the attorney can state what 
has been proved during the trial, and this phase consists of a series of sub-phases, 
which, following Aron et al (1996) can be identified as follows:  
- an introduction, where the crucial issues of the cases are emphasized 
- a development of the argument (including a review of the relevant evidence)  
- a discussion of the legal principles related to the case  
- a conclusion, which mainly aims at guiding the jury through the reasoning 
process and towards a favorable verdict. 
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As Burns (2009) remarks, in their closing argument attorneys carry out a reconstruction 
of the story by highlighting some of its crucial elements; at the same time this phase 
also has a deconstructive function in that ―this is the time when the advocate can point 
out the incoherence and implausibility of the competing account and the opponent‘s 
failure to keep his or her promise to present adequate evidence to support the story told 
in opening statement‖ (Burns 2009: 25-26). Closing statements are the last chance 
attorneys have to communicate directly with the jurors (Mauet 1980) and represent the 
final opportunity to offer a mental image of the case that will lead to a favorable verdict. 
In other words, the phase can be defined as ―the chronological and psychological 
culmination of a jury trial‖ (Mauet 1980: 205).  
 
 
4.7.1 Accommodating legal knowledge 
 
The education of the jury is an important aspect of proficient jury trial advocacy. 
Complex legal issues and principles are brought up throughout the trial, and successful 
communication with the jury also depends on the ability of explaining such issues in an 
accessible, involving way, and emphasizing the aspects that are favorable to one‘s side. 
Informing about legal concepts and principles is strategically important also in terms of 
preserving the attorney‘s credibility. The explanation of the law necessarily has to be 
precise and accurate, otherwise the presentation of a concept could easily be dismantled 
by the opposite party. At the same time, however, the law must be introduced in a clear 
and understandable way; for instance, Aron et al recommend using ―simply and clearly 
understood words‖ (Aron et al 1996: 12.19). 
The jurors are ascribed the key role of decision makers even though, by definition, they 
lack any legal professional expertise and competence. The reasoning processes they 
apply are often dependent on figurative language and analogies with personal 
experiences (e.g. Feigenson 2000), and that is why common exemplifications based on 
everyday situations are often employed. For example, Aron et al (1996: 12.29) report 
the case of a lawyer who would explain the difference between ‗simple negligence‘ and 
‗gross negligence‘ in the following way: ―Simple negligence occurs when you are 
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eating a plate of beans and you spill a bean on your tie. When you spill a whole knifeful 
of beans on your tie, that‘s gross negligence‖ (Aron et al 1996: 12.29). 
In attorney-juror talk the use of analogies is particularly significant and emerges 
evidently in closing arguments because of the nature and the scope of the phase
96
. 
Analogy is a common tool used by lawyers to explain abstract legal principles or 
elusive legal concepts. Indeed, analogies occupy a focal point in jury trial advocacy and 
their use is metalinguistically confirmed by Judge Mudd in a sidebar conference with 
the attorneys: 
 
MR. FELDMAN: There was the use of the word ‗I‘. When the 
prosecutor makes an argument, I‘ve always understood to be improper. 
So I was just raising the issue because to personalize it essentially 
constitutes vouching. Under the federal constitution, that‘s not 
permissible. Substituting the word ‗I‘ for ‗the people‘ or ‗the 
prosecution‘ I don‘t have a problem with. When it‘s personalized, I think 
it‘s improper.  
THE COURT: If he had been commenting on the evidence, you would 
have been correct. But he wasn‘t. He was drawing an analogy. And 
lawyers draw analogies all the time to life experience. When I was 
growing up as a boy on the farm, all the rest of that. And that‘s the exact 
context that was in. (Day 28, outside the presence of the jury) 
 
More specifically, analogies in closing statements may assume a variety of functions, 
such as a rhetorical, strategic, explanatory, illustrative, epistemic, heuristic, probative, 
or cognitive. For instance, lawyers can use analogical explanations to stress a pivotal 
point and make it clearer, and they can emphasize the aspects of the analogy that are 
deemed to assume a particularly persuasive function in light of the party‘s theory of the 
case.  
Analogies and exemplifications are powerful tools and are constantly employed to 
present legal concepts that would otherwise appear alien to laymen. In particular, it is 
often argued that, in order to be effective, figurative language used in court should be 
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 For instance, it is improper to argue about the law in opening statements (see Section 4.5). 
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personalized and possibly involve the jurors. For instance, the notions of ‗actual 
possession‘ and ‗constructive possession‘ are briefly explained by the prosecuting 
attorney in his summation by offering a clear, simple and juror-centered 
exemplification: 
 
MR. DUSEK: And you heard there was actual possession and 
constructive possession. You are in possession of the badge that‘s on you 
now. You have active control of that. These water bottles in front of you, 
you have constructive possession of them. You have control over them, 
but you do not have active control of them. It‘s not in your possession 
right now. (Dusek‘s closing-a97)  
 
The same concept had previously been described when the jury instructions were given:   
 
THE COURT: There are two kinds of possession: actual possession and 
constructive possession. Actual possession requires that a person 
knowingly exercise direct physical control over a thing. Constructive 
possession does not require actual possession but does require that a 
person knowingly exercise control over or the right to control a thing 
either directly or through another person or persons. (Jury instructions, 
day 28) 
 
The comparison between the two different descriptions shows that jury instructions 
include the use of specific legal terminology and have a high level of formality. 
Conversely, the attorney succeeds in offering a highly comprehensible and juror-
centered explanation. The concepts are epitomized in simple images that can be 
immediately visualized, and epigrammatic phrasing may also result in a more 
memorable, easily understood representation of a concept. 
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 ‗Dusek‘s closing-a‘ refers to the prosecution‘s closing arguments. 
‗Feldman‘s closing‘ refers to the defense‘s closing statements. 
‗Dusek‘s closing-b‘ refers to the prosecution‘s rebuttal. 
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Bugliosi (1996: 199) also emphasizes the functional role of figurative language in 
summation and notes that it is essential in order to keep the juror‘s attention in such a 
delicate moment of the trial: 
 
―I do not agree that it is difficult to hold a jury‘s attention for more than 
an hour or so. In fact, it is not difficult to keep their attention for one, 
two, or even three days if the lawyer can deliver a powerful, exciting 
summation that is sprinkled with example, metaphor and humour‖. 
(Bugliosi 1996: 199) 
 
 
4.7.2 Metaphors in court  
 
In their seminal work, Lakoff and Johnson argue that ―[t]he essence of metaphor is 
understanding and experiencing one kind of thing in terms of another‖ (Lakoff / 
Johnson 1980: 5). The use of metaphor
98
 in legal language has constantly attracted 
considerable scholarly attention. Indeed, metaphors in legal writing, reasoning or 
argumentation may prove crucial for understanding and interpreting the law. Legal 
metaphors
99
 are now considered ―constitutive of legal reasoning‖ and they are seen as 
―tools for denoting legal concepts through a shell permeable to social and economical 
evolutions‖ (Morra 2010: 387).  
As Gotti notes, metaphorization offers a series of advantages, such as terminological 
transparency, conciseness, and ―the tangible quality of images from the physical world 
used to represent abstract and often complex concepts that would otherwise be difficult 
to define‖ (Gotti 2008: 56-57). These features contribute to the use of metaphors also in 
courtroom communication, and the value of metaphorical imagery is particularly 
significant in a jury trial, where metaphors may be strategically used as a persuasive 
tool. Indeed, the persuasive power of metaphorical language has often been confirmed; 
in particular, Sopory and Dillard (2002) highlight that metaphors may have a greater 
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 For a broader discussion of the nature and the function of metaphorical language see, among the vast 
array of available readings, Shibles 1971, Ortony 1979, Reddy 1979, Lakoff / Johnson 1980, 1999, Burke 
1984[1954], Derrida 1986, Barlow 1994. 
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 For a deeper discussion of legal metaphors see Winter 1989, Smith 2007, Morra 2010. 
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impact when they display features of novelty (but preserving familiarity) and are 
introduced at an early stage in the message. 
Metaphorization is often a fluid process and a novel metaphor may subsequently 
assume the form of an unthinking idiom
100
. In other words, it can be argued that 
lexicalized metaphors are not recognized as having a metaphorical meaning, but, instead 
of a dichotomic vision between dead and living metaphors, it has often been suggested 
that other stages be identified, such as that of inactive metaphor
101
 (Goatly 1997). The 
intermediate stages emphasize the progressive transition from a living metaphor to a 
lexical item whose metaphorical origin is not generally recognized and highlight the 
impossibility of identifying an exact demarcation between the metaphor‘s life and death. 
In a similar vein, Derrida‘s (1972) concept of ‗usure‘ may also be employed to illustrate 
the progressive passage from living metaphor to idiomatic acceptance.  
A complex web of metaphors is employed in courtroom communication, especially in 
closing arguments, because of their nature, structure and purpose. For instance, the 
expression ‗smoking gun‘, which is widely used in closing arguments, shows the 
fluidity of metaphorization and idiomatization processes. The definition of ‗smoking 
gun‘ as a metaphor is not unproblematic, as  the metaphorical image may be seen as 
moving from the state of metaphor to that of idiom, or from ‗dead‘ to ‗living‘ metaphor 
(Billig / MacMillan 2005). The use of this expression is very common in closing 
statements as a way to refer to the hard evidence, the indisputable evidence or proof: 
 
MR. FELDMAN: Wait a minute. Where is the smoking gun? (Feldman‘s 
closing)  
 
MR. FELDMAN: We‘re still looking. That smoking gun we‘re trying to 
find. You might see the shadows of the outline of the gun, but they don‘t 
got the smoking gun. We‘re looking. (Feldman‘s closing)  
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 This process may be understood, for instance, in terms of Glucksberg‘s (2001) ‗property attribution 
model‘. 
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 Inactive metaphors refer to items that have become lexicalized, but their original metaphorical 
meaning is still recognizable.  
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In the latter example the image of a smoking gun is further elaborated from a 
metaphorical perspective, by highlighting that ‗the shadows of the outline of the gun‘ 
may be seen. The same expression is also accompanied by other figurative images that 
contribute to supporting the defense‘s theory of the case (‗there‘s too many holes‘): 
  
MR. FELDMAN: There‘s too many holes. There‘s no smoking gun. 
There‘s too many explanations. They can‘t put it together. That‘s the 
problem. It doesn‘t come together. (Feldman‘s closing) 
 
Similarly, the defense attorney also attempts to depict the evidence shown by 
prosecution as irrelevant, inconsistent and insufficient to prove his client‘s guilt: 
 
MR. FELDMAN: We‘re trying to make a lot, a mountain, as it were, out 
of a mole hill. (Feldman‘s closing) 
 
Metaphorical images do not emerge in isolation, but are characterized by circularity. 
Given their representational, conceptual and ideological force, an attorney often re-
employs and re-frames a metaphor used by his opponent at his advantage. Indeed, 
figurative representations often significantly prefigure or angle the subsequent 
representations suggested by the opposing attorney:  
 
MR. DUSEK: This is the smoking gun, right here, this jacket. This is the 
smoking gun. This is the smoking gun. This is the hard evidence. 
(Dusek‘s closing-b) 
 
Other metaphors related to the field of weapons are also often used; for instance one of 
the expert witnesses is referred to as ‗a hired gun‘: 
  
MR. DUSEK: He was a hired gun. (Dusek‘s closing-a)  
 
The metaphor of argument as a war (see also Lakoff / Johnson 1980) pervades closing 
arguments, and the image of ‗war‘ is used repeatedly to describe the nature of the 
adversary system: 
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MR. FELDMAN: This is part of the system. It‘s an adversary system. 
We don‘t fight wars in our society in the streets. This is why I used the 
word ―taliban‖ yesterday. We don‘t fight our wars in the streets. Literally 
our wars come to the courtroom. We don‘t have lynchings anymore. We 
don‘t have gun fights at the Okay Corral, we bring them into the 
courtroom. And this really is a very, very adversarial intense experience, 
and you can bet the other side is loading up. (Feldman‘s closing) 
 
MR. FELDMAN: I‘m telling you, folks, as soon as I sit down there‘s 
going to be some fireworks. They‘re going to start leveling on the other 
side. (Feldman‘s closing)  
 
Metaphors describing fighting activities show the aggressive and strategic nature of the 
adversarial process. The metaphorical language used to portray the antagonistic and 
combative nature of the system draws often on the field of war, and, in a similar vein, 
may extend to competitive sports. In the following examples, the conflict between the 
parties (and in particular the confrontational nature of cross-examination) is described 
as involving ‗some serious punches‘. Expressions of this type reinforce the competitive 
overtone of the process: 
 
MR. FELDMAN: You know, one of the things…one of the ways you can 
tell if a party‘s getting hurt by the testimony is how the cross goes. 
Notice that? Did you see a more aggressive cross on any witness in this 
case? Neil Haskell took some serious punches, but so too did Dave 
Laspisas because of what they had to say. And here again we see how the 
adversary system works. You‘re not here as casual observers. (Feldman‘s 
closing)  
 
It should be noted that these metaphorical images do not only represent a rhetorical 
persuasive device, but have a conceptual function. As Ullmann observes, ―[b]y 
unthinkingly and mechanically repeating the same image, we may in the end forget that 
it is metaphorical,‖ and this representation may affect our feelings for the object or idea 
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in question, in that ―our feelings for the tenor may be affected by those for the vehicle‖ 
(Ullmann 1964: 237-238). In this respect, Lakoff and Johnson suggest that ―[i]f we are 
right in suggesting that our conceptual system is largely metaphorical, then the way we 
think, what we experience, and what we do every day is very much a matter of 
metaphor‖ (Lakoff / Johnson 1980). 
More specifically, by applying these notions to the pervasiveness of metaphors in the 
courtroom, Thornburg aptly suggests that ―these metaphors, while originally mythical 
or inspiration, become real and influence the way litigators think and behave‖ 
(Thornburg 1995: 226). 
 
 
4.7.3 Concrete images for abstract principles: the case of ‘reasonable doubt’ 
 
Some scholars discourage discussing legal principles in closing arguments as ―nothing 
is gained by such remarks‖ (Klonoff / Colby 2007: 203), because they do not 
necessarily advance the advocate‘s case in the jurors‘ eyes. However, as previously 
noted, it is also in the interest of the attorney to portray the legal principles applicable to 
a case in the most persuasive way, by highlighting the contours of a principle that best 
fit his theory of the case. The description of complex legal principles cannot be based on 
a mere reproduction of what the law states but has to be strategically elaborated upon, 
paraphrased, expanded, or delimited, in order to appear understandable and acceptable.  
The concept of ‗reasonable doubt‘ is particularly important within the adversarial 
system, as the standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt is the highest standard that 
must be met by the prosecution‘s evidence. Given the importance of this concept for the 
outcome of a trial, the notion of ‗reasonable‘ is dealt with by legal professionals on 
several occasions in closing arguments.  
 
 
4.7.3.1 Towards a definition of reasonable doubt? 
 
As Koch and Devine remark, ―[t]he term ‗reasonable doubt‘ is not specified in the 
Constitution or its amendments, but it has emerged as the required standard of proof in 
criminal trials in the United States as a result of the way the Due Process clause has 
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been interpreted‖ (Koch / Devine 1999: 654); the authors also note a ―considerable 
variation in the language used to explain it across jurisdictions within the United States‖ 
(Koch / Devine 1999: 654). 
From a legal and procedural point of view, the definition of the concept of ‗reasonable 
doubt‘ is highly complex. Indeed, ―[t]he difficulty for the law is that wide use of and 
familiarity with a phrase do not ensure accurate legal understanding and appropriate 
application of the standard‖ (Stoffelmayr / Diamond 2000: 769). Following Stoffelmayr 
and Diamond (2000), the criteria that the instruction on reasonable doubt should include 
are: 
 
- Absolute certainty not required 
- High threshold for conviction specified 
- Discernibility from lower standards of proof 
- Consistent application by jurors sitting on the same case encouraged 
- Room for flexible tailoring of the standard to the costs of error.  
 
The authors aptly argue that ―[w]hat is reasonable depends on the consequences of the 
decision, and attempts to provide clear instructions should not define away the 
flexibility in the beyond a reasonable doubt standard in a blind drive for precision‖ 
(Stoffelmayr / Diamond 2000: 770). 
The word ‗reasonable‘ appears to display flexibility but at the same time also a high 
level of specificity, to the extent that it may not be possible to replace it with nearly 
synonymic expressions without raising interpretative issues
102
. For example, in the oft-
quoted case of Cage vs Louisiana
103, reasonable doubt was defined as ‗such doubt as 
would give rise to grave uncertainty‘ and ‗an actual substantial doubt‘. Unlike the 
Louisiana Supreme Court, the U.S. Supreme Court found that the appropriate threshold 
for conviction was not conveyed by this instruction, which suggested a higher level of 
doubt than what should be required. 
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 In this perspective, the word may be seen to display a monoreferential nature. Monoreferentiality is 
here intended according to Gotti‘s view that the concept does not indicate ―that each term has only one 
referent, as words generally have several referents‖, but it is used ―to signal that in a given context only 
one meaning is allowed‖ (Gotti 2008: 33). 
103
 Cage v. Louisiana, 498 U.S. 39 (1990). 
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In California vs Westerfield the jury instruction delivered regarding ‗reasonable doubt‘ 
is the following: 
 
THE COURT: Reasonable doubt is defined as follows: it is not a mere 
possible doubt, because everything relating to human affairs is open to 
some possible or imaginary doubt. Rather, it is that state of the case 
which, after the entire comparison and consideration of all of the 
evidence, leaves the minds of the jurors in that condition that they cannot 
say they feel an abiding conviction of the truth of the charge. (Jury 
instructions, day 28) 
 
The definition of the standard as ‗not a mere possible doubt‘, and contrasted with ‗some 
possible imaginary doubt‘ used in this case is in line with the Court‘s decision in 
Sandoval vs California
104
, stating that this instruction does not overstate the degree of 
doubt required to acquit a criminal defendant.  
In order to provide instructions as specific as possible it has also debatably been 
suggested that quantitative definition should be given, stating the level of probability 
required to define ‗reasonable doubt‘ (Kagehiro / Stanton 1985). However, theorists and 
practitioners tend to agree that the concept is qualitative in nature. Indeed, as early as 
1969 Simon argues ―Percentages or probabilities simply cannot encompass all the 
factors, tangible or intangible, in determining guilt—evidence cannot be evaluated in 
such terms‖ (Simon 1969: 113). Among the several apologies of the principle as a non-
quantifiable one, Rembar also notes that ―[p]roof beyond a reasonable doubt is a 
quantum without a number‖ (Rembar 1980: 412).  
 
 
4.7.3.2 Defining reasonability   
 
The definition of the word ‗reasonable‘ is a complex matter, because of its 
indeterminate and vague nature. The use of vague terms is common in legal language, 
and the relation between vagueness and precision in this field has often been 
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investigated (see inter alia Waldron 1994, Endicott 1997, 2000, 2001, Bhatia et al 2005, 
Cacciaguidi-Fahy / Wagner 2006). It has often been argued that ―language is inherently 
polysemic‖ and ―even clear expressions may appear in the absence of contextual 
information as indeterminate‖ (Charnock 2006: 66); therefore, it is through a process of 
contextualization that terms, and even legal terms, are interpreted and explained and 
acquire a more specific meaning.  
In his seminal description of legal language Mellinkoff introduces the notion of ‗weasel 
words‘ (Mellinkoff 1963: 21), intended as words with a highly flexible meaning. 
Among the several examples offered (e.g. adequate, proper, convenient, doubtless, fair, 
manifest, negligence, normal, ordinary, palpable, satisfactory, safe), ‗reasonable‘ is 
also treated as a ‗weasel word‘. This category of terms primarily refers to words 
included in written legal text, but also the language of the courtroom shows the presence 
of words of this kind
105
. Weasel words also tend to appear in collocations and are 
particularly sensitive to the phenomenon of coselection. This process is by no means 
limited to these kinds of terms but is ubiquitous in human language, and Sinclair 
explains:   
 
―One word can prepare the reader or listener to receive another one that 
comes just a little later, and to understand it in a certain way. The 
interconnections among words that occur close to each other are so 
intricate that quite often we are sure that they are not independently 
chosen, but COSELECTED‖. (Sinclair 2003: 57, original emphasis) 
 
This coselection is often (but not necessarily) given by adjectives followed by nouns. 
When using expressions such as ‗reasonable doubt‘, ‗reasonable interpretation‘, or 
‗reasonable explanation‘, their meaning may assume very different contours and depend 
on a variety of factors, such as cultural, social, moral, ethical values, and they can be 
associated with a particularly high level of vagueness. 
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 In this respect, the strong interrelation and interdependence between the written and the spoken mode 
in trial discourses should also be emphasized. 
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Evaluative adjectives (see Fjeld 2001, 2005) such as ‗reasonable‘ have been classified 
according to Fjeld‘s taxonomy in different categories (Fjeld 2005: 164-165)106:  
 
- General quality adjectives, which moves along the line good/bad. Adjectives of this 
kind are acceptable, useful, interesting, advisable (and their opposites).  
- Modal adjectives, which regard the parameters of necessity and desirability, such as 
(un)necessary and (un)desirable. 
- Relational adjectives, which refer to the relation between a word and some general 
standards (or so perceived). Examples are: (un)suitable, (in)sufficient (in)adequate and 
(in)appropriate. 
- Ethic adjectives, which denote some moral or ethic value, such as right, wrong, 
(in)equitable, (ir)responsible, (un)justifiable, (un)reasonable and objective.  
- Consequence adjectives, which express different degrees of consequence in relation to 
the modified noun. The examples mentioned are: crucial, critical, serious, considerable 
and significant. 
- Evidence adjectives, which express the relation between certain conditions and their 
consequences (e.g. evident, marked, natural and unlikely). 
- Frequency adjectives, defined by Fjeld as the ones which ―denote the evaluation of the 
appearance of the noun related to some kind of quantitative norm‖. Typical examples 
are: widespread, common, normal, unusual, special, and deviant (Fjeld 2005: 165). 
 
However, the line between these categories is finely drawn, because of the intrinsic 
vagueness related to the nature of evaluative adjectives. For example, the term 
‗reasonable‘ is identified as an ethic adjective, but this definition appears limiting in the 
context of courtroom communication. The ethic aspect is certainly crucial, but the 
concept carries with it features that may be ascribed to general quality adjectives, 
evidence adjective (as the consequence of the jurors‘ decision are often highlighted in 
relation to the concept of reasonable doubt) or relational adjectives.  
 
                                                 
106
 Even though Fjeld‘s research mainly focuses on written language, it is clear that evaluative adjectives 
play a crucial role in courtroom spoken language, especially if we consider the persuasive strength they 
may have. 
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4.7.3.3 Reasonable doubt in closing arguments 
 
The concept of ‗reasonable‘ assumes a specific legal meaning within the context of a 
criminal trial. As shown in Table 9, it tends to been used in connection with the term 
‗doubt‘ because of the specific legal meaning of the expression ‗reasonable doubt‘. It 
also accompanies other terms, as other expressions are also used in the process of 
explaining this legal principle (e.g. ‗reasonable interpretation‘, ‗reasonable explanation‘, 
and ‗reasonable grounds‘). Table 9 shows word clusters107 including ‗reasonable‘ that 
occur in closing arguments: 
 
Frequency   Probability108 Cluster 
65 0.374  reasonable doubt 
37  0.213  reasonable interpretations 
20  0.115  reasonable interpretation 
8  0.046  reasonable explanation 
3 0.017  reasonable grounds 
Table 9: Word clusters including the adjective ‗reasonable‘ in closing statements 
 
The term ‗reasonable‘ is mentioned by both attorneys and emerges in all the three 
different sub-phases of closing statements: the prosecution closing, the defense closing, 
and the prosecution rebuttal, as shown in Figure 15:  
 
 
                                                 
107
 As Anthony notes, ―[a]n alternative way to search for multi-word units is to find lexical bundles (Biber 
et al 1999), which are equivalent to n-grams, where n can vary usually between two and five words. Few 
corpus analysis programs offer this feature (Coniam 2004), but AntConc3.2.1 includes lexical bundle 
searches as an option in the Word Clusters Tool‖ (Anthony 2004: 11). 
108
 Transitional probability between target word and other words. 
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Figure 15: Reasonable: concordance plot
109
 
 
The notion of ‗reasonable‘ is introduced repeatedly by the defense attorney, who 
attempts to exploit the concept of ‗beyond reasonable doubt‘ to confirm his theory 
aiming at the defendant‘s acquittal. Table 10 shows the keyness of the term ‗reasonable‘ 
in the defense‘s closing in relation to the prosecution‘s closing:  
 
Frequency    keyness word 
107 71.416  REASONABLE 
Table 10: Keyness of the term ‗reasonable‘ (defense closing arguments)  
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 The file Dusekclosing-a.text corresponds to the prosecution‘s closing. 
The file Feldmanclosign.txt corresponds to the prosecution‘s closing. 
The file Dusekclosing-b.txt corresponds to the prosecution‘s closing. 
For a description of the concordance plot see Section 4.5.2.1. 
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4.7.3.4 Do you guys play 21? Attorney‘s strategies to explain reasonable doubt 
 
Delivering indisputable explanations about the standard of proof beyond reasonable 
doubt is not unproblematic. The task the attorneys have to carry out is highly complex, 
in that they have to provide definitions that are not only legally accurate, but also 
understandable to laymen, and at the same time functional to support one specific 
theory of the case. 
The fact that some instructions are given to the jurors prior to closing arguments allows 
the lawyers to integrate the actual instructions into their arguments and the defense 
attorney attempts to intertextually build his definition according to the instructions that 
have been delivered (see Section 4.7.3.1): 
 
MR. FELDMAN: Reasonable doubt is defined as follows:…but first 
remember the defendant is presumed to be innocent. Right? You know, I 
just took the instruction, I had it blown up. It‘s bold-faced. The defendant 
is presumed to be innocent. That‘s the law. And in case of a reasonable 
doubt, he‘s entitled to a verdict of not guilty. Entitled. Reasonable doubt 
is defined as follows: as the judge told you, it‘s not a mere possible doubt 
because everything relating to human affairs is subject to some possible 
or imaginary doubt. It is that state of the case which after an entire 
comparison, consideration of all the evidence leaves the mind of jurors in 
that condition that they can‘t say they feel an abiding conviction to a 
moral certainty of the truth of the charge. 
MR. DUSEK: Objection, Your Honor. Misstates the law. 
MR. FELDMAN: I‘m sorry. 
THE COURT: There is something in there extra, Mr. Feldman. 
MR. FELDMAN: Abiding conviction of the truth of the charge. Judge, 
I‘m looking for the papers. There was an easel that had papers on it. I 
know. I‘ve seen it seventeen times. I‘m sorry. I just don‘t see it now. 
THE BAILIFF: It‘s behind all that. 
MR. FELDMAN: Behind all that. Okay. Beyond a reasonable doubt. 
BDR. Okay? And an abiding conviction. (Feldman‘s closing)  
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Argumentation has to follow clear standards and, for example, counsel is not allowed to 
misstate the law or to offer an interpretation of the law that contradicts the court‘s 
decisions and instructions (Lubet 2004: 123). In this case the attorney fails to cite the 
instructions and the law accurately, but, apart from being persuasive and convincing, the 
attorneys‘ words should comply with legal requirements and the rules of trial procedure. 
The opposing party aptly notes the law has been misstated
110
 and this is detrimental to 
the defense attorney‘s credibility. Moreover, even though final arguments may often 
include references to jury instructions, it is generally  not recommendable to dwell on 
them for a long time as this practice may not sound interesting to the jurors (Lubet 
2004: 513). 
Mr. Feldman continues his explanation by offering a description of the concept of 
‗abiding conviction‘ by means of an exemplification which focuses on the jurors‘ 
feelings and beliefs and may trigger jurors‘ personal memories: 
 
MR. FELDMAN: And you have to take those words and feel whether 
you‘re so convinced that the conviction will never, never go away. It‘s so 
strong that it‘s the kind of belief you have that if you‘ve got a loved one 
on a respirator, a terrible decision to have to make, somebody dying, it‘s 
on you to make the decision to pull the plug. Only with an abiding 
conviction would you do so. (Feldman‘s closing) 
 
As mentioned, analogies are frequently used in courtroom communication, especially to 
explain concepts that have a high level of intricacy and abstractness. In his rebuttal, the 
prosecution attorney tackles the complex (highly specific but also multifaceted) notion 
of ‗reasonable doubt‘ by means of vivid language, permeated by graphic 
exemplifications and metaphorical images: 
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 However, deciding when to object may represent a very crucial moment. In fact, in the eyes of the 
jurors objections are sometimes perceived as interruptions of communication or as a strategy to hide 
things from them. As Aron et al note, ―jurors do not like lawyers who make a lot of objections. They 
think the lawyers are trying to keep something from them‖ (Aron et al 1996: 28.15). Moreover, when an 
objection is overruled, it can have particularly negative effects on the credibility of the lawyer being 
overruled. Conversely, a sustained objection contributes to enhancing a lawyer‘s reliability and 
competence in the eyes of the jury. Therefore, objections should be made only when they can make a 
point to one‘s case and be particularly beneficial.  
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MR. DUSEK: And when you‘re making that determination of what is 
reasonable and what isn‘t, there are many ways to look at that. One might 
be are there any facts to support that position. I would suggest that that is 
probably a good start. One other way, well, how reasonable is my 
position? Well, if I‘m standing in a crowd of ten, 20, 30 people and I‘m 
the only one holding my position and everyone else says I don‘t think so, 
how reasonable is my position? If everyone else sees it otherwise, maybe 
I‘m looking at the wrong facts. Maybe I‘m bringing in outside influences. 
Maybe I‘m missing the boat somehow. (Dusek‘s closing-b) 
 
As has been shown, legal language is easily associated, especially by laypeople, to 
legalese, intended as ―that often incomprehensible verbiage found in legal documents, 
as well as arcane jargon used among attorneys‖ (Schane 2006: 2). It is the aim of the 
attorney to project an image of himself as a facilitator of understanding: using clear and 
understandable language allows him to be perceived as having the jurors‘ interest at 
heart and as being trustworthy; he strategically avoids using convoluted language, as 
that could potentially be processed as a sign that he is hiding something from jurors. 
The attorney constantly suggests vivid visualizations in order to guide the jurors 
towards his interpretation of the concept, and consequently towards his perspective on 
the case: 
 
MR. DUSEK: It‘s kind of like…kind of like this rope…if we make 
like…this is the ultimate circumstantial evidence inference. The rope is 
made up of many, many twines, just like the ultimate conclusion in this 
case is made up of many, many facts. If any one of you, and you all get 
to make that individual assessment yourself, one fact, pick one, did he lie 
about the wallet. Use that one for an example. If all of you, or each 
individual, is convinced beyond a reasonable doubt, yes, that was a lie, 
that can be part of your rope. If there is a fact that I‘m not convinced on 
that one beyond a reasonable doubt, you pull that strand out and get rid of 
that fact. I‘m not going to consider that because it‘s not established 
beyond a reasonable doubt. Each fact leading to the inference, the final 
conclusion. So what you do is you put together all of the facts in this 
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case, and then you determine whether or not the ultimate conclusion, the 
ultimate inference, are there two reasonable interpretations, or is one 
reasonable and one unreasonable. You do not do it individually. So you 
take all the facts that you are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt exist, 
and then you make that determination. Does that rope still hold? Is there 
only one reasonable inference, one reasonable interpretation, one 
reasonable conclusion? And you know why that‘s true? (Dusek‘s closing-
b) 
 
Prosecution continues his vivid explanation with a simple example based on card 
games: 
 
MR. DUSEK Just as an example, do you guys play 21? Blackjack, over 
at Vegas? If we were to get a deck of cards and go down the row here 
playing 21, and I‘ve got these two guys are gonna watch and make an 
ultimate decision in this case, one of them I send outside the room, one of 
‗em I allow to sit in here while we‘re playing 21. He gets to watch, he 
doesn‘t. I work my way down the room here. I play one hand of 21. She 
pulls a 19, I get a 20. Oh, I‘m pretty lucky. She‘s pretty unlucky. I go 
down to the next person, another fact. You draw an 18, I get a 19. 
Whoops, you‘re unlucky. I‘m pretty lucky. Next hand, you get a 20, I get 
21. And I go right down the line. Each time I beat you by one. How did I 
do that? Am I lucky? One inference, or did I cheat? You bring these two 
fellows into the room. The fellow who had to sit outside and he sits in 
here and watches the last hand, well, bad luck. Just a chance. The 
inference is I didn‘t cheat. No reason to think I did. He‘s only looking at 
one fact. The other individual who sat in here and watched me win every 
single hand by one card knows I had to cheat. That‘s why you have to 
look at all the facts before you make that ultimate decision. They don‘t 
want you to do that. They don‘t want you to do that. They want you to 
violate the law, not apply the law as it is written, as it was instructed, as 
you took an oath to follow. (Dusek‘s closing-b) 
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The possibility of ‗characterizing‘ and remembering a legal principle is facilitated by 
connecting it to familiar or common experiences. The next step in the attorney‘s rebuttal 
is to confirm his explanation by offering another clear example. He builds his 
explanation around the reference to the San Diego baseball team, the Padres, which had 
been previously mentioned by the judge: 
 
MR. DUSEK: And when we start looking at circumstantial evidence, all 
of the evidence in this case, you kind of look at what‘s reasonable and 
what isn‘t. What are the possibilities of that really happening in my 
common sense? Perhaps the court‘s Padres and the local Chargers might 
be an example. How reasonable is it that the padres are going to get into 
the World Series and win the World Series this year? And the Chargers 
are gonna get in the Super Bowl and win the Super Bowl this year? It‘s 
possible. It‘s not reasonable. Sorry, guys. The statistics of that, the 
chance of that is virtually nil. Yet the possibility of that is greater than all 
of these other factors coming together in one case and leading us down 
the path of not guilty. The Padres and the Chargers have a greater chance 
than all of these facts coming together at one time in one place. (Dusek‘s 
closing-b) 
 
The circularity of figurative language emerges evidently in Mr. Dusek‘s words. For 
instance, in a subsequent moment he refers back to the exemplification based on card 
games that he had previously used:   
 
MR. DUSEK: It stings that he had to testify in a trial when his dad‘s on 
trial. That stings. They played the hand. Kind of like the guy dealing 21. 
It stings. (Dusek‘s closing-b) 
 
In this case circular representations convey coherence and cohesion and are processed 
by the listeners as being more familiar. After concluding his explanation of the concept 
of ‗reasonable doubt‘, Mr. Dusek clearly presents the consequences of its application: 
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MR. DUSEK: If I prove this case beyond a reasonable doubt, he‘s guilty, 
he is guilty. (Dusek‘s closing-b) 
 
Many adhere to the idea that closing arguments should make clear that a certain 
decision is necessarily a consequence of the correct application of a specific legal 
reasoning, and no other option is legally acceptable.  
In sum, as happens in other moments of the trial such as opening statements (see 
Section 4.5), in closing arguments the use of easily understandable language attempts to 
maintain a relationship of solidarity with the jurors and, therefore, to enhance the 
perception of cooperation. Everyday language is more likely to be easily understood, 
and consequently accepted; it may also be perceived as a sign of goodwill, in that 
convoluted jargon may instead be interpreted as a way to mask something from the 
jurors. The hybridism of courtroom language in jury trial emerges significantly also in 
this phase, where formality and terminological accuracy are merged with a colloquial 
and informal style.  
 
 
4.7.4 Explaining science 
 
As previously mentioned, one of the main features of courtroom language could be 
broadly defined as the coexistence of, on the one hand, formal language permeated by 
specialized terminology and, on the other hand, an informal and simple style which also 
includes highly colloquial expressions. As the law is accommodated to the jurors‘ 
assumed needs and desires (within the framework of what is procedurally acceptable), 
the discussion of evidence and testimony is also tailored to what are supposed to be the 
jurors‘ capabilities to understand it and the jurors‘ expectations.  
Lawyers attempt to position themselves as the juror‘s guiding light in the labyrinth of a 
courtroom, its practices and its language, as well as the jurors‘ helpers to untangle the 
complex web of the scientific notions and processes presented during the trial. Science 
is, therefore, presented in a highly simplified manner, to the extent that its nature may 
even result as being somehow distorted. The scientific paradigms and the specific 
terminology of science are often abandoned in the pursuit for simplicity and clarity. For 
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instance, the defense attorney tries to reduce the case to its minimal terms and neglect 
its inherent complexity: 
 
MR. FELDMAN: This case, if you step back and look at it all, is a 
simple case. It is not a complicated case, although there may be times 
when it seemed that way. Certainly some of the scientific evidence is 
complicated; the D.N.A. and all that type of stuff. But the facts and the 
reality of what this case is about is very simple. (Feldman‘s closing) 
 
In particular, in their closing arguments attorneys may refer to scientific evidence and 
the expert witnesses‘ testimonies and reframe them concisely and clearly in a jurors‘ 
perspective, instead of reciting all the details of the testimony. As happens with legal 
principles, the scientific principles and phenomena that are particularly favorable to 
one‘s case are also often explained and discussed in closing arguments. Their 
explanation makes use of simplified language and clear examples, as happens in the 
following passage, where the Locard transfer principle (see Locard 1920) is described: 
 
MR. FELDMAN: The Locard transfer principle says if you go some 
place, you leave a portion of your physiology, and you catch a portion of 
somebody else‘s or something else. If I sit in that witness chair, we did 
this with the witnesses, I‘m going to catch whoever‘s been there, and it‘s 
going to be on my jacket. And some of me is going to be left for the next 
person and the next and the next. (Feldman‘s closing)  
 
An attempt to sound familiar and to facilitate comprehension is fundamental in 
communicating with jurors, but it is also crucial not to pass the limits where an 
excessive use of colloquialisms may be perceived as inappropriate. In his closing 
arguments, the defense attorney makes a vast use of colloquial expressions, which may 
clash with the formal setting of the courtroom: 
 
MR. FELDMAN: Because we all recognize there‘s this thing called the 
Locard transfer principle that messes up crime scenes, that if we put too 
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many cops in the same spot, it‘s going to get things screwed up. 
(Feldman‘s closing) 
 
Science is constantly discussed and rephrased, the multiplexed network of specialized 
notions is often reduced to its minimal terms, and scientific terminology is frequently 
replaced by ordinary words, or even by colloquial expressions. 
For instance, given the crucial role played by entomological evidence in the Westerfield 
trial, references to the field of entomology and its practices inevitably emerge in closing 
statements. By means of an example, discussion of larvae and their life cycle are often 
introduced, as they prove essential for determining Danielle‘s time of death. The term 
‗larvae‘ is recurrently used in the expert testimonies but is considerably underused by 
attorneys in their closing arguments (in total, three occurrences), where the more 
common term ‗bugs‘ is instead preferred (in total, 27 occurrences). In particular, on one 
occasion the term ‗larvae‘ is used within the expression ‗those little larvae guys‘, which 
sounds more colorful and colloquial: 
 
MR. DUSEK: One thing you can do is you don‘t measure those little 
larvae guys. (Dusek‘s closing-a) 
 
The definition of professional experts is also subject to reinterpretation and 
simplification. For instance, an entomologist becomes a ‗bug guy‘ or a ‗bug man‘, a 
pathologist is referred to as ‗a fellow who did the autopsy‘, and these redefining 
processes are used by both parties: 
  
MR. DUSEK: Dr. Blackbourne, a forensic pathologist, a fellow who did 
the autopsy. He‘s the medical doctor. (Dusek‘s closing-a) 
 
MR. DUSEK: Start with the entomologists, the bug guys. (Dusek‘s 
closing-a) 
 
MR. FELDMAN: It‘s why they didn‘t call the bug man, their expert. 
Their expert is David Faulkner (Feldman‘s closing) 
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Definitions are clearly crucial for a variety of purposes. Firstly, simple labeling is often 
in line with attorneys‘ strategy to give their speech an essence of familiarity and 
understandability; moreover, labels of this type may also be strategically used to 
ultimately attack or confirm an expert‘s credibility. 
Issues related to the credibility of a witness may also be openly remarked in summation. 
In their closing statements attorneys may attempt to further impugn the scientific 
validity of a scientist. The competence of unfavorable witnesses, their ethical values, 
and the reliability of their findings are constantly challenged: 
 
MR. DUSEK: He was a hired gun. (Dusek‘s closing-a) 
 
MR. DUSEK: We‘ve also learned from dr. Goff and dr. Hall some of the 
mistakes that can be made, perhaps even cooking the books, making sure 
you get the results you want. Such as how can you get faulty results, 
unreliable results, results that are not right? One thing you can do is you 
don‘t measure those little larvae guys. You don‘t determine if they‘re 
beginning or end stage or the end of any of those stages. (Dusek‘s 
closing-a)  
 
In the following example, the defense attorney also emphasizes the importance of the 
role of the jurors in determining the trustworthiness and reliability of the experts: 
 
MR. FELDMAN: It‘s your job to evaluate the credibility of witnesses. 
The jurybox is placed right here closest to you all so that you could see 
jugular veins going, so that you can form opinions. You know about 
body language. […] If your kid says he didn‘t have some pie and there‘s 
pie on his face, you‘re close enough to see it. If the witness isn‘t telling 
the truth, you can see it. You can see it. That‘s why you‘re here. That‘s 
why the jury sits so close (Feldman‘s closing) 
 
The interdiscursivity that underlies the judicial process is made particularly evident in 
the closing argument phase where discourses deriving from different domains, such as 
different scientific fields, are intertwined with the mechanisms of legal discourse. As 
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Smart (1983) highlights, the processing of doing justice heavily relies on science: ―A 
series of subsidiary authorities have achieved a stake in the penal process; psychiatrists, 
psychologists, doctors, educationalists, and social workers share in the judgment of 
formality, prescribe normalizing treatment and contribute to the process of 
fragmentation of the legal power to punish‖ (Smart 1983: 72).  
In particular, the relation between law and science is a highly complex one. The 
outcomes of a trial are in part dependent on scientific findings, but a trial is in turn the 
locus where legal supremacy reifies scientific principles, notions, and values, and 
establishes their admissibility and their validity. In many trials, law and science are 
inextricably interdependent, but, because of the nature and the goals of the two spheres, 
they are often in a conflicting relationship, as Haack notes:   
 
―Science doesn‘t always have the final answers the law wants, or not 
when it wants them; and even when science has the answers, the 
adversarial process can seriously impede or distort communication. It‘s 
no wonder that the legal system often asks more of science than science 
can give, and often gets less from science than science could give; nor 
that strong scientific evidence some times falls on deaf legal ears, while 
flimsy scientific ideas sometimes become legally entrenched‖. (Haack 
2003: 57) 
 
 
4.7.5 Law, emotion and morality 
 
It can generally be argued that ―the intrinsic merits of any case are mediated by the 
persuasive impact of the messages which present the case and the persuasive skills of 
the individuals who present them‖ (O‘Barr 1982: 16). In closing statements it is clear 
that every word pronounced in front of the jury assumes a persuasive function, as 
persuasion is the ultimate goal of every attorney arguing a case. Every moment of the 
interaction virtually becomes a battle that could reveal crucial in determining who wins 
or loses (Hobbs 2003: 275). 
A jury trial is characterized by a fundamental systemic tension: on the one hand the 
attorney has to convey the idea that what takes place is the objective and neutral 
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application of the law; at the same time, because of the nature of the adversary system, 
his zeal has to focus also on the framing of an emotionally involving narrative. Indeed, 
emotion-laden words are often employed for specific persuasive purposes in a variety of 
contexts (Perloff 2010) and they are amply used in jury trials and in particular in closing 
arguments.  
 
 
4.7.5.1 Comparing lexical choices in closing arguments 
 
The comparison of the prosecution‘s and the defense‘s closing may be visualized by 
means of a word cloud in Wmatrix: 
 
 
Figure 16: Wmatrix Word cloud – closing arguments 111 
 
Figure 16 shows significant items in the prosecution‘s closing in relation to the 
defense‘s closing. Some of the emerging elements are related to the sphere of crime 
(e.g. ‗murder‘ and ‗kidnapping‘): their use pervades the prosecution‘s closing, which 
constantly emphasizes the gravity of the crimes committed.  
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 ―This shows up to 100 significant items from the top of the LL profile. 
Only items with LL > 6.63 (p < 0.01) are shown. 
Larger items are more significant‖. (See http://ucrel.lancs.ac.uk/wmatrix2.html) 
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Starting from the assumption that ―[a]nyone studying a text is likely to need to know 
how often each different word form occurs in it‖ (Sinclair 1991: 30), frequency lists112 
offer interesting insights for the analysis of a text, and frequency comparison lists prove 
useful in identifying the most significant items in the comparison of texts. Some crime-
related words have been extrapolated and their frequencies in Mr. Dusek‘s and Mr. 
Feldman‘s closing have been compared. Table 11 confirms the higher frequency of such 
terms in the prosecution‘s closing:                   
 
Item O1        %1      O2 %2          LL 
kill 21    0.08          2   0.01 +     24.36      
murder  23   0.09          3 0.01 +    23.87     
crime   35      0.13      13 0.04 + 17.96      
kidnap              8   0.03         1    0.00+ 8.44      
Table 11: Frequency comparison (crime-related terms)
113
 
 
 
4.7.5.2 Emotional language 
 
The actions attributed to the defendant are described by prosecution using hyperbolic 
definitions and highly connoted words, which are usually placed at one extreme end of 
the good/bad continuum. Negatively connoted lexical choices (such as bad, evil, 
terrible, horrible, etc.) are vastly used by prosecution; Figure 17 and Figure 18 show the 
concordance lines for the terms ‗evil‘ and ‗terrible‘ in Mr. Dusek‘s closing: 
 
                                                 
112
 In Wmatrix the comparison of two frequency lists is also based on likelihood-ratio scores (LL) in order 
to avoid fallacious conclusions about frequency variations between corpora which are not statically 
significant (Rayson 2008). The log-likelihood is also available in AntCon3.2.1 as a keyword generation 
method. See also Dunning 1993 for a general description of the use of the log-likelihood test for general 
textual analysis) and Rayson / Garside 2000 for a discussion of the use of the log-likelihood for corpora 
comparison. 
113
 O1 is observed frequency in d-cl-a/file.raw.pos.sem.wrd.fql (Referring to Mr. Dusek‘s closing). 
O2 is observed frequency in f-cl/file.raw.pos.sem.wrd.fql (Referring to Mr. Feldman‘s closing). 
%1 and %2 values show relative frequencies in the texts. 
+ indicates overuse in O1 relative to O2 (even though developed for a different approach, a further 
discussion of the concept of overuse and underuse is offered by Ringbom 1998). 
The table is sorted on log-likelihood (LL) value to show key items at the top. 
See http://ucrel.lancs.ac.uk/wmatrix2.html 
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Figure 17: Concordance lines for the term ‗evil‘ 
 
 
Figure 18: Concordance lines for the term ‗horrible‘ 
 
Emotional language, hyperbolic definitions, and moral judgments are rhetorically used 
by prosecution to seek disapproval against the defendant. In the following example, the 
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man is described according to his actions, and a sort of syllogistic line of thought is also 
presented to demonstrate the culpability of Mr. Westerfield: 
 
MR. DUSEK: If you can answer me why an individual, a normal fifty-
year-old man would collect that stuff, I can tell you why a fifty-year-old 
man would kidnap and rape…kidnap and kill, I‘m sorry, a seven-year-old 
child. They go hand in hand. (Dusek‘s closing-a) 
 
The apparent slip of the tongue (‗kidnap and rape…kidnap and kill, I‘m sorry‘) may 
also cast doubts as regards a potential intentionality behind such words. Moreover, 
District Attorneys and prosecution attorneys are generally trained to make the victim‘s 
presence felt as much as possible in murder trials. This technique is widely used by Mr. 
Dusek, who frequently calls to mind Danielle‘s presence: 
 
MR. DUSEK: Murder cases are different. Certainly from a prosecution‘s 
standpoint. They are different because unlike most other cases, we are 
missing our best witness. We don‘t have our best witness here to testify. 
But if by chance someone could cause a miracle, create a miracle, just a 
little one, for a short amount of time, and bring Danielle back to life, just 
for a moment, just to help us out, bring her back to life, make her 
presentable here, ask her to come into this courtroom and help us 
determine the one question we need answered: who did this. Bring her 
into this courtroom and ask her: Danielle, please tell us; who did this to 
you. (Dusek‘s closing-b) 
 
The attorney succeeds in evoking Danielle‘s presence in court, and the victim may 
indeed oxymoronically be defined as a participant in absentia: 
 
MR. DUSEK: In turn, I‘ve already told you. I‘ve already told you. I‘ve 
told you with my hair. You know where you found it. I told you with the 
orange fiber that you found on my choker and where you found it. I told 
you with the blue fibers that were on my naked body and where you 
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found them. I told you with my fingerprints. And I told you with my 
blood. Please listen. (Dusek‘s closing-b) 
 
As Aron et al remark, ―vivid language creating striking mental images will help the 
finder of fact visualize the cases‖ (Aron et al 1996: 12.20), and the attorney summarizes 
the case through highly emotional images: 
 
MR. DUSEK: Danielle van Dam gave us clues. She gave us the orange 
fiber from her necklace. She gave us the blue fibers from the blanket 
from her back, from her head. She gave up her hand to give us her 
fingerprint, the only known print we are able to get from her. She gave us 
her DNA, not blood because she didn‘t have any. We got the DNA. From 
her rib. That‘s the known source that was used. From those sources, from 
Danielle herself she helps us solve this case. (Dusek‘s closing-a) 
 
Moreover, by using the pronoun ‗us‘, the prosecution is explicating the polarization 
between two groups
114
 (implicitly intended as two different moral and ideological 
poles); the distinction between ‗us‘ and ‗him/them‘ strengthens the distance between the 
jurors and the defendant, minimizing therefore the possibility that the jurors may feel 
sympathy and empathy towards him. Indeed, ‗us‘ is intended not only as comprising 
prosecution and the jurors, but it is implicitly extended to the macro-level of all people 
sharing the same values. Expressing such a distinction emphasizes the dichotomy 
between ‗us‘ and ‗them‘, between ‗good‘ and ‗bad‘, therefore leading the jurors to think 
that only one choice is morally acceptable, and reducing their dilemma.   
Among the several psychological concepts that may be used to explain the processing of 
message on the part of the jurors, a particularly interesting one is the creation of in-
group vs out-group categorizations, as a juror identifies participants either as displaying 
similar features as himself (in-group) or not (out-group) (Fiske / Taylor 2008). 
Lawyers play a leading role in the performance of a trial and what is being evaluated is 
not only the evidence they present, but themselves as well, as they are under the 
constant scrutiny of the jurors. Beyond professional expertise, attorneys must develop 
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 This process also emerged in opening statements (see Section 4.5) 
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excellent rhetorical skills and master impression management in order to convey the 
idea of an ―attorney persona‖ that assumes a set of ideal features that may inspire the 
juror‘s consensus (Trenholm 1989). The optimal identity that lawyers strive to project is 
primarily twofold: on the one hand they have to emphasize the belonging to a certain 
professional category, their competence and their expertise; on the other hand, it is 
fundamental that the attorneys constantly construct and project a self-representation that 
is in line with the jurors‘ own identity, in order to seek alignment with them. Indeed, it 
is a well-assessed aspect of trial argumentation that it is easier for the jury to believe the 
attorney they identify most with (Mauet 1980), because they share a certain set of 
features (be they cultural, ethical, moral, etc.). It is the perception of a shared identity 
that may lead the jurors to associate with one of the participants (or a certain group of 
participants) and his theory of the case. 
Law, common-sense and morality are presented as some of the basic values and 
principles that have to be applied: 
 
MR. DUSEK: And there are jury instructions that talk about falsehoods. 
If you find that before this trial the defendant made a willfully false or 
deliberately misleading statement concerning the crimes for which he is 
now being tried, you may consider that statement as a circumstance 
tending to prove consciousness of guilt. Basically that‘s what guilty 
people do. Certainly it‘s not enough to prove a case. But it is a factor. 
The law coincides with common sense. (Dusek closing-a) 
 
In the following passage Mr. Dusek also expresses and/or constructs a specific social 
identity (or better a combination of identities) that goes beyond the classical categories 
of gender, status, race, age. This identity includes a form of professional identity that is 
based on features such as professionalism, credibility, competence and knowledge about 
the law, and at the same time a social identity construed on the sharing of widely-
accepted moral and ethics values. The attorney‘s aim is to present a polarized vision of 
good/bad and he clearly positions himself as the person who deserves the juror‘s trust: 
 
MR. DUSEK: We do have a moral problem with what he did to that 
child. We also have a legal problem with what he did to that child. They 
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are the same. They both violate the law, morality, all that is right in this 
world. Make no mistake about that. Morality and law are on the same 
footing here. (Dusek‘s closing-b)  
 
The use of easily understandable language and the emphasis on common sense values 
and principles are used by the attorneys to enhance their perceived similarity in the eyes 
of the jurors, both in terms of membership similarity, and, in particular, of attitudinal 
similarity. This phenomenon is a crucial characteristic of persuasive message sources 
(see inter alia Simons et al 1970, Petty / Cacioppo 1981, Bettinghaus / Cody 1987). 
The courtroom is often regarded as the ultimate expression of the process of doing 
justice (Marry 1990) and the importance of the role assumed by the jurors is 
emphasized by the attorneys, who also highlight that the task the jurors have to 
accomplish is unique in its difficulty:  
 
MR. FELDMAN: This is the single most, I submit to you, the single 
most difficult decision you‘ll ever have to make in your lives. Never, 
except as jurors, do 12 people have to go into a room who don‘t know 
each other, sit down and reach an accord. Can you imagine what life 
would be like at home? You got four children, come on, let‘s go out to 
McDonald‘s. We got to vote on it. Ah, somebody wants to go to, I don‘t 
know, Carl‘s Jr., somebody wants pizza. Somebody wants Chinese food. 
Now we got to negotiate. We don‘t make decisions in life like that. 
(Feldman‘s closing) 
 
Ostensibly presented as having an informative and educational value, these explanations 
allow the attorneys to present themselves as sympathetic assistants who try to help the 
jurors to understand the process; by spurning hyper-technical language and adopting 
ordinary language they enhance the idea that they have the jurors‘ interest at heart. 
Following Hodge and Kress (1993), power and solidarity can be defined as on the one 
hand contradictory, but on the other hand complementary. As Goodwin notes, ―rather 
than openly exerting force, then, lawyers use strategies of solidarity to entice others to 
accept their force‖ (Goodwin 1994: 218). In other words, attorneys enjoy a higher 
(institutionally granted) communicative power; however, it is crucial to show constant 
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solidarity with the jurors, by highlighting the importance of their role, as well as 
showing sympathy for the complexity of the task they are asked to carry out.  
 
 
4.8 Deliberations and verdict: which story did you prefer? 
 
As SunWolf notes, ―we know little about the shadows of the deliberation room or juror 
misconduct‖ (SunWolf 2007: 14). Indeed, the deliberation phase and its communicative 
dynamics remain a particularly unexplored area, due to the limited access to data, as 
deliberations in the jury room are not transcribed and cannot be observed. As Meyer and 
Rosenberg point out, ―researchers are forbidden to intrude upon the jury‘s working 
processes by recording and analyzing their private discussions‖ (Meyer / Rosenberg 
1971: 105). Consequently, most research on juror deliberations is based on post-trial 
reports or on mock trials
115
 (Hans et al 2003). Indeed, once the jurors are dismissed, 
they may be allowed to discuss the case (Warren / Mauldin 1980), but the accuracy and 
the validity of post-decision recollections have often been challenged (Severance / 
Loftus 1982)
116
.  
As previously mentioned, in the Westerfield trial, deliberations represent the only phase 
that was not recorded and not transcribed and will not specifically be the object of the 
analysis. During deliberations, the jurors asked to review some of the testimony 
concerning Danielle‘s time of death, the child pornography evidence, and Westerfield‘s 
audiotaped statement to police. Deliberations lasted more than 40 hours over 10 days, 
prompting speculation that the jurors were deadlocked. The jury was entering its tenth 
day of deliberations when Judge William D. Mudd was notified that the verdict had 
been reached.  
Von Mehren and Murray describe the deliberation phase from a historical perspective: 
 
―For centuries, trial or petit juries acted only by unanimous consensus of 
the members. A single ―holdout‖ could result in a ―hung jury‖ and 
prevent the rendition of a verdict. This requirement of unanimity has 
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 For a discussion of real vs mock jurors studies see Reifman et al 1992. 
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 See also cognitive dissonance theory (Festinger 1964). 
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been regarded by many as an important safeguard for criminal 
defendants. A single juror maintaining a reasonable doubt can prevent a 
criminal conviction. Although unanimity continues to be the rule for 
criminal trials, in many states civil juries may speak based on super-
majorities such as 9–3 or 5–1. In a criminal case, a ―hung jury‖ is not the 
equivalent of an acquittal but rather leads to a retrial of the case before a 
different jury‖. (von Mehren / Murray 2007: 221) 
 
Within deliberations, jurors collectively have to choose which narrative to accept, in 
light of the instructions they have been provided with. In other words, ―deliberating a 
verdict involves weighing the relative merits of different storytellers and their tales, but 
juries do so guided by the judge‘s charge to them‖ (Goodwin 1994: 215). 
Once deliberations terminate, the verdict is read. Within the macro-structure of a trial as 
a macro-narrative (see Section 3.6) the reading of the verdict represents the 
verbalization of the final collective judgment about the narratives the jurors have been 
confronted with. In this case the verdict was read on August 21 and Mr. Westerfield was 
found guilty of fist-degree murder, kidnapping and misdemeanor possession of child 
pornography. Figure 19 shows the first page of the verdict, which had been filled in and 
signed by the foreman: 
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Figure 19: Verdict, page 1 
 
 
The reading of the verdict also represents a phase that consists of a series of specific 
sub-phases. The verdict is firstly read by the court clerk: 
 
THE COURT: Good morning, ladies and gentlemen, and welcome back.  
Juror number 10, I understand the panel‘s made a decision. Is that 
correct?  
THE FOREMAN: That‘s correct.  
THE COURT: If you would kindly hand the verdict forms to my bailiff. 
All right. Each of the forms has been properly executed. Please recite the 
verdicts for the record.  
THE CLERK: The people of the state of California, plaintiff, versus 
David Alan Westerfield, defendant. Case number scd165805. Verdict. 
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we, the jury in the above-entitled cause, find the defendant David Alan 
Westerfield, guilty of the crime of murder, in violation of penal code 
section 187(a), as charged in count one of the information, and fix the 
degree thereof as murder in the first degree. Dated August 21st, 2002. 
Signed juror number 10, foreperson.  
 
This sub-phase is followed by the reading of the verdict in relation to the other crimes 
the defendant is charged with, and afterwards the jurors are collectively asked to 
confirm that those are their verdicts. In the Westerfield trial the panel was also polled 
individually for each verdict. Pronouncing the verdict is one of the activities where the 
power of the jurors emerges more clearly. First of all, it is the expression of their 
exclusive decisional power; secondly, in terms of communicative dynamics in this 
phase the jurors are entitled to express their opinion verbally. In particular, in the case 
examined, as the jury were also polled individually, every single juror had to confirm 
their verdict. Beside voir dire, this is the only phase where the voice of the jurors is 
heard in court, recorded, and transcribed. 
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5. Conclusions 
 
Law is an ongoing project in the development of 
mankind. One of the most impressive achievements 
in its long history is the strengthening of its 
discursive nature. (Galdia 2009: 331)  
 
 
 
The dynamics of courtroom interaction develop within a clear institutional framework, 
where setting, topic, and participants are, to some extent, pre-established; on the other 
hand, the specific contingencies of a single case have to be acknowledged in order to 
avoid making straightforward assumptions that ignore the complexity and the subtlety 
of some courtroom dynamics.  
This work has analyzed specific moments of interaction and some of the emerging 
linguistic and communicative features of a jury trial, and it has offered some explicative 
considerations that also take into account, for instance, whether the speakers‘ choices 
are in line with the behavior recommended in attorney‘s legal manuals. Legislation and 
doctrine have also been identified as legitimate analytical resources. 
Instead of positioning my work within the wide debate on the validity of generalizations 
in research (see e.g. Williams 2002), I have followed Richards‘ observation that ―the 
researcher must somehow establish a working compromise between a desire to draw 
general conclusions and the responsibility to do justice to the uniqueness of the 
particular‖ (Richards 2006: 2). Consequently, this investigation did not aspire to draw 
some generalizable considerations, to establish a definite characterization of courtroom 
language, or to provide a key to the unveiling of all the complex dynamics that are at 
play in the course of trial proceedings. However, it has identified some coordinates to 
explain some of the linguistic and communicative choices that emerge in different 
phases of a jury trial, with the hope that such observations will contribute to a better 
understanding of these dynamics and might prove useful in informing interventions 
aimed at improving some aspects of expert-lay interaction in jury trials.  
It can certainly be argued that the highly constrained and institutionalized nature of 
courtroom interaction may lead to clear interactional structures and predictable ways of 
210 
 
phrasing, but this work emphasizes the unique nature of every jury trial. Indeed, 
courtroom language, by virtue of its heterogeneity and versatility and because of the 
multiplicity of factors involved, cannot be treated as a monolithic entity. Consequently, 
the aim of the analysis was not to offer a generalizable and always applicable 
interpretation of social dynamics and communication processes in a jury trial, as that 
would be unachievable, especially in the light of the assumption that ―[m]eanings are 
situated in the specific contexts we are building here and now in our interactions with 
others‖ (Gee 1999: 134). 
This work also takes into account Mertz‘s view that a profound understanding of the 
dynamics and the power of legal language can best be achieved through a systematic 
analysis of language as structure-in-use, combined with a wider observation of the 
social dynamics with which it is inexorably intertwined, as ―legal language crystallizes 
the interplay of pragmatics, poetics, and social power‖ (Mertz 1994: 448). 
The attempt was to place the description and analysis of the significance of aspects such 
as the syntax and semantics of utterance forms within the broad framework of the social 
and institutional order of discourse. Indeed, on the one hand the observation of 
linguistic details is crucial because, as Conley and O‘Barr note, ―the details of legal 
discourse matter because language is the essential mechanism through which the power 
of the law is realized, exercised, reproduced, and occasionally challenged and 
subverted‖ (Conley / O‘Barr 1998: 129). On the other hand, the approach adopted in 
this work also tries to go beyond an atomistic description of different aspects of the 
language of the courtroom as if it developed in a vacuum; rather, this analysis 
constantly looks at how discursive social practices are shaped and reshaped in situ and 
emphasizes that courtroom discourses are not scissile from their wider contexts.  
From a methodological perspective, I hope to have shown the practical possibility of 
working within a qualitative approach without excluding the use of quantitative tools. 
Moreover, I have argued that different approaches to discourse analysis may be 
positively and coherently integrated, since, as has often been stated, discourse analysis 
is not necessarily to be understood as one theory and one methodology, but as a set of 
possible theories and methods that can be exploited in a complementary way. In short, 
while the fulfillment of the methodological requirements of proponents of different 
approaches to the analysis of legal discourse inevitably remains an open matter, the 
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combined use of such approaches has enormous potential for fruitful investigation, both 
on the micro and macro levels of analysis.  
 
 
5.1 Insights into courtroom dynamics 
 
 
The communication process in jury trials certainly assumes a special character. In very 
general terms, it is often described as a series of separate monologues (Aron et al 1996: 
16.1), and it is often argued that ―[t]he jurors are thus almost totally passive participants 
in a one-way communication process‖ (Aron et al 1996: 16.3). Indeed, in a jury trial, 
jurors may be perceived to be passive spectators of acts being performed in front of 
them. On the other hand, the complexity of the function performed by the jurors has to 
be emphasized; indeed, they are involved in a constant process of construction and de-
construction of meanings, and, within the multifaceted communicative situation of a 
trial, they play a crucial decisional role in choosing which meanings are to be accepted. 
From an interactional point of view, the jury apparently ―talk openly in court only at the 
close of the trial when the jury foreperson reads the final verdict‖ (Goodwin 1994: 217-
218). However, there are several moments in which jurors can assume a more active 
role. First of all, in the voir dire phase prior to the beginning of the actual trial, jurors 
reveal a lot of information about themselves and interact with both the judge and the 
attorneys. Moreover, most jurisdictions allow jurors to submit written notes to the judge 
to ask for clarifications and explanations, or to bring up issues they are concerned about. 
These are forms of active interaction, even though they are characterized by certain 
peculiarities: for example, they are initially carried out through the written mode and, 
after they have been approved, they are presented orally in court by another participant. 
Moreover, jurors can request, for example, to re-examine certain testimony during 
deliberations or to have access to specific material. Finally, after the reading of the 
verdict, the jury may also be polled individually.  
A jury trial offers a fascinating instance of a scenario involving people displaying 
significantly varying levels of (specialized) knowledge. By definition, in a jury trial the 
triers of facts are ordinary people, who should represent a varied section of society and 
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are unlikely to display the same degree of legal knowledge as the legal experts. The 
issues of impartiality and competence are obviously particularly crucial as the triers of 
fact are asked to base their decisions exclusively on the relevant evidence presented in 
the court proceedings, and not to be influenced by any other factors in their decision-
making process; jurors also have to follow all the jury instructions thoroughly and 
accurately. However, cognitive studies demonstrate the difficulty of applying such 
processes. For instance, information cannot be automatically disregarded on command, 
and the complexity of some jury instructions may lead to difficulty in their application. 
As Fiske and Taylor note, ―[e]ven the smallest interference or judgement begins with 
the process of deciding what information is relevant and sampling the information that 
is available. According to normative models, the social perceiver should take in all 
relevant information, but in fact efficiency pressure often precludes such thoroughness‖ 
(Fiske / Taylor 2008: 178).  
It may certainly be argued that ―in the courtroom, signs of institutional power abound‖ 
(Goodwin 1994: 217), from the physical layout of the court, to dress, gestures and 
verbal formulas (Goodwin 1994: 217). The institution of the law is inevitably 
―powerful, authoritative and hierarchical‖, which may lead one to assume that ―as 
invited participants, jurors should regard themselves, naturally and properly, at the 
bottom of this hierarchical structure‖ (Goodwin 1994: 217). However, the dynamics of 
a jury trial are highly complex, and the identification of the jurors as the least powerful 
participants should not lead us to overlook the crucial fact that the ultimate decisional 
power lies exclusively in their hands. 
In other words, from an interactional and communicative perspective, the asymmetrical 
allocation of opportunities to talk and the length and type of these opportunities are 
highly constrained (Matoesian 1993: 99). However, this apparently disadvantageous 
position is combined with a privileged position in terms of decisional force. 
 
 
5.2 The hybridity of expert-lay talk  
 
The nature of courtroom proceedings is highly institutionalized, standardized and 
constrained, but, at the same time, it also displays traits of unpredictability. On the one 
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hand, the courtroom language used by members of the legal profession displays some 
convergent traits, due to the fact that they share analogous professional backgrounds. 
For instance, attention to verbal correctness is a characteristic element of legal experts‘ 
talk, and it may simply be interpreted as an aspect of their forma mentis. Moreover, 
legal experts are also particularly aware that the words they pronounce during the trial 
are not only heard in court, but become part of an official transcript, and may potentially 
appear in the report of an appellate opinion. Consequently, it comes as no surprise that 
their speech is characterized by stylistic correctness and precision. 
At the same time, however, courtroom language has proven to be extremely 
heterogeneous, as speakers draw on different lexical, syntactical and textual features, as 
well as different registers and styles. This investigation has shown that linguistic and 
communicative choices cannot be understood in isolation from the institutional context 
and its constraints, from the legal system in which the trial texts place or from the social 
contexts that shape and are shaped by discursive dynamics. In other words, 
communicative and linguistic preferences emerge as a result of a complex nexus of 
different factors, such as procedural constraints, rhetorical strategies and individual 
choices.  
The danger of running into the erroneous assumption that a particular type of behavior 
is extendible to an entire professional category is generally acute. It is natural to equate 
the language of legal experts to ‗legalese‘, and to assume that professionals make a 
pervasive use of specialized terminology and convoluted syntactical patterns. However, 
the general features that are often associated with legal language predominantly derive 
from ‗the language of the law‘. The language employed by the judge and the attorneys 
in their interaction with the jurors is unique within the sphere of legal language and 
involves the use of informal style, figurative language, ordinary and colloquial lexical 
choices. The hybridity of courtroom discourse emerges evidently in the case observed in 
this work, the analysis of which has shown a hiatus between the features that are 
generally attributed to legal language and the characteristics emerging in the interaction 
between experts and laymen in court. From this perspective, Tiersma confirms that 
―many lawyers continue to sprinkle their written work with archaic expressions‖, but he 
also points out that the situation of spoken legal language is certainly different (Tiersma 
2005: 5). Moreover, if it may be argued that even the language of the law may 
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occasionally assume dynamic and innovative contours, this is much more evident in the 
language of the courtroom.  
Legal discourse has traditionally tended to be impervious to attempts at reform, but the 
language of the courtroom shows a distinctive level of versatility and heterogeneity, to 
the extent that it should not be considered a form of legal language stricto sensu. This 
analysis has shown that, while on the one hand some communicative moments are 
organized around preformulated textual patterns, on the other, courtroom interaction is 
also characterized by significant versatility of linguistic devices and communicative 
strategies.  
 
 
5.2.1 The tension between formality and informality in instructing the jurors  
 
Given the multiple potential dimensions of analysis that may be applied to courtroom 
communication, the focus has been restricted to the analysis of the interaction between 
legal experts and laymen
117. The judge‘s interaction with the jurors has been 
investigated, in particular, by observing the jury instruction phase. Jury instructions are 
complex texts: indeed, on the one hand, their target audience is represented by superior 
courts and, therefore, the texts have to maintain a faultless level of legal accuracy. On 
the other hand, their immediate users are the jurors, who are definable as outsiders in 
relation to the legal world.  
The issues related to the presentation of specific instructions and the description of legal 
concepts and procedures to laymen are not limited to the maintenance of accuracy and 
precision, but also include finding an adaptation of such concepts that may be 
understood by people who, by definition, generally lack any specific legal knowledge in 
that they are a representative cross-section of society. Crafting specific instructions to 
jurors‘ exigencies may be particularly problematic and Judge Mudd, in his interaction 
with the jurors, constantly alternates the reading of the instructions with comments that 
elaborate, paraphrase, simplify and summarize such instructions. Indeed, the jury 
instruction phase is characterized by an alternation between the reading of the actual 
instructions, which are originally in a written form, and the other pieces of information 
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 The impossibility of defining such categories as self-explanatory has also been addressed (see Chapter 
3). 
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provided by the judge in his speech. This alternation is reflected in the judge‘s talk, 
which displays several examples of register mixing and shows a constant fluctuation 
between formality and informality.  
In his comments, the judge tends to use a familiar and colloquial tone, which is 
permeated by instances of witty humor. It can certainly be argued that these aspects may 
simply be a peculiarity of his personal style, but they are also functional insofar as they 
maintain the juror‘s attention and facilitate the understanding of the instructions. 
Moreover, a familiar approach can also be used to maintain a more relaxed atmosphere 
and to limit the risk that the courtroom be perceived as ―a strange and alien setting‖ 
(Gibbons 1994: 32). 
 
 
5.2.2 The multifaceted nature of attorneys’ talk 
 
Lawyers‘ speech is generally portrayed as hypercorrect (see inter alia Walker 1986), 
lacking ungrammatical features or dialect markers, avoiding false starts and hesitations, 
and with a tendency to include features that are related to the idea of ‗powerful speech‘ 
(in O‘Barr‘s terms). This analysis also shows that hypercorrectness sometimes gives 
way to informal utterances and colloquialisms, in a delicate process of constant balance 
between apparently divergent approaches. In other words, as Aron et al note, it may be 
argued that ―[t]rial advocacy is both a science and an art; the trial lawyer must have a 
systematic, ‗scientific‘ knowledge of the principles and methods and must apply these 
with artistry and creativity in the courtroom‖ (Aron et al 1996: 1.26).  
The two principal moments of attorney-juror interaction investigated in this study are 
the opening and closing statements. The attorneys‘ opening statements serve the main 
functions that are generally assigned to this phase (see Tanford 2002: 147). First of all, 
attorneys strive to offer a clear picture of the case; secondly, they attempt to grab the 
jurors‘ attention and stimulate their interest in listening carefully to the evidence that 
will be introduced. Another crucial purpose of opening remarks is to establish a 
relationship with the jurors (building on the process that was initiated in the voir dire 
phase). During opening statements, a specific theory of the case is presented through 
narrative processes, and attorneys have to present a story that is not only epistemically 
plausible, but its acceptance must also result cogent.  
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This phase helps to create schemata according to which the jurors will process the rest 
of the story; for example, characters and events are introduced in a clear and coherent 
framework, as their presentation is functional to the creation of specific role schemata 
and event schemata (SunWolf 2007). In particular, a clear depiction of the characters 
contributes to bringing the story to life. A character can be seen as a ‗construct‘, i.e. a 
‗network of character-traits‘ (Rimmon-Kenan 1983: 59), and in their narratives the 
attorneys incorporate a variety of ‗character-indicators‘ (Rimmon-Kenan 1983: 59), 
which are functional in that they offer a characterization of the participants that can 
corroborate a specific theory of the case.  
Opening statements present a chronological order of events, which is often defined as 
―the safest, easiest, and most natural way to tell a story‖ (Tanford 2002: 167), as it 
assumes clear and understandable contours. Time references are also plainly pointed 
out: by explaining the clear sequence of events the story is easy to follow and appears 
more plausible, in that the emphasis on the precise time the events occurred can be 
functional to corroborating one‘s version of the story. This analysis also shows that 
facts are not simply listed or recited, but they are narrated by combining a vast network 
of micro-narratives within a wider framework.  
This study emphasizes the importance of narrativization strategies used by legal 
professionals. In particular, the persuasiveness of the attorneys‘ narratives is also related 
to their ability to blend canonical legalese with extralegal narratives (see Maynard 
1990). Attorneys have to work within the constraints of legal conventions, but, at the 
same time, they have to move away from abstract terminology and fossilized 
conceptualizations of the law. Their narrative has to be placed within a framework that 
is perceived as going beyond purely legal principles and in line with more ‗down-to-
earth‘ concepts; indeed, realism and concreteness play a crucial role in the attorneys‘ 
speech (for a discussion of legal realism see Sarat / Felsiner 1990). This apparent 
process of distancing themselves from the most abstract features of the legal order 
allows the attorneys to places themselves closer to the lines along which the reasoning 
of lay people presumably takes place.  
As Goodwin points out, abandoning ―signs of distance‖, such as ―legalese, complex 
sentence, formal appellations‖, somehow corresponds to abandoning signs of power 
(Goodwin 1994: 219) and also enhancing perceived similarity with the jurors. Even 
though stemming from a different perspective, the strategies that are often adopted by 
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attorneys in their interaction with the jurors may also be interpreted in the light of 
Bourdieu‘s (1991) concept of ‗condescension‘, in that it could be argued that, ―by virtue 
of his position‖, an attorney ―is able to negate symbolically the hierarchy without 
disrupting it‖ (Thompson 1991: 19). The avoidance of  pure legalese on the part of the 
attorneys may be considered as a process that is related to the ‗strategies of 
condescension‘, intended as ―symbolic transgressions of limits which provide, at one 
and the same time, the benefits that result from conformity to a social definition and the 
benefits that result from transgression‖ (Bourdieu 1991: 124). 
In a different but related vein, Goodwin states that the use of everyday language allows 
to obtain two profits: ―The first profit: by merely knowing the acceptable, superior legal 
language, the lawyer is superior in verbal, and therefore institutional, power over the 
jury. The second profit: by speaking the conversational, inferior language, the lawyer 
defers her power to accommodate the jury‖ (Goodwin 1994: 219). Even though the use 
of labeling such as ‗inferior‘ and ‗superior‘ calls for a deeper problematization, as does 
the correlation between verbal and institutional power, it is evident that a conversational 
style may be used strategically to show that the speaker has the jurors‘ interests at heart 
and to gain trust in the jurors‘ eyes.  
It is often stated that ―[p]ersuasion is, in sum, the purpose of trial communication‖ 
(Aron et al 1996: 1.26) and, therefore, concentrating on the jurors is even more 
important than concentrating on the case. The intricate relation of ‗power and solidarity‘ 
which characterizes different settings (see Tannen 1987c) emerges evidently between 
legal experts and laymen in courtroom communication. The relationship between the 
attorneys and the jurors is particularly complex and there is a constant tension between 
the need to exercise control over the jurors and, at the same time, to express solidarity 
towards them. Moreover, it may also be argued that even instances of solidarity can be 
seen as an indirect form of power, in that the prerogative of being solidal lies 
predominantly in the hands of the experts (Tannen 1987c: 9). The complexity and the 
subtlety of the strategies used by the attorneys to establish a rapport with the jurors 
emerge throughout the trial. For instance, the importance of the role of the jurors is 
often stressed for deliberative epideictic purposes and their action is treated as 
praiseworthy, in that it is fundamental for the process of justice. Laudatory remarks 
have a variety of functions, one of which clearly being that of ingratiating the jurors.    
218 
 
It has been shown that courtroom languages encompass a wide range of styles and 
registers that are significantly different, and even apparently incompatible. For instance, 
attorneys constantly merge specialized terminology with ordinary and simplified 
definitions. The use or abuse of jargon throughout the trial plays a crucial role. Indeed, 
there is sometimes a sort of hope ―that the difficult word has enough of an aura of 
brilliance to dazzle the jury‖ (Aron et al 1996: 10.11), but it is also remarked that 
―jargon can be a useful weapon or a hindrance in court depending on how it is used‖ 
(Aron et al 1996: 10.12). Specific technical terms may be used by lawyers in order to 
provide their speeches with an aura of erudition or to embellish their style, but they 
must be used sparingly in order to avoid creating a counterproductive distance between 
them and the jurors. 
In certain phases of the trial, and in particular in closing arguments, attorneys adopt an 
explanatory stance. This approach aims to provide the jurors with the tools to apply the 
law correctly, but primarily assumes the overarching function of creating a sense of 
collaboration with the jurors, fostering consensus and solidarity, and strengthening 
bonds with the jurors.  
Moreover, by mentioning, describing and explaining the law, the lawyers enhance their 
credentials as experts, and showing their knowledge of the law contributes to boosting 
their credibility in the eyes of the jurors. Flaunting a high level of topic-related 
knowledge is often considered fundamental in trial advocacy because, as Lubet notes, 
―[a]n apparent command of relevant information correlates strongly with believability‖ 
(Lubet 2004: 40). Given that credibility is one of the most important aspects in the 
acceptance of a story on the part of the fact finders, it is clear that advocates consider it 
very important to confirm their expert knowledge in front of the jurors.  In other words, 
the explanation of legal concepts, principles and procedures is obviously not primarily 
aimed at extending the jurors‘ understanding of theories and practices that the attorneys 
deem worth explaining; rather, it contributes to building or maintaining the experts‘ 
credibility and reputation and it allows them to craft those principles according to the 
version of the story they want jurors to accept.  
Speakers gain their listeners‘ acceptance by indirectly emphasizing their epistemic 
authority and by presenting themselves as facilitators of understanding. In order to do 
so, they make vast use of easily comprehensible and memorable terms, and often 
explicate complex legal concepts through figurative language and epigrammatic 
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phrasing. This analysis has shown that attorneys skilfully use epitomizing images to 
describe complex legal topics and employ striking figures of speech that are recurrent 
during the trial. Figurative language serves a vast array of concurrent goals; for 
example, it may perform a clarifying function and is also extensively used for 
persuasive purposes in order to enhance the acceptance of a specific theory of the case.  
Certain legal concepts are particularly complex and have to undergo processes of 
condensation, limitation and simplification. For instance, the concept of ‗reasonable 
doubt‘ often seems to assume the contours of a monoreferential expression and its 
explanation has to comply with specific legal standards; however, given the 
indeterminate nature of the term ‗reasonable‘, it may be difficult to position it into a 
neat scheme of discrete categories which allow one to clearly establish which meaning 
is acceptable. The word ‗reasonable‘ as used in the expression ‗reasonable doubt‘ has a 
precise legal meaning, and its definition is of great importance for the outcome of the 
trial: the concept is central to the adversarial process and the presumption of innocence 
has to be guaranteed until the defendant is proven guilty beyond reasonable doubt. 
Consequently, different aspects of its definition are highlighted, in turn, by the defense 
and the prosecuting attorney and, despite the inherent indeterminacy of this concept, 
attorneys strive to present an interpretation that, according to the law, should be 
perceived as unequivocal. In other words, a tension exists between the need to maintain 
legal accuracy and precision and the need to bring forward a specific interpretation 
which perfectly fits within a broader theory of the case.  
Even though attorneys do enjoy a certain freedom in court (O‘Barr 1982), what they say 
is constantly monitored and scrutinized, especially by the opposing party, and a 
sustained objection by their opponent may have serious consequences on a lawyer‘s 
credibility. Consequently, the attorneys desire to discuss the law with great precision, as 
their words may be subject to objections, and therefore they state claims with the 
appropriate caution. Moreover, the presentation of their statements in an apparently 
complete, accurate and precise manner contributes to the maintenance of their epistemic 
authority and the establishment of their credibility. Such an approach also has to be 
combined with a style that is easily understood and grabs the listeners‘ attention; 
adopting a style that meets the jurors‘ desires and needs has a clear persuasive function, 
as the establishment of credibility is a complex process that is achieved through the 
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affirmation of different factors, such as goodwill, perceived similarity and 
trustworthiness. 
This analysis shows that both law and science undergo a constant process of 
accommodation in the courtroom. Technical jargon is often replaced by informal or 
even colloquial terms; specific concepts are defined, simplified and paraphrased, 
specialized terminology is juxtaposed to figurative language and often described 
through simple exemplifications or memorable metaphors. Accommodation, however, 
has to preserve the essence of legal concepts, as law cannot be misstated. What emerges 
is a transition between the technical terms that the law requires and a simple, and at 
times even simplistic, way of phrasing, describing and explaining them. 
 
 
5.3 Concluding remarks 
 
This work has attempted to bridge a linguistic description with the observation of a 
wider dimension of social interaction in the courtroom. This approach has also been 
combined with a legal focus, in particular with insights into advocacy theory and 
practice, as the analysis has attempted to take into account new developments in 
‗modern trial advocacy‘ (Mauet 2009) throughout. The study was not conceived as an 
omni-comprehensive analysis, but it is to be considered as one part of a vaster ongoing 
process (especially in light of potential continuous changes in legislation and doctrine).  
The future of discourse analytical studies related to courtroom communication is not 
easily predictable, as the future never is, but one can expect a growing need for 
transdisciplinary integration. Indeed, on a practical note, different disciplines have 
entered the milieu of law: entomologists, chemists, biologists, IT analysts, coroners, 
psychiatrists, psychologists and a potentially infinite series of other professionals may 
be involved in the trial process; science and technology have increasingly penetrated 
proceedings and have often proved crucial for their development and outcomes. From a 
wider perspective, this work also argues for an interdisciplinary approach to language 
study with a critical perspective (see Wodak/ Chilton 2005), where ―in bringing 
disciplines and theories together to address research issues, [transdisciplinary research] 
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sees dialogue between them as a source for the theoretical and methodological 
development of each of them‖ (Wodak / Meyer 2007: 163). 
As has been shown, some considerations drawing on Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) 
have also shaped the nature of this work. CDA has often aimed to show and expose 
issues of inequality and injustice in society by discussing complex issues such as the 
relation between language and power. The aim of this study was not primarily to 
investigate such disparities, but to show which dynamics take place and observe the role 
played by different asymmetries in courtroom communication, starting from the 
assumption that all human relations are necessarily asymmetrical to some extent. 
However, a more ‗critical‘ impetus, intended as aiming at achieving ―enlightenment and 
emancipation‖ (Wodak / Meyer 2007: 7), constitutes a productive avenue for further 
research in this field, especially in the light of possible miscarriages of justice and the 
high number of cases involving people who feel they have been wrongly convicted of 
criminal offences or unfairly sentenced. 
Legal language is often seen as the language of the legal community, endogenously 
created, developed and exploited by its members. However, legal language permeates 
everybody‘s life. As Merry (1990: 9) notes, ―[l]egal words and practices are cultural 
constructs which carry powerful meanings not just to those trained in the law or to those 
who routinely use it to manage their business transactions but to the ordinary people as 
well.‖ The court provides a useful locus for the analysis of expert-lay interaction in 
legal settings, and the pervasive presence and significance of the law and its intrinsic 
linguistic nature call for a deeper investigation in the area of language and law. Gaining 
a deeper understanding of courtroom dynamics is not only a fascinating and interesting 
process, but is also imperative in that the courtroom is by definition the locus of justice, 
and it is therefore one of the most basic aspects of democracy. 
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Appendix 1  
 
UCREL CLAWS7 Tagset for POS tagging (see Rayson 2003) 
 
APPGE  possessive pronoun, pre-nominal (e.g. my, your, our) 
AT  article (e.g. the, no) 
AT1  singular article (e.g. a, an, every) 
BCL  before-clause marker (e.g. in order (that), in order (to)) 
CC  coordinating conjunction (e.g. and, or) 
CCB  adversative coordinating conjunction (but) 
CS  subordinating conjunction (e.g. if, because, unless, so, for) 
CSA  as (as conjunction) 
CSN  than (as conjunction) 
CST  that (as conjunction) 
CSW  whether (as conjunction) 
DA  after-determiner or post-determiner capable of pronominal function (e.g. such, former, same) 
DA1  singular after-determiner (e.g. little, much) 
DA2  plural after-determiner (e.g. few, several, many) 
DAR  comparative after-determiner (e.g. more, less, fewer) 
DAT  superlative after-determiner (e.g. most, least, fewest) 
DB  before determiner or pre-determiner capable of pronominal function (all, half) 
DB2  plural before-determiner (both) 
DD  determiner (capable of pronominal function) (e.g. any, some) 
DD1  singular determiner (e.g. this, that, another) 
DD2  plural determiner (these, those) 
DDQ  wh-determiner (which, what) 
DDQGE  wh-determiner, genitive (whose) 
DDQV  wh-ever determiner, (whichever, whatever) 
EX  existential there 
FO  formula 
FU  unclassified word 
FW  foreign word 
GE  germanic genitive marker  
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IF  for (as preposition) 
II  general preposition 
IO  of (as preposition) 
IW  with, without (as prepositions) 
JJ  general adjective 
JJR  general comparative adjective (e.g. older, better, stronger) 
JJT  general superlative adjective (e.g. oldest, best, strongest) 
JK  catenative adjective (able in be able to, willing in be willing to) 
MC  cardinal number, neutral for number (two, three..) 
MC1  singular cardinal number (one) 
MC2  plural cardinal number (e.g. sixes, sevens) 
MCGE  genitive cardinal number, neutral for number (two‘s, 100‘s) 
MCMC  hyphenated number (40-50, 1770-1827) 
MD  ordinal number (e.g. first, second, next, last) 
MF  fraction, neutral for number (e.g. quarters, two-thirds) 
ND1  singular noun of direction (e.g. north, southeast) 
NN  common noun, neutral for number (e.g. sheep, cod, headquarters) 
NN1  singular common noun (e.g. book, girl) 
NN2  plural common noun (e.g. books, girls) 
NNA  following noun of title (e.g. M.A.) 
NNB  preceding noun of title (e.g. Mr., Prof.) 
NNL1  singular locative noun (e.g. Island, Street) 
NNL2  plural locative noun (e.g. Islands, Streets) 
NNO  numeral noun, neutral for number (e.g. dozen, hundred) 
NNO2  numeral noun, plural (e.g. hundreds, thousands) 
NNT1  temporal noun, singular (e.g. day, week, year) 
NNT2  temporal noun, plural (e.g. days, weeks, years) 
NNU  unit of measurement, neutral for number (e.g. in, cc) 
NNU1  singular unit of measurement (e.g. inch, centimetre) 
NNU2  plural unit of measurement (e.g. ins., feet) 
NP  proper noun, neutral for number (e.g. IBM, Andes) 
NP1  singular proper noun (e.g. London, Jane, Frederick) 
NP2  plural proper noun (e.g. Browns, Reagans, Koreas) 
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NPD1  singular weekday noun (e.g. Sunday) 
NPD2  plural weekday noun (e.g. Sundays) 
NPM1  singular month noun (e.g. October) 
NPM2  plural month noun (e.g. Octobers) 
PN  indefinite pronoun, neutral for number (none) 
PN1  indefinite pronoun, singular (e.g. anyone, everything, nobody, one) 
PNQO  objective wh-pronoun (whom) 
PNQS  subjective wh-pronoun (who) 
PNQV  wh-ever pronoun (whoever) 
PNX1  reflexive indefinite pronoun (oneself) 
PPGE  nominal possessive personal pronoun (e.g. mine, yours) 
PPH1  3rd person sing. neuter personal pronoun (it) 
PPHO1  3rd person sing. objective personal pronoun (him, her) 
PPHO2  3rd person plural objective personal pronoun (them) 
PPHS1  3rd person sing. subjective personal pronoun (he, she) 
PPHS2  3rd person plural subjective personal pronoun (they) 
PPIO1  1st person sing. objective personal pronoun (me) 
PPIO2  1st person plural objective personal pronoun (us) 
PPIS1  1st person sing. subjective personal pronoun (I) 
PPIS2  1st person plural subjective personal pronoun (we) 
PPX1  singular reflexive personal pronoun (e.g. yourself, itself) 
PPX2  plural reflexive personal pronoun (e.g. yourselves, themselves) 
PPY  2nd person personal pronoun (you) 
RA  adverb, after nominal head (e.g. else, galore) 
REX  adverb introducing appositional constructions (namely, e.g.) 
RG  degree adverb (very, so, too) 
RGQ  wh- degree adverb (how) 
RGQV  wh-ever degree adverb (however) 
RGR  comparative degree adverb (more, less) 
RGT  superlative degree adverb (most, least) 
RL  locative adverb (e.g. alongside, forward) 
RP  prep. adverb, particle (e.g. about, in) 
RPK  prep. adv., catenative (about in be about to) 
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RR  general adverb 
RRQ  wh- general adverb (where, when, why, how) 
RRQV  wh-ever general adverb (wherever, whenever) 
RRR  comparative general adverb (e.g. better, longer) 
RRT  superlative general adverb (e.g. best, longest) 
RT  quasi-nominal adverb of time (e.g. now, tomorrow) 
TO  infinitive marker (to) 
UH  interjection (e.g. oh, yes, um) 
VB0  be, base form (finite i.e. imperative, subjunctive) 
VBDR  were 
VBDZ  was 
VBG  being 
VBI  be, infinitive (To be or not... It will be ..) 
VBM  am 
VBN  been 
VBR  are 
VBZ  is 
VD0  do, base form (finite) 
VDD  did 
VDG  doing 
VDI  do, infinitive (I may do... To do...) 
VDN  done 
VDZ  does 
VH0  have, base form (finite) 
VHD  had (past tense) 
VHG  having 
VHI  have, infinitive 
VHN  had (past participle) 
VHZ  has 
VM  modal auxiliary (can, will, would, etc.) 
VMK  modal catenative (ought, used) 
VV0  base form of lexical verb (e.g. give, work) 
VVD  past tense of lexical verb (e.g. gave, worked) 
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VVG  -ing participle of lexical verb (e.g. giving, working) 
VVGK  -ing participle catenative (going in be going to) 
VVI  infinitive (e.g. to give... It will work...) 
VVN  past participle of lexical verb (e.g. given, worked) 
VVNK  past participle catenative (e.g. bound in be bound to) 
VVZ  -s form of lexical verb (e.g. gives, works) 
XX  not, n‘t 
ZZ1  singular letter of the alphabet (e.g. A,b) 
ZZ2  plural letter of the alphabet (e.g. A's, b's) 
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Appendix 2  
 
UCREL Semantic Tagset for Semantic tagging (see Rayson 2003) 
 
A1 General and Abstract Terms 
A1.1.1 General actions / making 
A1.1.1- Inaction 
A1.1.2 Damaging and destroying 
A1.1.2- Fixing and mending 
A1.2 Suitability 
A1.2+ Suitable 
A1.2- Unsuitable 
A1.3 Caution 
A1.3+ Cautious 
A1.3- No caution 
A1.4 Chance, luck 
A1.4+ Lucky 
A1.4- Unlucky 
A1.5 Use 
A1.5.1 Using 
A1.5.1+ Used 
A1.5.1- Unused 
A1.5.2 Usefulness 
A1.5.2+ Useful 
A1.5.2- Useless 
A1.6 Concrete/Abstract  
A1.7+ Constraint 
A1.7- No constraint 
A1.8+ Inclusion 
A1.8- Exclusion 
A1.9 Avoiding 
A1.9- Unavoidable 
A2 Affect 
A2.1 Modify, change 
A2.1+ Change 
A2.1- No change 
A2.2 Cause/Effect/Connection 
A2.2+ Cause/Effect/Connected 
A2.2- Unconnected 
A3 Being 
A3+ Existing 
A3- Non-existing 
A4 Classification 
A4.1 Generally kinds, groups, examples 
A4.1- Unclassified 
A4.2 Particular/general; detail 
A4.2+ Detailed 
A4.2- General  
A5 Evaluation 
A5.1 Evaluation: Good/bad 
A5.1+ Evaluation: Good  
A5.1- Evaluation: Bad 
A5.2 Evaluation: True/false 
A5.2+ Evaluation: True  
A5.2- Evaluation: False 
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A5.3 Evaluation: Accuracy 
A5.3+ Evaluation: Accurate 
A5.3- Evaluation: Inaccurate 
A5.4 Evaluation: Authenticity 
A5.4+ Evaluation: Authentic 
A5.4- Evaluation: Unauthentic 
A6 Comparing 
A6.1 Comparing: Similar/different 
A6.1+ Comparing: Similar  
A6.1- Comparing: Different 
A6.2 Comparing: Usual/unusual  
A6.2+ Comparing: Usual  
A6.2- Comparing: Unusual  
A6.3 Comparing: Variety 
A6.3+ Comparing: Varied 
A6.3- Comparing: Unvaried  
A7 Probability 
A7+ Likely 
A7- Unlikely 
A8 Seem 
A9 Getting and giving; possession 
A9+ Getting and possession 
A9- Giving  
A10 Open/closed; Hiding/Hidden; Finding; Showing 
A10+ Open; Finding; Showing 
A10- Closed; Hiding/Hidden  
A11 Importance 
A11.1 Importance  
A11.1+ Important 
A11.1- Unimportant 
A11.2 Noticeability 
A11.2+ Noticeable 
A11.2- Unnoticeable 
A12 Easy/difficult 
A12+ Easy  
A12- Difficult 
A13 Degree 
A13.1 Degree: Non-specific 
A13.2 Degree: Maximizers 
A13.3 Degree: Boosters 
A13.4 Degree: Approximators 
A13.5 Degree: Compromisers 
A13.6 Degree: Diminishers 
A13.7 Degree: Minimizers 
A14 Exclusivizers/particularizers 
A15 Safety/Danger 
A15+ Safe  
A15- Danger 
B1 Anatomy and physiology 
B2 Health and disease 
B2+ Healthy 
B2- Disease  
B3 Medicines and medical treatment 
B3- Without medical treatment 
B4 Cleaning and personal care 
B4+ Clean  
B4- Dirty  
B5 Clothes and personal belongings 
B5- Without clothes  
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C1 Arts and crafts 
E1 Emotional Actions, States And Processes General 
E1+ Emotional 
E1- Unemotional  
E2 Liking 
E2+ Like 
E2- Dislike 
E3 Calm/Violent/Angry 
E3+ Calm  
E3- Violent/Angry 
E4 Happiness and Contentment  
E4.1 Happy/sad  
E4.1+ Happy  
E4.1- Sad  
E4.2 Contentment 
E4.2+ Content 
E4.2- Discontent 
E5 Bravery and Fear  
E5+ Bravery  
E5- Fear/shock 
E6 Worry and confidence 
E6+ Confident 
E6- Worry  
F1 Food 
F1+ Abundance of food 
F1- Lack of food 
F2 Drinks and alcohol 
F2+ Excessive drinking 
F2- Not drinking 
F3 Smoking and non-medical drugs 
F3+ Smoking and drugs abuse 
F3- Non-smoking / no use of drugs 
F4 Farming & Horticulture 
F4- Uncultivated 
G1 Government and Politics  
G1.1 Government 
G1.1- Non-governmental 
G1.2 Politics 
G1.2- Non-political 
G2 Crime, law and order 
G2.1 Law and order 
G2.1+ Lawful 
G2.1- Crime  
G2.2 General ethics 
G2.2+ Ethical 
G2.2- Unethical 
G3 Warfare, defence and the army; weapons 
G3- Anti-war  
H1 Architecture, houses and buildings 
H2 Parts of buildings 
H3 Areas around or near houses 
H4 Residence 
H4- Non-resident 
H5 Furniture and household fittings 
H5- Unfurnished 
I1 Money generally 
I1.1 Money and pay 
I1.1+ Money: Affluence 
I1.1- Money: Lack 
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I1.2 Money: Debts 
I1.2+ Spending and money loss  
I1.2- Debt-free 
I1.3 Money: Cost and price 
I1.3+ Expensive 
I1.3- Cheap 
I2 Business 
I2.1 Business: Generally 
I2.1- Non-commercial 
I2.2 Business: Selling 
I3 Work and employment 
I3.1 Work and employment: Generally 
I3.1- Unemployed 
I3.2 Work and employment: Professionalism 
I3.2+ Professional 
I3.2- Unprofessional 
I4 Industry  
I4- No industry  
K1 Entertainment generally 
K2 Music and related activities 
K3 Recorded sound 
K4 Drama, the theatre and show business 
K5 Sports and games generally 
K5.1 Sports 
K5.2 Games 
K6 Children‘s games and toys 
L1 Life and living things 
L1+ Alive 
L1- Dead 
L2 Living creatures: animals, birds, etc.  
L2- No living creatures  
L3 Plants 
L3- No plants 
M1 Moving, coming and going 
M2 Putting, pulling, pushing, transporting 
M3 Vehicles and transport on land 
M4 Sailing, swimming, etc. 
M4- Non-swimming 
M5 Flying and aircraft  
M6 Location and direction 
M7 Places 
M8 Stationary 
N1 Numbers  
N2 Mathematics 
N3 Measurement 
N3.1 Measurement: General 
N3.2 Measurement: Size  
N3.2+ Size: Big  
N3.2- Size: Small  
N3.3 Measurement: Distance 
N3.3+ Distance: Far 
N3.3- Distance: Near 
N3.4 Measurement: Volume 
N3.4+ Volume: Inflated 
N3.4- Volume: Compressed 
N3.5 Measurement: Weight 
N3.5+ Weight: Heavy 
N3.5- Weight: Light 
N3.6 Measurement: Area 
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N3.6+ Spacious 
N3.7 Measurement: Length & height 
N3.7+ Long, tall and wide 
N3.7- Short and narrow 
N3.8 Measurement: Speed 
N3.8+ Speed: Fast 
N3.8- Speed: Slow 
N4 Linear order 
N4- Nonlinear  
N5 Quantities 
N5+ Quantities: many/much 
N5- Quantities: little 
N5.1 Entirety; maximum 
N5.1+ Entire; maximum 
N5.1- Part 
N5.2 Exceeding  
N5.2+ Exceed; waste 
N6 Frequency 
N6+ Frequent 
N6- Infrequent 
O1 Substances and materials generally 
O1.1 Substances and materials: Solid 
O1.2 Substances and materials: Liquid 
O1.2- Dry 
O1.3 Substances and materials: Gas 
O1.3- Gasless 
O2 Objects generally 
O3 Electricity and electrical equipment 
O4 Physical attributes 
O4.1 General appearance and physical properties 
O4.2 Judgement of appearance 
O4.2+ Judgement of appearance: Beautiful 
O4.2- Judgement of appearance: Ugly 
O4.3 Colour and colour patterns 
O4.4 Shape 
O4.5 Texture 
O4.6 Temperature   
O4.6+ Temperature: Hot / on fire      
O4.6- Temperature: Cold      
P1 Education in general 
P1- Not educated 
Q1 Linguistic Actions, States And Processes; Communication 
Q1.1 Linguistic Actions, States And Processes; Communication 
Q1.2 Paper documents and writing 
Q1.2- Unwritten 
Q1.3 Telecommunications 
Q2 Speech  
Q2.1 Speech: Communicative 
Q2.1+ Speech: Talkative 
Q2.1- Speech: Not communicating 
Q2.2 Speech acts 
Q2.2- Speech acts: Not speaking 
Q3 Language, speech and grammar 
Q3- Non-verbal 
Q4 The Media 
Q4.1 The Media: Books 
Q4.2 The Media: Newspapers etc. 
Q4.3 The Media: TV, Radio and Cinema 
S1 Social Actions, States and Processes 
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S1.1 Social Actions, States and Processes 
S1.1.1 Social Actions, States and Processes 
S1.1.2 Reciprocity 
S1.1.2+ Reciprocal 
S1.1.2- Unilateral 
S1.1.3 Participation 
S1.1.3+ Participating 
S1.1.3- Non-participating 
S1.1.4 Deserve 
S1.1.4+ Deserving 
S1.1.4- Undeserving 
S1.2 Personality traits 
S1.2.1 Approachability and Friendliness 
S1.2.1+ Informal/Friendly 
S1.2.1- Formal/Unfriendly 
S1.2.2 Avarice 
S1.2.2+ Greedy 
S1.2.2- Generous 
S1.2.3 Egoism 
S1.2.3+ Selfish 
S1.2.3- Unselfish 
S1.2.4 Politeness 
S1.2.4+ Polite 
S1.2.4- Impolite 
S1.2.5 Toughness; strong/weak 
S1.2.5+ Tough/strong  
S1.2.5- Weak 
S1.2.6 Common sense 
S1.2.6+ Sensible 
S1.2.6- Foolish 
S2 People 
S2- No people 
S2.1 People: Female 
S2.1- Not feminine 
S2.2 People: Male   
S3 Relationship 
S3.1 Personal relationship: General 
S3.1- No personal relationship  
S3.2 Relationship: Intimacy and sex 
S3.2+ Relationship: Sexual 
S3.2- Relationship: Asexual 
S4 Kin 
S4- No kin 
S5 Groups and affiliation 
S5+ Belonging to a group  
S5- Not part of a group 
S6 Obligation and necessity 
S6+ Strong obligation or necessity 
S6- No obligation or necessity 
S7 Power relationship 
S7.1 Power, organizing 
S7.1+ In power  
S7.1- No power  
S7.2 Respect 
S7.2+ Respected 
S7.2- No respect 
S7.3 Competition 
S7.3+ Competitive 
S7.3- No competition 
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S7.4 Permission 
S7.4+ Allowed 
S7.4- Not allowed 
S8 Helping/hindering 
S8+ Helping  
S8- Hindering 
S9 Religion and the supernatural 
S9- Non-religious 
T1 Time 
T1.1 Time: General 
T1.1.1 Time: Past 
T1.1.2 Time: Present; simultaneous 
T1.1.2- Time: Asynchronous 
T1.1.3 Time: Future 
T1.2 Time: Momentary 
T1.3 Time: Period 
T1.3+ Time period: long 
T1.3- Time period: short 
T2 Time: Beginning and ending 
T2+ Time: Beginning  
T2- Time: Ending 
T3 Time: Old, new and young; age 
T3+ Time: Old; grown-up 
T3- Time: New and young  
T4 Time: Early/late 
T4+ Time: Early  
T4- Time: Late 
W1 The universe 
W2 Light 
W2- Darkness 
W3 Geographical terms 
W4 Weather  
W5 Green issues 
X1 Psychological Actions, States And Processes 
X2 Mental actions and processes 
X2.1 Thought, belief 
X2.1- Without thinking 
X2.2 Knowledge 
X2.2+ Knowledgeable 
X2.2- No knowledge 
X2.3 Learn 
X2.3+ Learning 
X2.4 Investigate, examine, test, search 
X2.4+ Double-check 
X2.4- Not examined 
X2.5 Understand 
X2.5+ Understanding 
X2.5- Not understanding 
X2.6 Expect 
X2.6+ Expected 
X2.6- Unexpected 
X3 Sensory 
X3.1 Sensory: Taste 
X3.1+ Tasty 
X3.1- Not tasty 
X3.2 Sensory: Sound 
X3.2+ Sound: Loud 
X3.2- Sound: Quiet 
X3.3 Sensory: Touch 
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X3.4 Sensory: Sight 
X3.4+ Seen 
X3.4- Unseen 
X3.5 Sensory: Smell 
X3.5- No smell 
X4 Mental object 
X4.1 Mental object: Conceptual object 
X4.1- Themeless 
X4.2 Mental object: Means, method 
X5 Attention 
X5.1 Attention 
X5.1+ Attentive 
X5.1- Inattentive 
X5.2 Interest/boredom/excited/energetic 
X5.2+ Interested/excited/energetic 
X5.2- Uninterested/bored/unenergetic 
X6 Deciding 
X6+ Decided 
X6- Undecided 
X7 Wanting; planning; choosing 
X7+ Wanted 
X7- Unwanted 
X8 Trying 
X8+ Trying hard 
X8- Not trying 
X9 Ability 
X9.1 Ability and intelligence 
X9.1+ Able/intelligent 
X9.1- Inability/unintelligence 
X9.2 Success and failure 
X9.2+ Success  
X9.2- Failure 
Y1 Science and technology in general 
Y1- Anti-scientific 
Y2 Information technology and computing 
Y2- Low-tech 
Z0 Unmatched proper noun 
Z1 Personal names 
Z2 Geographical names 
Z3 Other proper names 
Z4 Discourse Bin 
Z5 Grammatical bin 
Z6 Negative 
Z7 If 
Z7- Unconditional 
Z8 Pronouns 
Z9 Trash can 
Z99 Unmatched 
 
 
 
 
 
 
